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Preface
Cost accounting furnishes management with much of the input 
required in order that management may make proper decisions. Per­
haps one of the prime reasons that a business entity maintains a cost 
system is to provide some guidance for determining the adequacy 
of pricing and distribution policies.
The intelligent analysis of relevant cost data will go a long way 
toward determining the essence of profit planning—what to produce 
and what price to charge.
Cost analysis for pricing and distribution policies is the second 
effort in this series of technical studies in management services.
The contents of this technical study are divided into two sections: 
(1) textual material concerning the type of analysis covered by the 
study, and (2) four case studies describing engagements performed by 
CPAs in that area. All of the case studies are based on actual situations, 
although the names, locations, and, in some cases, minor details have 
been changed. In a few instances the figures also have been changed. 
Where this has been done, every effort has been made to avoid dis­
torting significant relationships.
Each case study consists of two parts: (1) a description of the 
client situation as it unfolded to the practitioner, and (2) a description 
of how the practitioner dealt with the situation. The cases are pre­
sented in this format to enable readers to use them as a self-teaching 
device.
Several questions are asked at the end of part one: questions re­
quiring quantitative analysis of the data in the case; questions about 
how the job should be approached; questions about fee estimates or 
man-day requirements; and so forth. It is suggested that the reader 
should plan to read part one carefully and prepare answers to the 
questions presented before proceeding to part two. Part two then 
provides an opportunity for the reader to compare his analysis with 
that prepared by the practitioner.
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Most management decisions do not have just one obviously right 
answer. Therefore, the reader’s solution to a case may frequently, and 
perhaps appropriately, differ from the approach taken by the practi­
tioner. Working through the series of cases over a period of several 
weeks the management services student should find increasing con­
fidence in his ability to size up a situation and devise an approach for 
dealing with the particular problem area discussed in this bulletin.
This is the second in a series of five technical studies prepared under 
the general supervision of Professor Richard F. Vancil, D.B.A., CPA, 
Harvard Business School. Assistance in the field research and case 
writing was provided by Dr. James S. Hekimian, Dr. Charles J. Chris­
tenson, Dr. David F. Hawkins, Dr. Robert C. Deming, Dr. Robert C. 
Hill, and L. Paul Berman.
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Cost Analysis for Pricing and 
Distribution Policies
As CPAs continue to increase the scope of management services 
offered to their clients, the practitioner’s ability to render competent 
advice on pricing policies and distribution costs becomes increasingly 
essential. Determining intelligent and profitable pricing policies is one 
of management’s more important responsibilities. As an advisor to 
management, the CPA is in a position to make a unique contribution 
to management’s analysis of pricing problems. This is a unique posi­
tion because the CPA (1) can frequently analyze the company and 
its environment in a more objective and dispassionate manner than 
management itself, (2) is intimately familiar with the cost structure 
and other characteristics of his client’s organization that relate to 
pricing problems, and (3) approaches the problem in a professional 
and analytical manner rather than relying on intuition as management 
frequently does in its pricing actions.
The purpose of this bulletin is to describe and illustrate the types 
of analyses that CPAs may be called upon to perform in the pricing 
area. First, this text will discuss some of the useful theoretical con­
cepts that are applicable in dealing with pricing problems; then, the 
series of case studies will illustrate the application of these concepts 
and some of the problems of applying them in actual situations.
The first bulletin in this series, Cost Analysis for Product Line De­
cisions, provides a useful introduction to pricing decisions. The first 
bulletin deals with the subject of cost behavior and prediction, and 
examines some of the problems that arise in determining a useful 
measure of product costs. The cost concepts developed in Bulletin 
No. 1 are helpful in an analysis of pricing problems. In particular, the
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concept of contribution to overhead, derived from an analysis of fixed 
and variable costs, is frequently useful in making pricing decisions.
Bulletin No. 1 deals with a fairly simple class of problems involving 
the determination of product costs in order to identify low-profit items 
and permit more effective utilization of existing facilities. In contrast, 
this bulletin is concerned with distribution costs and pricing policies, 
a somewhat more complex area because it involves not only the 
analysis of selling and promotional costs but also the analysis of 
changes in the price and quality of a product offered for sale.
COST-PRICE-VOLUME RELATIONSHIPS
Most discussions of price determination begin with the assumption 
that the characteristics of a product have already been determined. 
This is a crucial assumption, and one that will be explored in the third 
section of this text. This and the following section accepts this as­
sumption and thus restricts attention to the effect that prices and other 
demand creating costs have on profits.
A simple example involving a firm that manufactures only one 
product facilitates discussion. The Radnor Corporation, a manufac­
turer of household vacuum cleaners, had the following operating 
results for 1964.
Exhibit 1
RADNOR CORPORATION
Statement of Income 
For the Year Ended 1964
Total Amount Amount Per Unit
Sales (50,000 units) $2,000,000 $40.00
Cost of goods sold:
Materials $ 700,000 $14.00
Direct labor 500,000 10.00
Factory overhead 400,000 8.00
Total factory cost $1,600,000 $32.00
Manufacturing profit
Selling, general, and administrative
$ 400,000 $ 8.00
expenses 250,000 5.00
Profit before taxes $ 150,000 $ 3.00
2
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The importance of price in determining a company’s profitability is 
illustrated in Exhibit 1. In general, from that exhibit it is noted that 
there are three major ways in which price influences profitability:
1. Unit price has a direct effect on total revenue. In Radnor’s case, 
the sales revenue of $2,000,000 is a result of selling 50,000 units at $40 
each. Since the profit per unit is only $3, the company would have 
lost money for the year if it sold the 50,000 units below $37 each.
2. Selling price will influence the volume sold. The quantity sold 
is another factor which determines sales revenue, and for most prod­
ucts—particularly competitive ones—the quantity that can be sold is 
determined to some extent by the selling price.
3. Volume in turn will influence costs. Radnor’s total costs in 1964 
amounted to $1,850,000, but this figure would have been higher or 
lower depending on the number of units sold.
The interrelated variables (cost, price, and volume) are easier to 
consider if the conventional income statement is recast into a format 
which recognizes the differences between fixed and variable costs. 
Bulletin No. 1 describes the analytical techniques involved. The re­
sult of applying this analysis to the Radnor Corporation is illustrated 
in Exhibit 2.
Exhibit 2
RADNOR CORPORATION
Statement of Income 
For the Year Ended 1964
Total Amount Amount Per Unit
Sales (50,000 units) $2,000,000 $40.00
Variable costs
Materials
Direct labor
Variable overhead
$ 700,000 
500,000 
50,000
$14.00
10.00
1.00
Total variable costs $1,250,000 $25.00
Contribution to fixed costs and profit $ 750,000 $15.00
Fixed costs for factory overhead
Selling, general, and administrative
expenses 600,000
Profit before taxes $ 150,000
3
Exhibit 3
RADNOR CORPORATION 
Breakeven Chart
Thousands 
o f dollars
In this example, the total overhead costs for factory, selling, gen­
eral, and administrative expenses amount to $650,000, of which only 
$50,000 are identified as variable costs, resulting in a total variable 
cost of $25 per unit. One of the greatest advantages of a fixed-variable 
costs analysis is that it permits the determination of a contribution 
per unit—the difference between selling price and variable cost per 
unit. The contribution per unit of $15.00 incorporates two (price and 
cost) of the three profit factors mentioned above, thus making it much 
easier to observe the influence of volume on profits. In applying the 
contribution concept to the Radnor Corporation, this analysis shows 
that the company made a profit of $150,000 because it earned a con­
tribution of $15 per unit on 50,000 units, or $750,000. From this con­
tribution, Radnor Corporation must recover $600,000 of fixed costs,
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leaving a profit of $150,000. A change in price might influence the 
quantity sold and the total amount of variable costs, but not the 
variable cost per unit. These effects can be measured in terms of the 
total contribution earned.
A familiar way of presenting the results of a fixed-variable cost 
analysis is through the use of a breakeven chart as illustrated in 
Exhibit 3.
Units Produced and Sold
Given only the two facts that Radnor’s total fixed costs were 
$600,000 and the contribution per unit was $15, the Radnor Corpora­
tion’s breakeven point can also be determined by the following 
computation:
Fixed Costs
Breakeven Point =  -------- --------------------
Contribution per unit 
$600,000
Breakeven Point =  -----------
$15
Breakeven Point =  40,000 units
Radnor’s profit performance for 1964 is therefore a result of the 
10,000 units sold above the breakeven point of 40,000 units multiplied 
by the contribution of $15 on each unit for a total profit of $150,000. 
These several ways of analyzing cost, price, and volume deal with the 
same data and yield the same profit result in any given situation. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to have several alternative ways of consider­
ing a company’s profit structure.
Breakeven Point Analysis
The main reason that breakeven point analysis is so widely known 
is that it is an extremely useful pedagogical device for explaining 
the relationship between fixed and variable costs. More important, 
perhaps, breakeven point analysis has several practical advantages:
1. The concept is a simple one to comprehend. Many highly 
effective businessmen may be salesmen or may be production orien­
tated, but are not able to comfortably deal with accounting and 
statistical data. A great advantage of the breakeven point is that the 
uninitiated can easily grasp it in concrete terms. The danger is that 
managers may place more faith in the breakeven point than it de­
serves, thus overlooking the limitations listed in (A) and (B) below.
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2. The breakeven point is a useful diagnostic tool. Theoretically, 
knowing where a company’s breakeven point is is not relevant in an 
evaluation of alternative courses of action. Any specific action that 
management is considering should be evaluated in terms of its effect 
on the profits of the firm, and there is no logical reason why this 
evaluation should be influenced by whether or not the firm is oper­
ating at a loss. As a practical matter, however, a knowledge of where 
the breakeven point lies can be quite helpful to management in de­
termining the need for action. Businessmen are neither completely 
rational nor are they persistently logical. Certain desirable expendi­
tures (particularly programmed or managed costs such as advertising 
and promotion, preventive maintenance, and research and develop­
ment) are often incurred during a period of profitable operations, but 
are curtailed in opposite situations. To the theoretician, drastic re­
visions in the level of programmed costs may appear irrational, but to 
the businessman it is simply a matter of survival. Business manage­
ment involves more than making a series of discreet, optimal decisions. 
Data on which decisions are based are often hazy projections at best, 
and the wise manager employs the cautious test of overall profitability 
in determining whether or not a company can “afford” to undertake 
certain programs.
3. Breakeven analysis is a useful method for considering the risk 
implications of alternative actions. Careful quantitative analysis of 
alternatives is an extremely useful way of comparing the net effect on 
profitability of those factors which can be measured. Alternatives, 
however, involve not only different expected profits but also different 
degrees of risk—an elusive, almost unmeasurable factor that must be 
considered in reaching a final decision. One way that a businessman 
can approach the problem of risk evaluation is to observe the effects of 
the alternatives on his breakeven point. One alternative may lower 
the variable costs and thus widen the contribution per unit on sales, 
but only at the expense of incurring higher fixed costs. Another alter­
native might permit lower fixed costs but only through increasing 
variable costs and narrowing the contribution margin. The relative 
attractiveness of the two alternatives cannot be measured in terms of 
profit alone. The first alternative may be more profitable, although it 
entails more risk. Comparing alternatives in terms of their effect on 
the breakeven point of a firm is useful in making a decision.
4. Breakeven point analysis provides the basic data for further 
profit-improvement studies. This last point may be the most important
6
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advantage, even though it has nothing to do with the usefulness of 
preparing a breakeven chart. A breakeven chart cannot be prepared 
until the total costs of the firm have been broken into their fixed and 
variable components. Even though the resulting chart may be of 
little specific value, the detailed analytical data required are a useful 
starting point for subsequent investigations. Viewed in this way, a 
breakeven chart is not the end product of a fixed-variable cost anal­
ysis but merely a presentation of the revised cost data.
Against these advantages, two important limitations of breakeven 
point analysis should be noted:
A. The breakeven chart is a static measure of a dynamic process; 
that is, it is a picture of the cost and profit structure of a company at 
a given point in time. While it may present a true picture of a situa­
tion at a specific point in time, the chart may not be very useful for 
predicting what the situation will be like in future time periods. For 
example, the revenue line on a breakeven chart illustrates how the 
total sales revenue grows as the number of units sold increases. For 
example, Exhibit 3 (page 4) indicates that Radnor’s $2 million sales 
volume was the cumulative effect of selling 50,000 units, one-by-one, 
at a price of $40 each. However, there is usually a relationship between 
price and volume, and the chart does not recognize this relationship. 
It does not, for example, indicate what the effect would be of selling 
55,000 units at $38 each (although the effect of such a change could 
easily be measured by drawing another revenue line). The cost lines 
on a breakeven chart are also static; they show what the variable cost 
per unit and the total fixed costs were during one historical time pe­
riod. These lines do not necessarily predict what the cost will be in 
the future. Costs are almost sure to change either because of the un­
expected effects of changing volume or because of the planned action 
of management to improve profit results by spending more or less 
money for certain expenses.
B. The breakeven point is difficult to determine for multi-product 
firms. Few companies produce only a single product such as the 
Radnor Corporation. For multi-product firms, the breakeven point is 
hard to determine because the base line on the chart cannot be in 
terms of number of units. It must deal in terms of equivalent units 
(with some factor for converting units of one product into units of 
another) or in some measure of plant capacity such as direct labor 
hours. Further, different products earn different profits. The pin­
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pointing of a breakeven point must therefore assume some specific 
product mix. For a two-product firm it may be possible to measure 
the breakeven point in terms of the combined sales of both products, 
but the breakeven point would be lower if more of those sales were of 
a higher-profit item, or it would be higher if the product mix assump­
tion were weighted in favor of a lower-profit product. The product 
mix assumption is another example of the danger of using static, his­
torical analysis to extrapolate a future situation, particularly when the 
product mix is almost certain to change.
In summary, breakeven analysis is frequently a useful place to 
begin an examination of the cost-price-volume relationship of a par­
ticular company. For the CPA-advisor, a breakeven chart may be the 
first tangible product which can be shown to management as a result 
of his analysis. The ultimate value of this analytical tool depends 
primarily on how well management understands the assumptions 
built into the determination of the breakeven point, and the subse­
quent use that it makes of the detailed data in evaluating the alterna­
tive courses of action.
Contribution Pricing
The value of variable cost information for pricing purposes may be 
illustrated by observing the way that Radnor Corporation’s manage­
ment might evaluate an offer from an exporting firm to buy 5,000 units 
for shipment to South Africa at a price of $30 each. (The ordinary 
competitive considerations of upsetting the price structure in a do­
mestic market, and the potential legal problems of discriminatory 
pricing, may be ignored in this situation.) Radnor Corporation must 
decide to accept or reject the offer based primarily upon its effect on 
profitability. The cost data shown in the Income Statement in Exhibit 
1 (page 2) are not useful in evaluating such a proposal. Factory cost 
of $32 per unit is a mixture of both fixed and variable costs, and would 
be an inaccurate measure for predicting the cost of accepting the order. 
The variable cost data shown in Exhibit 2 (page 3), however, are in­
dicative of the effect of accepting the order.
Selling price of foreign order $ 30.00
Variable cost per unit 25.00
Contribution per unit $ 5.00
Total contribution (and increase
in net profit) on 5,000 units $25,000.00
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Profits would be increased by $25,000 with the special order because 
each of the 5,000 additional units earns a contribution of $5.00.
Pricing based on variable costs, sometimes called “contribution 
pricing,” has been widely discussed in accounting literature.1 The 
general theory of contribution pricing is that it will be more profitable 
for a firm to accept an order which yields a contribution than to reject 
the order. This theory is logical, and is also extremely simple to illus­
trate. However, this theory is difficult to apply in practice.
Perhaps the most common argument against contribution pricing is 
the equally irrefutable, and eminently practical, observation that if all 
products are priced to yield only a contribution to overhead, there may 
not be a sufficient profit margin to cover all of the fixed costs of the 
business. Stated in terms of a single product, the selling price must be 
higher than the total cost per unit if the company is to generate a 
profit. Both statements, the theoretical and the practical, are true; 
neither by itself is of much specific value in reaching a decision on a 
specific pricing action. For special order, such as Radnor’s sale to 
South Africa, contribution analysis is a valuable tool for handling the 
costs and revenues that would be affected by the decision. This simple 
analysis, however, does not reveal whether or not it would be wise for 
Radnor to hold out for a price of $31 or $32 per unit. Ways of dealing 
with this question, and other problems involved in pricing special 
orders or custom products, are discussed in the last section of this text.
The immediate concern of this section lies in the pricing of “proprie­
tary” products, products designed by the manufacturer and sold 
through traditional marketing channels. Suppose that the proposal 
that Radnor Corporation received had come from a wholesaler in one 
of its regular domestic markets—a proposal in the form of an implica­
tion that if Radnor did not wish to fill the order at the $30 price, the 
wholesaler would find another manufacturer who would accept the 
order. In terms of the economics of contribution analysis, this proposal 
is no different from the South Africa proposal. As a practical matter, 
however, the situation differs radically because the wholesaler’s pro­
posal strikes at the very roots of Radnor’s $40 domestic price. Al­
though the theory of contribution pricing is not inoperative in evalu­
ating the wholesaler’s proposal, it is much harder to apply in such 
situations. The difficulty arises not because of any weaknesses in 
theory, but because of the difficulty of taking into account all of the 
ramifications of granting a special price to one customer. First, such a
1 References 4 and 7 in the Bibliography discuss this subject at some length.
9
pricing action might be construed as a violation of the Robinson- 
Patman Act, or other legislation prohibiting discriminatory pricing. 
Even if the price concession took the form of a quantity discount that 
was made available to all large volume purchases, the new pricing 
policy could trigger a chain reaction of events. For example, other 
wholesalers and distributors may decide to bulk their purchases in 
order to qualify for the discount; Radnor’s competitors may feel 
compelled to meet Radnor’s lower price; at lower prices, consumers 
would probably buy more vacuum cleaners, if only because it would 
be relatively less attractive to hire repairmen to maintain their existing 
cleaners; and finally, Radnor’s plant capacity may prove to be inade­
quate to meet the requirements of an expanded market, with the 
result that additional facilities would have to be built. The net effect 
of this complex series of events would be extremely difficult to predict. 
The point is that a simple contribution analysis is not all inclusive in 
determining whether a special quantity discount policy should be 
initiated.
The value of contribution pricing as an analytical tool is no greater 
than the adequacy and validity of the predictions which must be made 
about the future. It is difficult to predict how competitors and con­
sumers will react to a price change. It is also difficult to predict what 
the variable costs of production will be in the future, particularly if 
the pricing action being considered requires a change in the quantity 
of productive facilities required. One of the dangers of contribution 
pricing is that it may not be explicit enough in requiring a considera­
tion of the important indirect effects that result from a pricing decision. 
One way to overcome this potential disadvantage is to use the clas­
sical approach (discussed below) of comparing marginal revenue to 
marginal costs.
The Price-Volume Relationship
After deciding to reject the South African order, Radnor’s manage­
ment decided to evaluate the advisability of reducing its price by $1.00 
per unit, which represents a price cut of 2 ½  per cent. After allowing 
for the possibility that some or all of their competitors will match the 
price reduction, Radnor’s executives believe that the lower price will 
be sufficiently attractive to consumers to increase Radnor’s volume by 
4 per cent to 52,000 units per year. The various ways that Radnor’s 
management analyzed this pricing action are described below.
The possibility of selling 2,000 additional units at a price of $39 
might appear attractive when compared to variable costs of $25 per
10
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unit. However, it must be recognized that it will not be possible to 
grant the price reduction solely to new customers. Existing customers 
will also share in the lower price. Exhibit 4 summarizes the relevant 
figures in terms of cost and revenue per unit.
Exhibit 4
RADNOR CORPORATION 
Marginal Analysis of a One Dollar Price Reduction
Marginal revenue
Revenue at a $40 price (50,000 units) $2,000,000
Revenue at a $39 price (52,000 units) 2,028,000
Added revenue $ 28,000
$28,000 additional revenue
Average marginal revenue: --------------------------------------  =  $14
2,000 additional units
Marginal cost — Variable cost (from Exhibit 2) $25
Although the price cut will increase sales revenue by $28,000, this 
amounts to only $14 per unit on the additional 2,000 units sold. The 
increase in revenue, when compared to variable costs of $25, indicates 
that the price reduction would not increase Radnor’s profits.
In reaching this conclusion, a careful analysis of variable costs and 
the effect that a 4 per cent volume change might have on the utiliza­
tion of productive facilities must be made. As noted in Bulletin No. 1, 
labor costs are not always strictly variable. Possibly, Radnor’s existing 
labor force could generate a small increase in production without a 
proportional rise in costs. On the other hand, at some point the in­
crease in production costs might be more than proportionate because 
of the necessity of adding increments to certain fixed elements of 
expense in the plant.
At this point the primary concern is the effect of the pricing action 
on revenue. The $28,000 increase is the net effect of two opposing 
forces:
Revenue from added sales: 2,000 units @ $39 $78,000
Less: loss in sales revenue on existing volume
50,000 units sold for $1 per unit less 50,000
Net increase in revenue $28,000
Since the net additional revenue is inadequate to cover marginal 
costs, the price reduction should not be implemented. In terms of
11
classical economic theory, the optimal price is the price at which 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost; that is, neither a price reduc­
tion nor a price increase would yield an average marginal revenue 
higher than marginal cost.2 A lower price for Radnor yields no profit 
improvement, but suggests that the company explore the effect of a 
small price increase.
Analyzing the expected effects of a potential price change in terms 
of marginal revenue has the important advantage of forcing an 
explicit consideration of the change in volume that will occur as a 
result of the price change. The price-volume relationship (the 
“demand function”) is the most critical factor to weigh in evaluating 
a pricing decision. Making such an estimate is frequently difficult, 
and an alternative approach is to determine the breakeven volume 
that will be necessary if the company is to earn the same amount of 
profit at the new price as it earned at the old price. In Radnor’s case, 
the company earns a $750,000 contribution at a $40 price. If the price 
were cut to $39, the contribution per unit would be $14.3 The company
would then have to sell 53,571 units $750,000 total contribution 
$14 contribution per unit
in order to earn the same profit. It might be difficult for Radnor’s 
executives to specify just what the effect of a 2½  per cent price cut 
would be, but they might find it easier to make a decision if they 
realized that such a price cut could increase profits only if it resulted 
in an increase in volume of more than 7 per cent.
Summary
Changing the price of a proprietary product is a subject that has 
received a great deal of attention both from theoretical economists 
and practical businessmen. The reason for this attention is obvious: 
Management’s pricing actions on such products have an appealingly 
direct impact on profits. But the impact is not always favorable, and 
the results of a price change may be so difficult to predict that pricing 
decisions are one of the most risky types of decisions that manage­
ment may be called upon to make. Careful cost analysis is a manda­
2 The reader wishing to review his knowledge on economic theory is 
referred to item 6 in the Bibliography.
3 This $14 is the $15 shown in Exhibit 2, reduced by the $1 price cut; it 
is only coincidental that the marginal revenue in Exhibit 4 was also $14.
12
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tory step in evaluating pricing actions, but the problem of predicting 
the price-volume relationship still remains. Because of the risk and 
difficulty in initiating intelligent price changes, many businesses, par­
ticularly smaller businesses, try to avoid direct pricing actions as a 
form of competition in the sale of proprietary products or services. 
Competition today takes the less direct forms of customer service, 
advertising and promotion, and product design. As the discussion 
of these topics in the next two sections will illustrate, the type of 
economic analysis that is essential for intelligent decision making in 
these areas is quite similar to that illustrated above in the evaluation 
of direct pricing actions.
DISTRIBUTION COSTS
The critical importance of the effective management of selling and 
distribution costs in a successful business requires little documenta­
tion. The fact that businesses in the United States spend $13 billion 
a year on advertising is fairly conclusive evidence that many business­
men believe these expenditures are justified in improving the profit­
ability of their companies. But how does a company decide how 
much to spend on advertising? To some extent, as with direct pricing 
actions, decisions regarding advertising expenditures are influenced 
by the competitive situation; a cigarette manufacturer who did no 
advertising might never be able to build a market for his product. 
But the variation in the practices of individual competitors is much 
greater in the area of advertising expenditures than in the area of 
product prices. One company might spend significantly more or less 
for advertising than one of its competitors; although it is almost im­
possible to justify this difference and to observe its impact on corpo­
rate profits.
Theoretically, of course, it is possible to determine with great 
precision the optimal amount that a company should spend for its 
advertising. The advertising budget should be increased to the point 
where the last dollar spent will sell just enough additional units 
to produce an additional contribution of $1; that is, marginal revenue 
will equal marginal cost. The fact that this convenient rule is not 
widely used in evaluating advertising expenditures is not due to 
ignorance on the part of advertising executives. It is due to the im­
possibility of getting precise measurements of the effectiveness of 
most advertising expenditures.
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Despite these problems, the degree of sophistication in the manage­
ment of distribution costs is rapidly increasing. Although the analyt­
ical tools to be used may never be applied with the same precision 
as in the management of manufacturing costs, the value of better 
decisions is just as important in one area as it is in the other. The 
CPA who acts as an advisor to management is expected to bring a 
high level of technical skill to the analysis of manufacturing costs. 
But the need for analytical skill may be even greater in the distribu­
tion cost area, and the CPA should not retreat from this challenging 
problem simply because less precision is possible. Competent, pro­
fessional analysis may be of great help to management in this area by 
narrowing the range of feasible alternatives, and by focusing manage­
ment’s attention on the critical factors that influence their decisions. 
The professional advisor who can do no more than this still has 
contributed greatly.
Types of Demand-Creating Costs
Using a term such as “demand-creating costs” rather than “distribu­
tion costs” permits a broader definition of the costs considered to be 
relevant for management analysis and action. Demand-creating costs 
include all the traditional distribution costs such as salesmen’s salaries 
and commissions, advertising and promotional expenses, samples and 
premiums, entertainment, and so forth. However, another group of 
costs, frequently of greater importance, may not appear on the Income 
Statement at all: the costs (and profits) charged by wholesalers, 
distributors, and retailers for performing the function of selling the 
product to the ultimate consumer.
An example of the magnitude of a company’s demand-creating 
cost can be illustrated in terms of the Radnor Corporation. The 
Radnor Corporation’s expenditures for selling, general, and adminis­
trative expenses amounted to $250,000 in 1964. This consists of 
$150,000 of selling and promotional costs and $100,000 of plant over­
head and other fixed costs. Radnor’s distribution network involves 
selling vacuum cleaners to wholesalers for $40. Wholesalers, in turn, 
sell to retailers at a price of $47, and retailers typically charge con­
sumers a price of $80. Thus, the retail value of Radnor’s sales is $4 
million, of which $2,150,000 is “spent” for demand-creating costs. It 
is easy to overlook the $2 million in distribution margins paid by this 
company on the grounds that Radnor’s management has no control 
over prices charged by wholesalers and retailers, that Radnor Cor­
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poration is a manufacturer and that its customers are the wholesalers. 
Such statements are true in terms of the way the company currently 
markets its products, but blind acceptance of the status quo is not 
the most suitable way to begin an analysis of distribution costs. For 
example, one of Radnor’s more successful competitors, the Electrolux 
Corporation, receives the full retail price on its sales by distributing 
the product through company employed door-to-door salesmen. The 
management of Electrolux recognizes that demand-creating costs are 
its greatest area of expense; why should Radnor’s management not 
admit that the same situation exists?
Viewed in this manner, marketing and distribution costs become 
more important than manufacturing costs for many businesses. As 
with manufacturing costs, some demand-creating costs are fixed over 
wide ranges of volume while others are variable, depending upon 
the quantity of product sold. In the case of the Radnor Corporation, 
the fixed costs amount to $150,000 per year while the variable costs 
amount to $40 per unit. The question that management must ask 
itself about these costs is the same question asked in the more techni­
cal area of manufacturing costs: Are these costs being spent in an 
efficient manner which yields more than a dollar of contribution for 
each dollar of cost incurred?
The Cost-Volume Relationship
As the above question implies, a useful way to approach the 
analysis of demand-creating costs is in terms of the impact on profits 
that would result from changing certain elements of expense. The 
Radnor Corporation serves as an example (Exhibit 2) to explore the 
three general kinds of action that management might undertake to 
improve profits through better utilization of its demand-creating 
expenditures.
Changes in programmed costs. One way that Radnor might improve 
its profitability would be to change the level of fixed costs incurred 
by the company. Actually, the costs incurred for salesmen’s salaries, 
advertising, and so forth, are not irrevocably fixed; rather, they are 
controlled, or programmed, by management decision. One action that 
Radnor’s management might take would be to increase its advertising 
expenditures with the expectation that the resulting increase in 
volume would fully cover the additional costs involved. An analysis 
of the profit effects of this action is shown in Exhibit 5 (page 16).
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Exhibit 5
RADNOR CORPORATION
Effect of Increased Programmed Costs
1. Assumptions: A $50,000 advertising campaign would result in the sale 
of 5,000 additional units at the regular price of $40.
2. Contribution Analysis:
Additional contribution (50,000 units at $15 each) $75,000
Additional programmed costs 50,000
Net increase in contribution and profit $25,000
3. Breakeven Point Analysis:
a. Effect on company breakeven point
Total fixed costs $600,000 plus $50,000 =  $650,000 
Contribution per unit (no change) $15
$650,000 total
Breakeven point  ----------- =  43,333 units$15 per unit
b. Additional volume required to 
breakeven on this proposal 
$50,000 added costs
$15 contribution per unit 3,333 units
The wisdom of an increased advertising expenditure is determined 
by (1) the additional volume generated, and (2) the contribution 
per unit on the additional volume. If Radnor assumes that a $50,000 
expenditure would result in the sale of 5,000 additional units, the 
campaign would produce a profit increase of $25,000. In terms of 
the company’s breakeven point, 3,333 additional units would have to 
be sold in order to cover the costs of the campaign. Management 
should not initiate the campaign unless it believes that such a new 
volume can be obtained.
Changing variable costs. As an alternative proposal, Radnor’s man­
agement might consider a change in its variable costs. There are 
many ways to do this, but the proposal analyzed in Exhibit 6 
assumes that the company would give its retailers an advertising 
allowance of $1 per unit sold.
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Exhibit 6
RADNOR CORPORATION
Effect of Increased Variable Costs
1. Assumptions: An “advertising allowance” of $1 per unit, given direct to 
retail dealers, would result in the sale of 5,000 additional units at the 
regular price of $40.
2. Contribution Analysis:
New contribution per unit of $14 ($40 less $26)
times 55,000 units $770,000
Old contribution per unit of $15
times 50,000 units 750,000
Net increase in contribution and profit $ 20,000
3. Breakeven Point Analysis:
a. Effect on company breakeven point
Total fixed costs (no change) $600,000
Contribution per unit ($40 less $26) $14
$600,000 total
Breakeven point   -----------—  42,857 units$14 per unit
b. Additional volume required to breakeven
on this proposal
Units required to earn $750,000 contribu­
tion at $14 per unit $750,000
 $14
=  53,571
Units required to earn $750,000 contribu­
tion currently (at $15 each) 50,000
Number of new units required to earn the 
same profit 3,571
Superficially, the cost of this program appears to be the same as that 
of the advertising campaign because the advertising allowance would 
also amount to $50,000 based on the volume sold in 1964. As Exhibit 
6 shows, however, the economics work out differently for this 
proposal.
If the advertising allowance to dealers produces an additional 
volume of 5,000 units, the profits of the company would be increased
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by $20,000. Again, the breakeven analysis is a useful way to put the 
problem into perspective. Initiating an advertising allowance would 
increase Radnor’s breakeven point, although not quite as much as 
a $50,000 advertising campaign. In this sense, the advertising allow­
ance involves less risk because it increases the variable costs rather 
than the fixed costs. On the other hand, Radnor would have to sell 
a few more units under the advertising allowance program in order 
to make the same profit as it made in 1964.
Which of these two proposals is the more attractive? Certainly 
the analyses shown in Exhibits 5 and 6 (pages 16 and 17) do not pro­
vide a precise answer. Management’s decision must be based on more 
than a careful examination of the cost-volume relationships of the two 
proposals. An effective advertising campaign, for example, may create 
additional sales revenue, and also create longer lasting effects by estab­
lishing the company’s brand name more firmly in the minds of con­
sumers. The advertising allowance program, on the other hand, may 
endear Radnor Corporation to its retailers with resulting beneficial side 
effects that cannot be measured in terms of sales volume alone. The 
final decision, would, no doubt, be highly subjective, but the analyses 
shown in Exhibit 5 and 6 would be of value to management as it 
approaches this difficult decision.
Trade-offs of fixed and variable costs. Another way of improving 
the efficiency of demand-creating expenditures is to substitute fixed 
costs for variable costs, or vice versa. For example, Radnor might 
consider the advisability of using company-owned branch offices 
instead of wholesale distributors. The analysis shown in Exhibit 7 
(page 19) assumes that the branch offices would entail an annual fixed 
cost of $250,000, plus variable costs of $1 per unit sold, but that the 
company would be able to avoid “paying” the mark-up of $7 per unit 
which its wholesalers now receive.
As the analysis indicates, this proposal seems attractive. At exist­
ing volume levels, the company would earn an additional profit of 
$50,000 per year. The project has Only a negligible effect on the 
company’s breakeven point; in fact, the total volume sold could 
decline by 2,381 units without decreasing the company’s profit below 
the level realized in 1964.
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Exhibit 7
RADNOR CORPORATION 
Effect of Substituting Fixed Costs for Variable Costs
1. Assumptions: A group of company-owned branch offices could be 
established to replace the existing independent wholesale distributors. 
Vacuum cleaners could be sold direct to retailers for $47 (the same 
price wholesalers now charge). The branch offices would cost $250,000 
per year for fixed expenses, plus $1 per unit sold.
2. Contribution Analysis:
New distribution system:
Contribution per unit ($47 less $26) =  $21
Total contribution on 50,000 units $1,050,000
Less fixed costs ($600,000 plus $250,000) 850,000
Profit before taxes $ 200,000
Old distribution system:
Profit before taxes 150,000
Net increase in profit $ 50,000
3. Breakeven Point Analysis:
a. Effect on company breakeven point:
Total fixed costs ($600,000 plus $250,000) $ 850,000
Contribution per unit ($47 less $26) $ 21
$850,000 40,476
Breakeven point $21 per unit units
b. Additional volume required to break even on 
this proposal:
New units required to earn contribution of $150,000 in
excess of fixed costs =  $850,000 +  $150,000 =  47,619$21 per unit
Old units required to earn contribution of $150,000 in
  $600,000 +  $150,000  
excess of fixed costs =  ----------------—--------  =50,00
$15 per unit units
Volume reduction possible without suffering loss of 
profit (2,381)
units
The interesting aspect of this proposal is that it assumes that there 
will be no change in the number of units sold. Such an assumption
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might be valid, but if the existing distributors are well entrenched 
there might be a temporary loss in volume. In addition, this proposal 
involves substantial risks about the accuracy of the cost estimates. 
Establishment of a series of branch offices involves more than merely 
spending money. New personnel to staff the branch offices must be 
found and trained. The program could not be accomplished over­
night, and during the interim period the existing wholesalers might 
lose interest in selling Radnor’s product. Furthermore, if all of these 
hidden costs were taken into account, the proposal might be rejected. 
However, the proposal could make a good long-term objective for 
the company. Once again, quantitative analysis in the distribution 
cost area is rarely conclusive.
Summary
The efficient utilization of expenditures intended to stimulate 
product demand is a subject of increasing importance for manage­
ment. While direct pricing actions are an obvious form of competition, 
such actions may be extremely hazardous. Nonprice methods of 
competition, including advertising and promotion, salesmen’s com­
pensation, channels of distribution, and all the other aspects of a 
company’s “marketing mix,” can also be effective ways to improve 
profits. The above analyses illustrate that the analytical techniques 
appropriate for evaluating either price or cost changes are virtually 
identical; in order to evaluate either type of change, it is necessary 
to explicitly estimate the effect that the change will have on volume. 
Holding the selling price at a constant (or competitive) level does 
not actually simplify the analytical problem; the inexorable profit 
equation described by the interrelationship of costs, prices, and vol­
ume must still be solved.
Discussion of “demand-creating” costs has encompassed a rather 
broad group of business expenditures. However, the most significant 
factor in the creation of demand, the product itself, has been ignored. 
This is the subject of the next section.
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PRODUCT DESIGN AND 
ITS RELATIONSHIP TO DEMAND
One important class of product pricing problems frequently cannot 
be solved by even the most sophisticated cost analysis. A broader 
view of the problem may indicate that the trouble is not in an in­
efficient manufacturing process, but in a product design that is not 
closely tailored to the market being sought. The best example of 
the importance of product design is probably the automobile industry, 
in which a manufacturer first selects a price category in which the 
car will compete, and then designs a product which can be produced 
to yield a profit at the “target price.” The theoretical solution to this 
problem is essentially the same as the solution previously described 
for products in which the characteristics of the product were fixed 
and the price was the controllable variable which would determine 
the volume sold. For products designed to meet a target price, how­
ever, product costs become the controllable variable, based on the 
assumption that the greater the value of the product, the greater the 
demand will be. The analyst working on a pricing problem should 
carefully consider management’s ability to vary the design of its 
product as a way to influence demand and improve profitability.
As with product design, the quality of a product can have a 
significant influence on product costs and on the demand for the 
product in the marketplace. The illusive nature of cost classifications 
is illustrated as follows. No one would disagree that the cost of a 
steering wheel is a part of the “product cost” of a car, or that advertis­
ing is a “demand-creating” cost; but what about the chrome-plated 
horn ring on the steering wheel? And how should the cost of the 
horn ring be classified if management decides to use stainless steel 
rather than chrome? While there are many situations in which factors 
of design and quality are largely controlled by the marketplace, the 
analyst should be aware that there are also many situations in which 
these two factors may be even more important than price in determin­
ing the profitability of a given product.
Viewed in this manner, product design, which includes the elements
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of style, quality, and quantity, is actually another major form of non­
price competition. There are few competitive products that are 
absolutely identical. Most manufacturers will endeavor to differentiate 
their product one way or another. Some differences may be only 
negligible (style or finishing differences), while others may be of a 
more substantial nature. The important matter is that these product 
differences, which often involve differences in the cost of creating 
the product, are not always reflected in the price charged to the 
consumer. Thus product cost, which is an important element in the 
cost-price-volume relationship, is adaptable to the same type of 
analysis illustrated previously for product price and distribution costs.
The Marginal Cost of Design Changes
The analysis of product costs can be illustrated by the example 
of the Radnor Corporation. Radnor’s management is considering the 
advisability of approving a change in the product design which would 
result in increased variable costs of $1 per unit. If the change were 
adopted, Radnor would not increase its price; but it would expect 
that the higher quality product would find better market acceptance 
and that an additional 2,000 units per year could be sold. Exhibit 8 
(page 23) analyzes the profitability of this proposal.
Exhibit 8 requires no explanation, although two points should be 
noted. First, there is an analogy between the calculation of marginal 
cost in this example and the calculation of marginal revenue for the 
proposed price change analyzed in Exhibit 4 (page 11). The design 
change cannot be incorporated only into the additional 2,000 units that 
will be sold; the extra $1 per unit must also be spent on the present 
volume of 50,000 units. Thus, the marginal cost of the additional 2,000 
units is not simply the $25 of variable costs shown in Exhibit 2 (page 
3) plus an additional $1 for the design modification. Rather, the 
marginal cost is $51: $26 per unit because the entire $52,000 cost of 
the design modification must be charged against the 2,000 additional 
units which may be sold, plus the regular $25 per unit manufacturing 
costs for those 2,000 units. As shown in Exhibit 8, this design modifica­
tion would not be profitable for Radnor.
The second interesting thing to note from Exhibit 8 is that the 
analysis there is similar in almost every respect to the analyses of 
previous proposals in Exhibits 4 and 6 (see pages 11 and 17, respec­
tively). Superficially, these three proposals are radically different: The 
first involves a price reduction of $1 per unit; the second increases
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Radnor’s distribution costs by granting retail dealers an advertising 
allowance of $1 per unit; and the third involves a $1 per unit increase 
in the direct m anufacturing costs of the product. However, each of 
these proposals is essentially the same; Radnor proposes to reduce its 
contribution per unit by $1 w ith the expectation that the resulting in­
crease in volume will improve the company’s profitability. Each of 
these proposals has the same effect on Radnor’s breakeven point, and 
each requires the same increase in volume in order for Radnor to earn 
the same amount of profit it earned in 1964. Although it would be 
possible for Radnor’s m anagem ent to adopt all three proposals at the 
same time, m anagem ent m ight (appropriately) consider that such a
Exhibit 8
RADNOR CORPORATION
Effect of a Design Change Involving Higher Variable Costs
1. Assumptions: A design modification resulting in substantially higher 
product quality could be incorporated into the existing model, increas­
ing variable costs by $1 per unit. Better consumer acceptance would 
result in additional sales of 2,000 units per year.
2. Contribution Analysis:
New contribution per unit of $14 ($40 less $26) 
times 52,000 units $728,000
Old contribution per unit of $15 times 50,000 units 750,000
Net decrease in contribution and profit $(22,000)
3. Breakeven Point Analysis:
a. Effect on company breakeven point
Total fixed costs (no change) $600,000
Contribution per unit ($40 less $26) $ 14
$600,000 total
Breakeven point    $14 per unit
42,857 units
b. Additional volume required to break even on this
proposal
Units required to earn $750,000 contribution at
$14 per unit  $750,000 $14
53,571
Units required to earn $750,000 contribution cur­
rently (at $15 each) 50,000
Number of new units required to earn the same 
profit 3,571 units
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radical shift in its cost-price-volume structure would be an undesirable 
risk. But analysis of the three proposals in a consistent manner might 
make it much easier for Radnor’s management to select the one that 
was most likely to succeed in terms of realizing the greatest volume 
increase.
The Cost-Price Relationship
Differences in product design and product costs are frequently 
passed on to the consumer in the form of price differentials. In fact, 
the Sears Roebuck and Company catalog is a veritable textbook on 
the economics of pricing product design differentials. Sears’ policy 
is to offer “good,” “better,” and “best” items in many of its product 
categories. The design features of each product are described in 
great detail so that the careful, rational buyer may select the price- 
design combination that best suits his needs. It is worthwhile to 
reflect how difficult it must be for Sears to price these items in such 
a way as to yield the greatest profit for the company.
Such pricing decisions are really just another exercise in the analysis 
of cost-price-volume relationships. The Radnor Corporation will serve 
to illustrate the point. The engineering department has proposed that 
a new feature be added to Radnor’s vacuum cleaner. Research and 
development necessary to refine the idea into a workable feature and 
to re-tool the production line will cost $100,000. The modified prod­
uct (incorporating the feature) will not cost any more to manufac­
ture. Radnor would not be able to patent the idea; thus its manage­
ment expects that their competitors will also adopt the feature within 
a year. The advantage in developing the idea is that during the year 
before its competitors perfect the same innovation, Radnor’s product 
would be unique; thus the company may (1) either charge a higher 
price, (2) sell more units, or (3) some combination of the two. Exhibit 
9 (page 25) analyzes this proposal with the assumption that this prod­
uct advantage would be reaped in the form of a small price increase to 
$41 per unit plus a volume increase to 52,000 units.
Using these assumptions, the proposed new feature does not appear 
profitable. But knowing the company’s fixed and variable cost struc­
ture makes it a simple matter to evaluate alternative ways of using 
this product innovation. For example, Radnor’s management might 
find it useful to try to “price out” the value of this new feature to a 
consumer. Would the consumer be willing to pay 5 per cent more 
for a vacuum cleaner incorporating this feature? If so, Radnor could
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Exhibit 9
RADNOR CORPORATION 
Effect of Adding a New Feature to the Product
1. Assumptions: The engineering department has an idea for a new prod­
uct feature. It will cost $100,000 to develop the idea and re-tool the 
production line, but the modified product (incorporating the feature) 
will not cost any more to manufacture. Competitors will probably copy 
the feature within a year. During that year a rise in price to $41 per 
unit and an increase of 2,000 extra units is expected.
2. Contribution Analysis:
With new feature:
Contribution per unit ($41 less $25) =  $16
Total contribution on 52,000 units $832,000
Less fixed costs ($600,000 plus $100,000 ) 700,000
Profit before taxes $132,000
Without new feature:
Profit before taxes 150,000
Net decrease in profit
3. Breakeven Point Analysis:
a. Effect on company breakeven point
Total fixed costs ($600,000 plus $100,000)
Contribution per unit ($41 less $25)
    $700,000 totalBreakeven point  ------------------------
$16 per unit
b. Additional volume required to break even
on the proposal:
Number of new units required to earn 
 $850,000 total 
$700,000
$16
$ 18,000
43,750 units
$150,000
 $16 per unit 
Number of old units required to earn
53,125 units
$150,000 $750,000 total 
$15 per unit
50,000 units 
3,125 units
raise its price to $42 and pay for the cost of developing the new 
feature without requiring any increase in volume. In effect, $42 is a 
breakeven price for this feature; it is the price that Radnor would 
have to receive in order to breakeven on the development of the 
feature without benefiting from any increase in volume. On the other 
hand, Radnor could hold its price at $40 and attempt to capitalize
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on the feature through a substantial volume increase. In any event, 
the proposal is a risk because the $100,000 for development must 
be spent against only an expectation that the feature will be suf­
ficiently attractive to consumers to permit Radnor to recover its costs. 
As in almost every such analysis, the prime value of the figure work 
is in helping management obtain a better grasp on the profit require­
ments and risks that the proposal entails.
Summary
Discussion thus far has been restricted to pricing and profitability 
analyses of proprietary manufactured products, products for which the 
manufacturer determines the product specifications, marketing 
methods, and price which he will use in competing against similar 
products offered by other manufacturers. This discussion is also 
applicable to certain types of service industries. A retail laundry 
service, for example, is analogous in many respects to a proprietary 
manufacturer. Prices for certain high-volume items such as men’s dress 
shirts may be established rather rigidly by local competition. Product 
(service) differentials may be difficult to achieve, but such factors 
as the quality of laundering, one-day service, free pickup and delivery, 
and so forth, may involve cost differentials that can be justified only 
in terms of the cost-volume relationship. As with a manufacturer, 
useful profitability analyses for a service activity can be made only 
after a careful investigation and classification of fixed and variable 
costs.
Through a series of simple examples, the pervasive importance of 
the inter-relationship between costs, prices, and volume has been 
illustrated. Competition for the profitable manufacture and distribu­
tion of proprietary products and services takes many forms. The CPA 
whose client says to him that he “has a pricing problem” cannot ac­
cept the client’s diagnosis. A CPA can help management to improve 
product profitability only after a careful analysis of all three factors 
in the profit equation.
PRICING CUSTOM PRODUCTS AND SPECIAL ORDERS
In contrast to the complex analysis that is almost unavoidable in 
pricing proprietary products, there is one important class of problems
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in which the price of the product is the single most important vari­
able. Competitive bidding is the most common example of this type 
of pricing problem, but stated in more general terms, price assumes 
paramount importance in any situation in which the customer specifies 
the product characteristics (quantity and quality) and the major ser­
vice requirements (delivery time). This definition is intended to be 
broad enough to cover not only custom products, such as those pro­
duced by machine shops, job printers, and building contractors, but 
also to include special orders for proprietary products, such as Radnor’s 
opportunity to sell their vacuum cleaners in South Africa, in which 
the price quoted is the major factor in determining whether or not 
the order is received.
The determination of product price is more important for custom 
products than for proprietary products for at least two reasons. First, 
because custom products are not standardized, management itself 
must arrive at a new price for each product; prices cannot be set 
simply by meeting the price offered by competitors for similar prod­
ucts, because the competitor’s prices are not known. Second, price 
is the most important method of competition in the manufacture of 
custom products; competing by means of extremely effective distribu­
tion policies or through product differentiation is impossible because 
the physical characteristics and service requirements for the product 
are specified by the customer. Similarly, manufacturing costs of cus­
tom products are primarily determined by the customer, not by 
management. With one element of the cost-price-volume equation 
thus determined, management’s primary tool for influencing profit­
ability is through its manipulation of the price-volume relationship.
Another important characteristic of pricing custom products is the 
frequency with which such decisions must be made. A small machine 
shop or job printer, for example, may find it necessary to prepare a 
dozen or more price quotations every day, and the sheer volume of 
work precludes the possibility of making a detailed analysis before 
reaching each decision. Instead, pricing policies, or bidding formulas, 
are established as a way of routinizing the task of determination. 
The discussion below, therefore, is divided into two parts. The first 
part deals with the type of analysis that would be theoretically appro­
priate for the determination of optim al prices for custom products, 
and the second part deals with the practical problems of establishing 
pricing policies which may be used to arrive at individual pricing 
decisions with a minimum amount of analysis.
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Competitive Bids
In order to illustrate theoretically the proper way to determine a 
competitive bid, a simple example of a small, job-order machine shop 
will be utilized. The Robinson Company employs half a dozen 
machinists who use general-purpose equipment to turn out small 
metal parts according to customer specifications. A potential customer 
has asked Robinson to quote a price for manufacturing 30 steel pipe- 
fittings of a unique design, as specified by the blueprint submitted. 
What price should Robinson quote?
Contribution pricing. It is a fairly simple matter to determine the 
minimum price that Robinson should charge for this order: The price 
must exceed the variable costs that would be incurred in manufactur­
ing the parts. Thus, as in most types of pricing decisions, the first 
step involves cost analysis. By examining the blueprint, Mr. Robinson 
determines that the fittings will require $10.25 worth of raw materials 
and that the machining will take about 1½  hours. The wage rate 
( including payroll taxes) for the machinist is $2.50 per hour, indicat­
ing a total labor cost of $3.75 and a total variable cost for labor and 
materials of $14 per unit. Frequently, labor costs are relatively fixed 
expenses because of the difficulty of hiring and firing skilled workers, 
but in Mr. Robinson’s case one of his machinists is employed on a 
part-time basis as needed.
As in the case of the Radnor Corporation’s South African order, it 
is easy to prove that at any price exceeding $14 the Robinson Company 
would be better off (more profitable) with this order than without it, 
if the capacity could not be used more profitably on other jobs. A 
price of $15, for example, would contribute $1 to overhead and profit 
that the company would not otherwise receive. But it is also obvious 
that Robinson would be better off having this order at a price of $16 
than at $15. The question that Mr. Robinson must answer is not, 
“What is the minimum price?” but rather, “What is the most profitable 
price to charge?” While this latter question is very difficult to answer, 
it is unfortunately true that finding an answer to the first, easier ques­
tion is not very helpful. In the Robinson Company, as in most com­
panies, variable costs are usually substantially lower than selling 
prices. While variable costs are important, they are only one element 
in the determination of a profitable price.
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The price-volume relationship. What is the most profitable price 
for Robinson to quote on this order? The answer, of course, is the 
highest possible price (above $14) that would still be successful in 
getting the order. A $30 price would be much more profitable than a 
$20 price, but Mr. Robinson knows that one of his competitors would 
almost surely bid less than $30. Thus a price quotation of $30 would 
yield no profit at all because Mr. Robinson would lose the order. In 
theory, nevertheless, the solution to Mr. Robinson’s complex problem 
is quite analogous to the solution found earlier for the manufacture 
of a proprietary product: The most profitable price is the price that 
yields the largest total contribution to overhead and profit. For the 
proprietary manufacturer, this means setting a price at which the 
contribution per unit times the number of units that can be sold at 
that price yields a larger total contribution than any other combination 
of contribution and volume. For the manufacturer of a custom product 
like the Robinson Company, the best price is that price at which the 
contribution per order received times the number of orders received 
yields more total dollars of contribution than any other combination 
of contribution and volume. The important distinction between these 
two types of manufacturers is that the price-volume relationship is 
much more explicit for standardized products. The proprietary manu­
facturer who raises his price by 3 per cent may see his volume fall by 
5 per cent, but the custom product manufacturer who raises his price 
by 3 per cent will either win the order at a more profitable price or 
lose it completely. Analyzing the effect of the price-volume relation­
ship for a custom producer, therefore, requires the utilization of the 
analytical technique described below.
The concept of expected profit. One way of developing the price- 
volume relationship on custom orders is to make explicit estimates of 
the likelihood of winning the order at any given price. For example, 
Mr. Robinson might believe that he is “almost certain” to receive the 
order for the steel fittings if he quotes a price of $16. If the Robinson 
Company wins the order at a price of $16, it will earn a contribution 
of $2; if it loses the order, it will earn no contribution. In Exhibit 10 
(page 30) we have taken a weighted average of these two possibilities 
on the assumption that there is a 95 per cent chance that the $16 price 
would be successful.
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Exhibit 10
ROBINSON COMPANY
Evaluation of $16.00 Bid
Probability Contribution at
Event of Event a $16 Price Expected Profit
Win the order .95 $2.00 $1.90
Lose the order .05 0 0
Totals 1.00 $1.90
The “expected profit” of $1.90 at this price is not very meaningful 
by itself, but it assumes added meaning when that profit is compared 
with the profit expected at higher prices. Mr. Robinson knows that, 
as he raises his price, the chances of his getting the order decline. The 
CPA might ask Robinson to be explicit about what he thought his 
chances would be at a variety of higher prices. Exhibit 11 then per­
mits a profit comparison of the alternative bids.
Exhibit 11
ROBINSON COMPANY 
Evaluation of Alternative Bids
Probability of
Price Getting the Order Contribution Expected Profit
$16.00 .95 $2.00 $1.90
17.00 .75 3.00 2.25
18.00 .60 4.00 2.40
19.00 .50 5.00 2.50
20.00 .40 6.00 2.40
21.00 .30 7.00 2.10
22.00 .20 8.00 1.60
What is the most profitable price for Mr. Robinson to quote on this 
order? The answer, according to Exhibit 11, is $19.00. The reason that 
$19.00 is a more profitable price than any other is that it offers the best 
combination of (1) profit if the order is received, and (2) likelihood 
that the order will be received. A $20.00 price would be more profit­
able than an $18.00 price, but there is less chance that Robinson will 
receive the order at that price; the chances of receiving the order at 
an $18.00 price are greater than receiving it at a $20.00 price but 
Robinson would not earn as much profit at the $18.00 price. The
30
COST ANALYSIS FOR PRICING AND DISTRIBUTION POLICIES
price-volume relationship is an important profit determinant, and the 
analysis in Exhibit 11 is an attempt to measure the profit implications 
of this interrelationship.
At this point it might be pointed out that, even though Exhibit 11 
is designed to deal with the price-volume relationship, the result of 
this analysis is importantly determined by product costs. The best 
price was the one that yielded the largest expected contribution, not 
the largest expected revenue. Thus, if the variable costs on this 
order were $15.50 rather than $14.00 (and assuming that Mr. Robin­
son’s probability estimates were not changed by this fact), the most 
profitable price would be $20.00 rather than $19.00.
The use of mathematical probabilities as an aid to business decision 
making has received increasing attention in recent years. The reader 
who wishes to pursue the matter further might begin with Probability 
and Statistics for Business Decisions by Schlaifer listed in the bibli­
ography. Two further observations, however, are made here:
1. It is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain “accurate” probability 
estimates that can be used for analytical purposes in the manner shown 
in Exhibit 11. Likewise, it is also impossible to obtain accurate data 
on the price-volume relationship for proprietary products. Neverthe­
less, management must make pricing decisions. Subjective probability 
estimates, based on management’s judgment and experience rather 
than on historical “facts,” are just as useful for analytical purposes as 
similar subjective estimates of the quantity of a proprietary product 
that can be sold at various prices. Making such subjective, unprov­
able estimates is an inevitable part of managerial decisions.
2. The great advantage in making explicit estimates, either about 
the probability of receiving an order or of the quantity that will be 
sold at a given price, is the improvement that such estimates permit 
in the analysis and evaluation of alternative pricing actions. In the 
simple example of the Robinson Company, Mr. Robinson might have 
arrived at a $19.00 price without going through the analysis shown in 
Exhibit 11, but in more complex situations, and particularly in situa­
tions where the analysis of variable costs is complex, intuitive decision 
making may be dangerous.  The two-step decision process in which 
management first estimates demand (or the probability of demand), 
and then combines this estimate with the other economic factors in 
order to evaluate the profitability of alternative pricing actions may 
be more useful than the familiar intuitive approach.
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The analytical technique illustrated above, while theoretically ap­
propriate, is too complex and detailed to be used for routine pricing 
decisions. Instead, the usual approach is to develop a pricing formula 
to calculate prices, with management occasionally intervening to 
change the calculated price based on its experience and judgment. 
In businesses where a large number of price quotations must be pre­
pared, management’s most important pricing action is not the de­
termination of individual prices but the determination of the formula 
by which prices are computed.
Most pricing formulas for custom products involve an attempt to 
measure the total cost of manufacturing the order and add a desired 
mark-up for profit in order to arrive at a selling price. For example, 
the pricing formula for the Robinson Company might look something 
like the following:
Materials $10.25
Labor: 1½  hrs. @ $2.50 3.75
Variable costs $14.00
Overhead @ 100% of labor 3.75
Total costs $17.75
Profit @ 7% of total costs 1.25
Selling price $19.00
Pricing formulas involving an allocation of fixed costs to a specific 
order are commonly known as full-cost pricing formulas. The argu­
ment most frequently offered in defense of such formulas is that “each 
order must bear its share of the fixed overhead in order to recover 
overhead costs and earn a profit.” This argument is fallacious because 
total fixed costs will not change as a result of volume fluctuations. 
However, contribution pricing (using variable costs alone) is also 
inadequate for pricing most custom products. The rationale for full- 
cost pricing, therefore, is not that it will in some m agical way insure 
that the business covers its fixed costs, but rather that it is an extremely 
practical tool for arriving at a competitive price quotation.
Suppose Mr. Robinson were bidding against only one competitor. 
If he knew what the competitor’s bid was, it would be very easy for 
Robinson to establish his own quote. Assuming a customer would 
place an order with the lower bidder, Robinson should bid one cent
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lower than his competitor, and would have a 100 per cent chance of 
receiving the order. That price would yield the highest “expected 
profit” and Mr. Robinson would not need to make any elaborate 
calculations to reach this conclusion. However, the competitor’s price 
quotation is not usually known, and a full-cost pricing formula may 
yield a reasonable approximation of the competitor’s bid.
The logical defense of full-cost pricing is based on the premise that, 
over the long run in a free enterprise economy, an efficient producer 
is able to make a reasonable profit by charging a price high enough 
to more than cover his fixed and variable costs. When a producer uses 
a full-cost pricing formula, therefore, he is implicitly assuming two 
things: (1) that times are “normal,” that is, that there is neither a 
shortage nor a surplus of capacity in his industry which might have a 
short-run impact on profits, and (2) that his productive efficiency is 
equal to that of his average competitor. The validity of both of these 
assumptions may be subject to frequent and rapid revision, but when 
they are valid, and when fixed costs are appropriately allocated to 
products, a full cost formula will be sufficiently successful to win 
enough orders at a competitive price to permit the producer to earn a 
reasonable profit.
The following theoretical base on which full-cost pricing rests per­
mits a recognition of several key factors that must be kept in mind in 
an attempt to develop useful and practical pricing formulas:
1. Information about the industry. Because competitive pricing 
cannot be done in a vacuum, it is important for management, as well 
as its advisors, to have solid, current information about the industrial 
environment in which the company is operating. Several types of in­
dustry data are necessary before a practical, competitive pricing 
formula can be designed. Management must be aware of current 
economic conditions, for both the national economy and their par­
ticular industry, nationally and locally, including such data as current 
prices and price trends, the existence of excess capacity in the industry, 
and the current state and rate of technological change in the industry. 
Using this information, management must decide whether or not the 
current, short-term economic situation requires the ( temporary) modi­
fication of its full-cost pricing formula. Data about the industry will 
also permit management to evaluate its own productive efficiency 
against that of its competitors; an inefficient producer will not be able 
to charge a higher price simply because he needs it in order to cover
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his greater costs.4 Finally, through trade associations in some indus­
tries, it may be possible to obtain information about competitors’ 
prices and their pricing formulas. When such information can be 
obtained, it may prove invaluable to a company trying to revise its 
own pricing formula to reflect the current situation.
2. Selecting bases for allocation. One of the requirements of a 
full-cost pricing formula is that the fixed overhead be assigned to 
products using one or more bases of allocation. Realizing that one of 
the main purposes of allocating fixed costs is to aid in the determina­
tion of a competitive price may make it easier to select the most 
appropriate bases for allocation. Essentially, the goal of cost alloca­
tion is to load against each product an appropriate share of the fixed 
costs of the capacity that an efficient producer would have to incur in 
the long-run to manufacture a product. Machine operating hours, for 
example, are frequently a good basis for allocating the costs of the 
equipment and related plant facilities. Another way of viewing the 
allocation process is as a crude measure of the opportunity costs of 
devoting the plant capacity to the manufacture of a particular product. 
This does not represent an attempt to achieve a “fair” allocation of a par­
ticular company’s historical costs, but rather to estimate what the costs 
would be for the average efficient producer in an industry. The cost 
allocation task is easier in industries where a fairly traditional pricing 
pattern has developed. Where an industry pricing formula is avail­
able, it should be adopted without regard to the company’s own level 
of fixed costs, because a pricing formula leading to any other price 
would probably be too high or too low. When no industry pattern is 
available, each company must do its best to measure long-run produc­
tion costs through the cost allocation device, although chaos sometimes 
results.5
3. The volume assumption. Allocating fixed costs requires not only 
the selection of a basis of allocation but also an assumption regarding 
the volume of production over which the costs are to be spread. The 
appropriate volume assumption to use provides a clear example of the
4 For an interesting article on this subject see Robert S. Schultz, “Profits, 
Prices, and Excess Capacity,” Harvard Business Review, July-August 1963, 
pp. 68-81.
5 For a readable article on this point, see Louis E. Newman, “Diseases 
that Make Whole Industries Sick,” Harvard Business Review, March-April 
1961, pp. 87-92.
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dangers of using historical or actual information about a specific com­
pany rather than information based on the current competitive situa­
tion. If, for example, a company expects that worsening competitive 
conditions will cause its volume to drop within the next few months 
to only 50 per cent of its capacity, that prediction does not mean that 
the company should attempt to allocate its fixed costs over a smaller 
volume base in an attempt to cover those costs at the lower volume. 
Such an action would only increase the prices that the company was 
attempting to charge during a period when prices will probably be 
dropping. Similarly, in a period of expansion, the fact that a company 
is operating at 100 per cent capacity does not mean that lower prices 
should be charged simply because the fixed costs can be spread over 
more units; if anything, prices should probably be raised during such a 
period. The result is that the actual volume currently or prospectively 
enjoyed by a company should not be built into its pricing formula. 
Instead, the formula should be based on some estimate of normal or 
standard volume which represents the approximate utilization of 
capacity that an average efficient producer could expect to achieve 
in the long run. This concept of standard volume, which would 
normally be between 75 per cent and 95 per cent of capacity, will 
rarely be appropriate for the economic circumstances that exist on any 
one date, but it is probably the best figure that is available. Clearly, 
trying to change the volume assumption to reflect current economic 
circumstances only causes the pricing formula to produce results 
(prices) that move in the wrong direction.
4. Adaptation to changing circumstances. The most important 
aspect of pricing formulas is that they are made to be changed. The 
measure of the success of a pricing formula is whether it works or not,
i.e., whether or not the company is successful in receiving a volume 
of business which, in the eyes of management, is appropriate under 
the economic circumstances that exist at a given point in time. If 
the formula is not successful when measured by these standards, it 
should be changed. Perhaps the best, and certainly the easiest, way 
to modify a pricing formula is in terms of the profit allowance that is 
added to the total costs. The profit allowance can be easily raised or 
lowered, and has the effect of an across-the-board price reduction or 
increase, with the amount of the change reflecting the current eco­
nomic situation. Recognizing this need for continually reevaluating the 
success of a pricing formula returns to the first point mentioned above: 
management’s continuing quest for information about its industry.
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Pricing formulas are imperfect tools at best, but when carefully 
developed by well informed management they can be vital tools for 
increasing profits. The CPA can be useful to management in develop­
ing pricing formulas for custom products in three ways: (1) gathering 
industry and other environmental data in order to assist management 
in adapting its pricing formula to the current situation, (2) analyzing 
product costs and devising useful ways for allocating fixed costs at an 
appropriate volume level against products, and (3) developing report­
ing systems to aid management in keeping informed about the success 
of its pricing mechanism, thus helping management to anticipate the 
inevitable need for modifications.
Summary
Traditionally, management actions in the area of pricing and dis­
tribution policies have been made on the basis of judgment and 
intuition. One of the greatest services the CPA can perform for his 
client is to increase the extent and quality of analysis that is brought 
to bear on such decisions. Analysis cannot eliminate uncertainty about 
the future, nor is it possible to eliminate the crucial factor of manage­
ment judgment in making decisions. Nevertheless, it is possible to take 
some of the guess work out of decision making by breaking complex 
problems into smaller pieces. Most pricing problems are complex and 
involve two distinct phases: (1) estimating the effect that a change in 
product price and/or product cost will have upon the quantity of the 
product that the company will be able to sell, and (2) calculating the 
effect that this realignment of the company’s cost-price-volume struc­
ture will have on its profits. Using this two-step approach to decision 
making should be both professionally rewarding to the CPA and finan­
cially profitable for his client.
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LIST OF CASES
The remainder of this bulletin consists of four case studies. The 
cases are arranged roughly in order of increasing complexity in terms 
of the amount of analysis required by the reader using the cases for 
staff training purposes.
1. Utility Equipment Company. Pricing a special order for a pro­
prietary product.
2. Bartlett Lithographers. Evaluating alternative prices, through 
modifying the bidding formula, for a job order printing company.
3. Greenville Seaplane Service, Inc. Pricing problems in a service 
organization with a high proportion of fixed costs.
4. Industrial Heating Equipment Co. Designing a control system to 
aid management in evaluating and changing its pricing policies.
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Utility Equipment Co,
On March 1, 1962, Fred Hosmer, the President of Utility Equip­
ment Co., a private owned manufacturer of pumps and hoists, re­
ceived the following letter from National Paint Products, a large dis­
tributor of industrial paints.
Dear Mr. Hosmer,
From time to time over the last ten years, National Paint Prod­
ucts has offered valuable and useful items to its customers in the 
form of sales premiums. For instance, last year we gave a set of 
wrenches to each customer placing an order for over $100 worth of 
paint during the months of June and July. These promotions have 
been enthusiastically received by our customers.
It is our intention to offer another sales premium to our cus­
tomers during November and December of this year. For this pur­
pose we have selected three items ranging in wholesale price from 
$8 to $12 which might be suitable for this forthcoming sales pro­
motion. Included among these items, only one of which can be 
selected as the premium, is your pump.
If you would like us to consider your pump for the premium 
would you please submit to us, by April 1, a firm price per pump.
This price should include the costs of shipping the pumps from 
your plant to our customers, the vast majority of whom are located 
in the Midwest.
Should we adopt your pump as our premium, we would adver­
tise it as a premium in those magazines which regularly carry our 
advertisements. You would be named as the pump’s manufacturer. 
Also, the value of the premium that would be displayed in these 
advertisements would be your regular listed retail price.
Our sales department’s research staff has estimated that the most 
likely demand for your pumps would be 10,000 units. Therefore, if 
your pump was selected as the premium, we would guarantee to 
purchase 8,000 pumps for delivery to our customers during Novem­
ber and December. For your part, you would have to guarantee 
that these 8,000 pumps would be completed by November 1 and
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that an additional 4,000 pumps could be provided, if needed, dur­
ing the months of December and January. For any additional 
pumps we might need, beyond this initial 12,000, you would be 
given two months lead time.
It is not our policy to divulge the names of the other items being 
considered as premiums for our sales promotion. Nor is it our 
policy to reveal the prices paid for past premiums. However, 
should you require any other information before submitting a 
quote to us please feel free to contact Mr. Alvin Cresm of our 
Wichita sales office.
Yours faithfully,
Harold Sykes 
President
After reading National Paint’s letter, Mr. Hosmer believed he might 
be interested in National Paint’s proposition but he was in a quandry 
as to what price he should quote.
On March 2, Fred Hosmer phoned Peter Jenkins, a partner of Smith, 
Adams, and Jenkins, a local firm of certified public accountants who 
prepared Utility Equipment’s tax returns. Hosmer read the National 
Paint letter to Jenkins and then asked if he would be willing to help 
him arrive at a firm price to quote to National Paint. Jenkins said that 
he thought his firm might be able to offer some assistance and agreed 
to visit Hosmer at the Utility plant the next day to discuss the matter.
Smith, Adams, and Jenkins
Smith, Adams, and Jenkins was a firm of certified public accountants 
located in Wichita, Kansas. The firm consisted of three partners, 
Albert Smith, Nick Adams, and Peter Jenkins, assisted by eight staff 
men and three clerks. During 1961, the firm’s gross billings had been 
over $250,000. Of this total, about $40,000 had come from manage­
ment services work, most of which had been done for small manufac­
turing companies located throughout Kansas. The firm did not have a 
separate m anagem ent services departm ent. Each partner directed any 
management services work performed for his own clients, and drew 
on the firm’s group of staff men for any assistance required. This 
policy had been adopted because of the firm’s small size. It was hoped 
that this policy would give all members of the firm an exposure to 
management services engagements in addition to their regular audit 
and tax duties, thus increasing their awareness of the potential services 
the firm could perform for its clients.
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In preparing for his meeting with Hosmer on March 3, Jenkins re­
viewed the office file on the Utility Equipment Company and spent 
some time discussing the account with Alexander Ryan, the staff man 
that had prepared Utility Equipment’s tax returns for the past three 
years. The tax return for 1961 had been completed only a couple of 
weeks before, and Jenkins knew that it had been prepared from data 
provided by the client. The 1961 Income Statement and year-end 
Balance Sheet as provided by Utility Equipment Co. are shown in 
Exhibits 1 and 2 (pages 45 and 46). Mr. Hosmer had never requested 
an audit of his accounts by Smith, Adams, and Jenkins, and Ryan told 
Jenkins that Utility’s “minimal sort of an accounting system” was main­
tained by a part-time bookkeeper. Ryan’s brief review of Utility’s 
books, as he collected the data needed for the tax return, had satisfied 
him that the records were adequate for tax reporting purposes, but he 
told Jenkins that he didn’t think the accounting data would be of much 
help in making an important management decision. Jenkins, too, 
realized the limited value of Utility’s current system, and wondered if 
Hosmer’s call might be a tangible symptom of a more fundamental 
problem.
Jenkins’ First Meeting with Hosmer
At his meeting with Hosmer the next day, Jenkins started off by 
suggesting that Hosmer give him a brief review of Utility Equipment 
Co., its products, its personnel, and its method of operations. Although 
the office file had contained an up-to-date series of notes about the 
company, these did not go into any great detail, and Jenkins wanted to 
hear Hosmer’s own description of the context in which he saw his 
problem.
Utility Equipment Co.
Utility Equipment Co. was owned by the families of Fred Hosmer 
and his two brothers who together formed the company’s management 
group. The firm, which had been founded in Wichita in 1920, manu­
factured pumps, hoists, pulleys, and blocks. Each of these items was 
offered in one style only. Pumps and hoists together accounted for 
over 95 per cent of the company’s sales volume.
Since its founding, Utility Equipment had sold its products to 
farmers throughout the Midwest. Distribution of the products was 
achieved through two channels: (1) a sales agency organization which 
used door-to-door salesmen calling directly on farmers, and (2) cata­
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log sales companies that specialized in the farm market. Sales made 
through the door-to-door agencies were shipped directly to the cus­
tomer from Utility’s plant; the catalog companies purchased in larger 
lots and filled orders from their own warehouses. Utility had more 
than a dozen small catalog sales companies as customers, but had 
been unsuccessful in getting any large national catalog company to 
stock its line.
Utility Equipment employed no regular salesmen, although Mr. 
Hosmer made it a practice to try to visit each of his major customers 
in both categories once a year. Nevertheless, to facilitate the sales of 
its products to the ultimate user, Utility Equipment regularly placed 
advertisements in farm journals. The company had made no effort to 
have its products stocked by retail hardware stores or farm supply 
stores. As for the future, Hosmer said he had no plans to expand the 
market for his products beyond the farm group. According to Hosmer, 
he “knew the farm market and had a good sales set up; to go after 
any other market would be too much trouble.”
Utility Equipment’s pump was a simple portable hand pump. In all, 
during 1961, Utility had sold approximately 20,000 of these pumps at 
an average selling price of $12.60. The wholesale list price to door-to- 
door sales agencies was $12.75; sales to catalog companies on all orders 
for 10 or more units were subject to a quantity discount of 20 cents 
per unit. No cash discounts were given. The $12.75 price, Hosmer 
believed, was in line with the wholesale prices for similar pumps 
offered by Utility’s competitors.
Jenkins learned that the company employed about 20 persons, all 
of whom worked in the company’s one-floor plant. The total area of 
the plant was 16,000 square feet, of which about 70 per cent was 
devoted to manufacturing and storage. The rest of the building was 
used for office space, and was occupied by the administrative group 
who divided their time equally between the two major product lines, 
pumps and hoists.
As for the National Paint offer, Hosmer told Jenkins that he believed 
he could meet the production schedule outlined in the National Paint 
letter. However, since it was anticipated that Utility Equipment’s 
one-shift pump production capacity would be tied up well into 1963 
producing for regular customers, a second shift would be necessary to 
meet the promotion’s needs. Consequently, a second foreman would 
have to be hired as well as some part-time factory help. Finding 
skilled part-time help would not be difficult, Hosmer said, as many of 
the local farmers had previously worked for him and their productivity
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after several days on the job was usually as high as his regular help. 
Hosmer thought he would have no problem hiring farmers, even dur­
ing the late summer, to work on a second shift basis. All second-shift 
factory help would be paid the same hourly rate as the regular 
employees.
When questioned by Jenkins about the availability of reliable cost 
data, Hosmer replied that neither he nor his brothers “have any time 
for figures, except for tax purposes. My oldest brother, who died in 
1959, used to pay quite a bit of attention to such things, and a year 
or two before he died he set up some kind of a standard cost system. 
I imagine we’re still using it, because I haven’t bothered to change it, 
but the only thing I pay any attention to is the over-all profit figure 
for the company.”
In response to Hosmer’s statement, Jenkins observed that the 
absence of useful, detailed, and current cost data would make it much 
more difficult to arrive at a price to quote on the National Paint con­
tract. Jenkins suggested, however, that they defer a further discussion 
of the costing problem until they had explored, in general terms at 
least, the desirability of bidding for the National Paint order.
Jenkins explained that he was thinking of what might be called the 
“marketing implications” of the potential new business. Both Jenkins 
and Hosmer agreed that a National Paint promotion involving a Utility 
Equipment pump would have little, if any, impact on Utility’s primary, 
agricultural market. This belief was based on the following con­
siderations:
1. National Paint’s promotion campaign would be limited primarily 
to industrial concerns.
2. All of the advertising carrying the premium offer would be in 
the trade journals which few farmers were likely to read.
3. The premium offer price to National Paint would have no im­
pact on Utility’s price structure since the value of the pump displayed 
in the premium advertisements would be Utility’s list price.
Jenkins did raise two points which Hosmer agreed should be investi­
gated or thought about further: (1) Jenkins did not believe that there 
were any Robinson-Patman problems in connection with this proposed 
reduced pricing but he suggested that Hosmer should check the point 
with his lawyer, and (2) the fact that National Paint thought that 
Utility’s pump might make a good premium—with an expected volume 
equal to half of Utility’s current annual volume—might indicate that
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the industrial market for the pump was important enough for Hosmer 
to reconsider his marketing policy of selling exclusively to the farm 
market. The two men agreed, however, that even if Utility subse­
quently decided to enter the industrial market, taking part in Na­
tional’s promotion would not restrict the effectiveness of Utility’s 
future marketing efforts.
As the discussion about marketing drew to a close, Jenkins asked if 
the company’s bookkeeper was working that day, and said that before 
leaving he would like to spend some time with her to investigate the 
operation of the cost system that Hosmer’s late brother had estab­
lished. He arranged to meet with Hosmer the following day to make a 
proposal to carry out the work he thought was needed to help Hosmer 
solve his problems.
In the hour that he spent discussing the record-keeping system with 
the bookkeeper, Jenkins learned that a simple standard cost system 
was in use. By reviewing the general ledger and related workpapers, 
Jenkins found that (1) standard costs per unit for labor and for ma­
terials on each of the company’s four products had been established 
in 1958, (2) cost variances against standard had been increasing each 
year, amounting to about 18 per cent in 1961, apparently because the 
standards had not been changed to reflect increases in materials prices 
and wage rates, and (3) the system was a “direct cost” system, in that 
factory overhead was not formally allocated to product lines. In­
quiring into the availability of supporting detail, Jenkins also dis­
covered that informal records were maintained by product line which 
would permit a breakdown of sales revenue, materials, labor, selling 
expenses, and postage and freight. The bookkeeper summarized these 
breakdowns as shown in Exhibit 3 (page 47).
Questions
1. Is Jenkins in possession of sufficient facts to make a proposal? 
If not, what further facts does he need for this purpose, and how 
would you suggest that he obtain them?
2. What form should the analysis of Mr. Hosmer’s problem take? 
What proposal should Jenkins make?
3. In the light of your views as to the proposal to be made, what 
further information would you require to complete your analysis? 
What analytical steps would you follow in your work?
4. Should Jenkins plan to prepare a lengthy written report for 
Hosmer? If not, what should he do at the termination of the project?
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Exhibit 1
UTILITY EQUIPMENT COMPANY
Statement of Income 
For the Year Ended December 31, 1961
Gross sales $417,247
Less: returns and allowances 2,966
Net sales $414,281
Cost of goods sold:
Materials $168,514
Labor 45,275
Burden
Factory supplies 8,043
Fuel, water, heat, etc. 1,673
Taxes—property 4,130
Insurance—property 3,803
Repairs—property 267
Depreciation—building 1,000
Depreciation—machinery 382
Foreman 6,813
Total cost of goods sold $239,900
Gross profit $174,381
Selling expense
Bad debts $ 184
Direct mail 7,325
Advertising 28,392
Printing and mailing 3,505
Postage 12,032
Total selling $ 51,438
General and administrative expense
Management salaries $ 35,300
Administrative salaries 15,673
Stationery and supplies 1,161
Postage 8,539
Freight and express 6,006
Travel expense 152
Auto expense 477
Depreciation—auto 747
Depreciation—furniture 1,369
Telephone 610
Accounting and legal 600
Entertainment 2,459
Total general and administrative $ 73,093
Income from operations $ 49,850
Less corporate taxes 23,000
Net profit $26,850
Less dividends 25,000
Increase in retained earnings $ 1,850
Source: Smith, Adams and Jenkins file; prepared by Utility Equipment Company
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Exhibit 2
UTILITY EQUIPMENT COMPANY 
Balance Sheet
December 31, 1961 
Assets
Current Assets
Cash $14,976
Accounts receivable 25,111
Inventories 18,618
Total current assets $58,705
Property, Plant and Equipment
Building $36,123
Less allowance for depreciation 29,123 7,000
Equipment $15,675
Less allowance for depreciation 10,118 5,557
Other Assets
Loans to employees 3,900
Various other assets 8,038
Total assets $83,200
Liabilities and Stockholders Equity
Current Liabilities
Accounts payable $22,909
Notes payable 5,000
Accrued wages 1,086
Total current liabilities $28,995
Stockholders equity
Capital stock 30,000
Retained earnings 24,205
Total liabilities and stockholders equity $83,200
Source: Smith, Adams and Jenkins files; prepared by Utility Equipment Company
Establishing Objectives for the Engagement
Returning to Mr. Hosmer’s office the next day, Jenkins remarked 
that he was sure that he could help Mr. Hosmer. He said he had spent 
several hours considering the problem on the previous day, after re­
turning to his office, and was now ready to discuss an outline of the 
work he felt should be done.
Jenkins said that he saw Hosmer’s original question on what price to 
bid as being split into two parts: (a) What would be the lowest ac­
ceptable price, and (b) how much higher, if any, should Utility
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Exhibit 3
UTILITY EQUIPMENT COMPANY
Revenue and Expense Analysis—1961
Total Pump Hoist Pulley Block
Gross sales: $417,247 $252,788 $145,650 $3,454 $7,651
Less: returns and allowances 2,966 714 2,235 17 —
Net sales $414,281 $252,074 $143,415 $3,437 $7,651
Materials—actual $168,514 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Standard costs 142,270 $ 98,652 $ 38,282 $1,678 $3,658
Excess $ 26,244
Labor—actual $45,275 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Standard costs 38,441 $ 22,234 $ 14,753 $ 409 $1,045
Excess $ 6,834
Selling expense:
Bad debts $ 184 — $ 184 — —
Direct mail 7,325 $ 1,268 6,057 — —
Advertising 28,392 12,426 15,966 — —
Printing and mailing 3,505 247 3,258 — —
Postage 12,032 1,368 10,664 — —
$ 51,438 $ 15,309 $ 36,128
General and Administrative Expenses:
Postage $ 8,539 $ 3,416 $$ 5,123 — —
Freight and Express 6,006 4,390 1,418  $ 6 0  $ 13
Equipment Co. bid? Jenkins explained that the lowest acceptable 
price in his opinion was a price which would both cover costs and 
provide a “satisfactory” profit, the latter being a quantity that Hosmer 
himself would have to determine. However, Jenkins said that in addi­
tion to price there were other related areas that needed analysis, 
which he would propose to do along with his pricing analysis. 
These areas were production scheduling and working capital require­
ments, both of which were significant because the size of the potential 
order was very large in relation to Utility Equipment Co.’s present 
pump output—40 per cent to 60 per cent of the 1961 unit volume.
Jenkins pointed out that good cost information was essential in 
determining the minimum price, since the actual costs to be covered 
were a part of the price. His questions to Hosmer and the company’s 
bookkeeper on the previous day had brought out that the company 
possessed no data that could readily be used for this purpose. He 
proposed, therefore, to undertake a study of all the elements of cost
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that would enter into the production of the pumps for National Paint. 
The specific purpose would be to determine the production cost (per 
unit) of an additional 8,000-12,000 units, but the study would nec­
essarily cover many of the costs associated with the present (continu­
ing) production volume. Jenkins assured Hosmer that this type of 
cost investigation was not a major undertaking. Alexander Ryan, 
Jenkins’ staff man who had worked on Utility Equipment’s tax returns, 
would be brought in to carry out the actual investigation; Ryan would 
have to have an hour or two of Hosmer’s time, and probably two or 
three times as much of the bookkeeper’s time, to answer questions and 
assist in locating and refining data, respectively.
Jenkins said that he himself would of course also work on the 
project. Once Ryan had finished his cost investigation Jenkins would 
take over and work on the pricing question. On the latter he would 
need to consult with Hosmer later in order to translate the latter’s 
thinking into quantitative terms. Essentially this discussion would 
amount to an informal verbal report (which Jenkins felt would be 
appropriate because of Hosmer’s stated dislike of figures), but Jenkins 
said that he would in any event follow up with a brief letter summar­
izing his findings and opinions.
In terms of time Jenkins estimated that Ryan would require no more 
than three days, and he himself no more than two. He told Hosmer 
that his billing rate on management services work was $25 per hour, 
and Ryan’s, $15. There was little doubt that the job could be com­
pleted within the proposed time, unless Ryan’s investigation turned up 
results requiring extended work, which would be known within a day 
or two of the beginning of the project. Jenkins concluded his presen­
tation by saying that if Hosmer approved the proposal, work could 
be begun at the beginning of the coming week.
Hosmer accepted the proposal, stating that he knew a successful 
bid would pay for the cost, and that even an unsuccessful bid would 
not mean consulting fees wasted, in that Jenkins would have looked 
into the areas of the company’s operations that probably needed some 
study in any event, particularly cost standards.
Ryan’s Investigation
On the following Monday, Alexander Ryan arrived at Utility Equip­
ment’s offices to begin his investigation. His objective, as Peter Jenkins 
had expressed it to him, was to “survey the pump line’s costs and 
specifically establish the costs that would be incurred in producing
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the 8,000-12,000 units called for by the potential contract with Na­
tional Paint.”
Ryan’s first move was to see Mr. Hosmer, as he needed some facts 
about the pump manufacturing operation. In answer to Ryan’s ques­
tions, Hosmer provided the following information:
1. During 1961, pump (and all other) production had been on a 
single shift, all year. There had been no significant variations in 
monthly pump production, which was to all intents and purposes as 
close to single shift capacity as was practicable.
2. The company’s manufacturing labor force totaled eleven men, 
including two men engaged in packaging the finished units, and ex­
cluding the foreman. Five men worked on the pump line more or less 
full time, although there was some interchanging of manpower alloca­
tions between lines from time to time.
3. As previously mentioned to Jenkins, production of pumps for the 
National Paint order would take place on a second shift, for which 
additional labor would be engaged, at the same hourly rate as first 
shift employees.
In response to another question Hosmer indicated that his late 
brother, Herbert, who had prepared the material and labor standards 
in 1958, had maintained files with his notes and working papers rela­
tive to the standards. These files had been kept after Herbert’s death, 
and Hosmer turned these over to Ryan with the remark that he hoped 
they made some sense to him.
Before proceeding any further Ryan noted that his problem was 
in a sense simplified by the fact that all he was concerned with was 
the cost of operating a second shift. Since pump production in 1961 
was approximately 1667 units per month (20,000 ÷  12) Ryan decided 
to assume that second shift production would be 1,600 units per month, 
and that production would have to start on June 1 if 8,000 units were 
to be ready by November 1 as required by National Paint. Continued 
production at the same rate through mid-January would provide the 
additional 4,000 units that could be called for in December and Janu­
ary. (Ryan noted that he should suggest that Jenkins point out to 
Hosmer that second shift production beyond November 1 would essen­
tially be speculative, at least until December when National Paint 
could request further deliveries.) If they did not, Hosmer would have 
additional inventory on his hands which would have to be disposed of
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either by increasing sales through present outlets, finding new markets, 
or allowing the first shift production rate to slow down below the 
regular sales rate.
Ryan then reviewed the late Herbert Hosmer’s files. He was pleased 
to find that the 1958 standards had been based on detailed studies 
that Herbert had made of production time and labor productivity 
and detailed bills of materials. After familiarizing himself with what 
Herbert Hosmer had done, Ryan next spent several hours with the 
production foreman. He later reported to Peter Jenkins as follows:
“I decided to start with the assumption that Herbert’s basic calcu­
lations were correct, and only needed updating for variables that had 
changed. If this were so, I would save a great deal of time that 
would otherwise have been required to go into basic detail. A full 
check on this approach would be whether revised standards calculated 
for all product lines accounted adequately for actual material and 
labor costs in 1961. I did not in fact make this check since I restricted 
myself to pump standards only, which I am satisfied are now very 
much more accurate. I did not think that our client would wish us to 
revise material and labor standards for the other lines at this time, 
although I believe that it would be in his interest if this were done, 
perhaps after this engagement is completed.” (Jenkins nodded his 
concurrence, and Ryan continued.) “I established the following facts 
from my discussion with the foreman.
“1. There has only been one minor design change in the pump since 
1958. This simplified the manufacturing process somewhat, and re­
duced process time by perhaps 2 per cent and material content by 3 
per cent.
“2. Subject only to the 2 per cent I have just mentioned, there have 
been no changes in the manufacturing procedures from those noted 
by Herbert Hosmer. The foreman wrote down his estimate of the 
time presently required for each step in the manufacturing process as 
listed by Herbert, and came up with a total of 39 minutes of labor per 
unit, including 8 minutes for packaging, compared to 41 in 1958. Al­
lowing for the 2 per cent design change (0.82 minutes) this meant 
that productivity had increased by 1.18 minutes (41-39-0.82), or 2.8 
per cent, which the foreman said seemed reasonable to him. On the 
basis of these estimates I computed that second shift production of 
1,600 units per month would require 827 hours of manufacturing 
labor and 213 hours of packaging labor. Since we are dealing with a 
completely new second shift, we have to talk in terms of whole men;
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on the basis of a 40 hour work-week and a 4⅓ week month, an em­
ployee works 173 hours per month, so Utility Equipment will need 
five manufacturing labor employees (865 hours) and two packaging 
labor employees (346 hours). This allows an excess of 4 per cent in 
manufacturing labor hours and 61 per cent in packaging labor hours. 
I think that Utility Equipment ought to be conservative and expect 
less efficiency or productivity on the second shift, but the appropriate 
figure is undoubtedly higher than 4 per cent and less than 61 per cent. 
On a total basis, 1,040 hours per month are required and 1,211 will be 
provided by seven men, or an excess of 16 per cent. This is probably 
more than enough, provided that one of the men on packaging can be 
assigned to manufacturing for part of the time. In essence, what I am 
saying is that the second shift will require seven men: five manufac­
turing, one packaging, and one floating to fill in where required.
“As far as material usage is concerned, the foreman reviewed 
Herbert Hosmer’s calculations and stated that the only change that 
needed to be made was the 3 per cent adjustment for the design 
change which I have already referred to. He specifically stated that 
Herbert’s scrap and spoilage allowance of 5 per cent was still a fair 
estimate.”
[Ryan next worked with Utility Equipment’s bookkeeper to investi­
gate relevant costs. The next portion of his report to Jenkins ran as 
follows.]
“My first line of inquiry with the bookkeeper was to price out the 
labor and material quantities I had just established with the foreman.
“By examining the general ledger account for labor expense I found 
that, as I had suspected, it included payroll taxes and employee bene­
fits. By examining payroll records I found that the average hourly 
rate for production employees was $1.80 for manufacturing labor and 
$1.55 for packaging labor. I investigated further and established that 
state and Federal payroll taxes amount to 5.2 per cent of wages and 
benefits, about 14.7 per cent. I compared these figures with Herbert 
Hosmer’s calculations for 1958 and confirmed that the total hourly 
labor costs had risen about 20 per cent since then, which fits with a 
2.8 per cent productivity increase and the 18 per cent wage variance 
for 1961 based on the 1958 standards. The bookkeeper confirmed that 
there had been no wage increase this year so far, and when I double- 
checked with Hosmer, he said that none was in sight for this year.
“Based on the figures I have just quoted, the incremental labor cost 
for the second shift can be estimated as follows:
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Base wage 
Benefits —14.7 % 
Taxes — 5.2%
Total
(Rounding)
Manufacturing
$1.80
.265
.094
$2,159
$2.16
Packaging
$1.55 /hour 
.228 
.081
$1,859
$1.86 /hour
Assume that a differential of 10¢ is 
paid to the “floating” laborer, 
which will increase the packaging 
average rate by .05
$1.91
Hours per month 
$ cost per month
Total per month 
No. of units per month
865 346
$1,868.40 $660.86
$2,529.26
1,600
Labor cost per unit $1.58
“On materials, I asked the bookkeeper to pull the latest invoices 
from her files for raw material purchases, and I priced each item on 
the bill of materials. The material cost per pump came out at $5.79, 
as against the old standard of $4.95. Again, I compared price changes 
since 1958 and noticed an average increase of about 22 per cent. Sub­
tracting the 3 per cent material usage saving through change in de­
sign leaves a net increase of about 19 per cent, which is close enough 
to the total material variance for 1961 of 18.4 per cent.” (Ryan added 
that a schedule showing his calculations of the revised standard ma­
terial cost was included in his working papers; it is not reproduced 
here.)
“I next considered what items of factory burden expense would be 
incurred in the operation of a second shift. I checked off the items 
in the 1961 Income Statement as follows:
‘‘Factory supplies Yes
Fuel, water, heat Yes
Taxes—property No
Insurance—property Yes
Repairs—property No
Depreciation—building No
Depreciation—machinery No
Foreman Yes
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“Depreciation on manufacturing equipment might increase because 
of increased usage, but the absolute amount of this expense ($382 in 
1961) was so small that I decided to ignore it. On each of the other 
items, this is what I found out.”
“Factory supplies: In the foreman’s opinion these vary in proportion 
to both material and labor cost although there is no way to check or 
confirm this. I decided to relate this cost to the total of the two, as 
follows:
“Factory supplies cost, 1961 $8,043
Materials expense, 1961 $168,514
Labor cost, 1961 45,275
Total $213,789
Factory supplies cost % =  3.76%
Material standard $5.79
Labor standard 1.58
Total $7.37
3.76% of $7.37 =  $0.28
“Fuel, Water, and Heat: Although all the bills were available to 
support the 1961 expense under this heading, there is no way to deter­
mine, without considerable study, just how much of each item is 
attributable to each product. We do know that the bulk of the expense 
is for heat and light; the amount of power used by manufacturing 
equipment is nominal. Since the 1961 expense is relatively so small, I 
do not feel the detailed study would be worthwhile at this stage. As 
we know, manufacturing and storage occupy about 70 per cent of the 
building. When the second shift is in operation, the whole of this space 
will have to be heated and lit. I therefore assumed that the monthly 
expense will be 70 per cent of the 1961 average, i.e.,
1,673
70% x , or $97.58
On the basis of 1,600 units per month, the per unit cost is 6.1 cents— 
call it 6 cents. Since the proportion of cold to warm months in the 7½  
month (maximum) period in which the second shift will be operating 
is about 50:50, I do not think it necessary to load this estimate with a 
seasonal factor for heat. I’m no engineer, but I imagine any additional
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cost to keep out the cold of winter nights will be offset by the fact that 
the building will be somewhat warmer in the morning to start with.
“Property insurance: This expense amounted to $3,803 in 1961, and 
would increase if the National Paint contract is received because the 
inventory would be higher during the months until shipments begin. 
The insurance contract covering inventory requires a report at the end 
of each month about the amount of inventory on hand. Based on this 
report, an adjustment in the premium is computed. I estimated 
that this adjustment would amount to about $400 for the first six 
months of the contract, or about 5 cents per unit on the guaranteed 
8,000 units. If the number of units is increased, the inventory turnover 
will be faster, but 5 cents per unit is still a pretty fair figure.
“Foreman: A foreman will obviously be needed for the second shift. 
I discussed this with Hosmer and he anticipated no difficulty in ob­
taining one. He said he would approach one of the senior first shift 
employees, and replace him temporarily with a new employee. 
Hosmer anticipates that the second shift foreman will have to be paid 
$3.00 per hour, inclusive of benefits. With taxes at 5.26% that comes 
to $3.16. Multiply this by 167 hours per month and divide by 1,600 
units, and the unit cost comes out at 33 cents.
“No selling, or general and administrative expense will be incurred 
as a result of the operation of the second shift, with the exception of 
two items—shipping expense and interest. Hosmer says that he and 
his regular office staff will be able to handle the extra purchasing and 
payroll chores, and that he will be able to store the inventory until 
shipped without renting any extra space. According to the letter from 
National Paint, Utility Equipment Co. will have to ship the pumps 
direct to National Paint’s customers. These are located in the Midwest, 
which is also the area served by Utility Equipment’s sales agency 
organization, and they, too, ship individually. With the assistance of 
the bookkeeper, I sampled shipping records for a three month period, 
and found that the average shipping cost was 37 cents. The dispersion 
around this average was very close; two thirds of the values were in 
the 32 cents to 42 cents range, and they were evenly split on either 
side. I think 37 cents is a fair estimate to use.
“In order to approximate what the interest cost might be for carry­
ing the inventory until it is shipped, I assumed that production for the 
contract would start on June 1, and continue at the rate of 1,600 units
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per month. I also decided to assume that Utility Equipment Co. would 
have to pay its labor and supervisor costs in the month incurred, and 
that other costs would be paid on 30-day credit terms, i.e., one month 
after being incurred. Shipping expense would be paid when shipping 
took place. I then constructed a cash flow table, which appears on 
page 56.
“Next, I assumed that Hosmer could get a 6 per cent bank loan to 
carry this inventory, once he had the contract in hand. The loan would 
amount to $3,000 at the end of June, rising to $72,000 at the end of 
November just before he collects for the first 8,000 units. Thus, inter­
est at ½  per cent per month on each month’s loan balance would 
amount to a little over $1,000, or about 13 cents per unit on the 
minimum quantity.
“To summarize my work, Mr. Jenkins, I have ascertained the follow­
ing as the likely costs to be incurred in the monthly production of 
1,600 pumps on a second shift:
Per Unit
Labor $1.58
Material 5.79
Factory supplies 0.28
Fuel, water, heat 0.06
Property insurance 0.05
Foreman 0.33
Shipping 0.37
Interest 0.13
Total, per unit $8.59
“Perhaps the most interesting aspect of my study was the realization 
that if Utility Equipment gets the contract, all the costs it incurs will 
be variable. While it is true that, for example, the cost of employing 
a foreman will not be incurred at the rate of 33 cents per unit, the fact 
is that this expense will only be incurred if the contract is obtained 
and, if it is, the production can be stated with confidence at 1,600 units 
per month. This being so, this cost can be expressed in per unit terms. 
In my opinion nothing would be gained by introducing a fixed dollar 
cost element into any analysis you make for Mr. Hosmer.”
Jenkins thanked Ryan for his excellent presentation and after re­
viewing Ryan’s work papers immediately arranged to have another 
meeting with Hosmer.
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Jenkins’ Second Meeting with Hosmer
Exactly one week after his first meeting with Hosmer, Jenkins re­
turned to review the results of his investigation with him. After the 
usual round of pleasantness, Jenkins began: “Mr. Hosmer, this morn­
ing I plan to tell you what we have found out about your potential 
costs on the National Paint contract, and to be of as much help as I 
can in setting a price for you to bid on. I would also like to review 
with you an important consequence of your getting the order—if you 
do, you will have a need for working capital quite in excess of the 
company’s apparent resources. As I said to you a week ago, I plan to 
follow up this meeting with a letter to you describing what we have 
done and repeating my findings, which we will be discussing in a 
minute. That part of the letter you can skip, if you want to. I would 
urge you, however, to take a look at the second part of the letter be­
cause there I am going to list some areas of your operations where I 
believe we might be able to do additional and valuable work for you.
“Coming back to the matter at hand, I would like to start by saying 
that the absolute rock-bottom price for your bid is $8.59 per pump, 
which is the best estimate of the total additional costs, including 
shipping, without any allowance for profit. Why don’t we concentrate 
on that area, profit, for a minute? Is there a minimum total dollar or 
dollar-per-unit profit figure which you would want to feel certain of 
securing if you had the contract? Or would you take it if it were avail­
able at, for instance, a nickel more than projected cost per unit?”
“My feeling,” Hosmer replied, “is that I am not really interested in 
the deal unless I make a before-tax profit of about $5,000. This would 
be about 10 per cent of our 1961 profit. I just don’t see how it would 
be worth our while to do it for less. After all, the second shift won’t 
just materialize out of thin air. There has to be something in the deal 
for top management’s time and effort too.”
“Is that $5,000 figure really your minimum? You wouldn’t put in a 
bid that allowed for a profit of only $4,000 for instance?”
“Don’t try to pin me down by getting those numbers too close. 
$4,000 is just not really enough. No, I wouldn’t do it for that price.”
“Very well, then. National Paint has talked of a minimum order of 
8,000 units, a likely order of 10,000, and a possible total of 12,000. 
Which do you think is the safest ‘base’ to use to calculate the desired 
profit per unit?”
“Oh, the 8,000 minimum,” Hosmer replied. “If I’m talking about a 
sure $5,000 profit, then I want it to be a sure profit.”
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“In that case,” said Jenkins, “your profit objective is 62½  cents per 
unit, and your total minimum revenue per unit is $9.22 ($8.59 cost +  
62½  cents profit). Go lower than this and you miss your profit target. 
On the other hand, if the order exceeds 8,000 units you will make an 
additional profit of $625 per thousand at a price of $9.22. Being an 
‘odd’ number, the cost figure of $8.59 might give you the impression of 
being the result of a very precise calculation. I would just like to 
caution you, therefore, to realize that while $8.59 has been arrived at 
by what I consider to be the best and most precise means appropriate 
to your situation, it is impossible for me to guarantee its accuracy. 
I’m sure you realize that. The best statement I can make about the 
figure of $8.59 is that it is the most likely outcome of a series of con­
tingent future events. It is quite possible that the ‘correct’ figure, 
determined after the completion of the contract, will be something 
different. I am also quite sure that any such difference will not be 
major.”
Hosmer replied that he understood the necessity of using the $8.59 
figure with caution, but nevertheless would appreciate Jenkins’ advice 
on what price to charge. He followed the argument that $9.22 should 
be the minimum, but felt that he might well be able to go higher, and 
make more profit.
Jenkins remarked that setting a figure above $9.22 was a matter for 
the most delicate business judgment, and in the last analysis would 
have to be Hosmer’s decision alone. He said that Hosmer ought to 
bear several facts in mind:
1. At $9.22 Utility Equipment would make a “satisfactory” profit, 
even on a minimum order (8,000 units).
2. National Paint would be evaluating Utility Equipment’s bid, 
along with others, and each bid would of course state only one price. 
This was important because the final result would be an “all or noth­
ing” affair, at the bid price.
3. At a high enough price, possibly $12.00, Utility Equipment’s 
chance of getting the contract was probably minimal.
4. From a strategic point of view, Utility Equipment’s chance of 
winning the contract would probably not vary with small variations in 
price. For example, if the next bid above Utility Equipment’s possible 
bid of $10.00 were $10.40, Utility Equipment’s chances would prob­
ably not have been adversely affected had their bid been $10.25. 
Jenkins said he doubted whether National Paint would be able to
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trade-off any supposed difference in the drawing power of different 
premiums with minute differences in their prices.
5. What it all amounted to, in Jenkins’ opinion, was that Hosmer 
ought to pick a price somewhere between $9.22 and $12.00 that he felt 
would be competitive with other, necessarily unknown, bids. Jenkins 
said he favored a bid of $10.00 because it straddled National Paint’s 
stated range of $8.00 to $12.00 and, therefore, he felt, stood a good 
chance of success without being “too low.”
Hosmer said that Jenkins’ analysis had been very helpful, and added 
that he would give the matter of pricing some serious thought before 
making his decision. He said that Jenkins’ very clear analysis had 
helped him to realize that there was no neat formula that could be 
used for pricing, and that it was a matter that involved a high degree 
of business judgment.
At this point Jenkins told Hosmer that he would like to take a few 
minutes to discuss the working capital problem that would arise if the 
bid were successful. He gave Hosmer a copy of the cash flow schedule 
he had prepared (See Table 1, page 56), and explained the 
assumptions on which it was based. Hosmer was most intrigued with 
this schedule, and remarked that although it could not in any way 
be described as profound, it set things out in a way he had never en­
visaged them, and very clearly as well. He said that he had known that 
the contract would call for working capital above the firm’s resources, 
but had not realized that the amount would reach $54,500 by Novem­
ber 1; he assumed that money would begin to come in from National 
Paint soon after that date. He felt that perhaps $5,000-$10,000 of 
Utility Equipment’s existing resources could be applied to this need; 
he doubted, however, that he would be able to defer dividend pay­
ments unless the situation were desperate, so that he would need 
external financing of up to $50,000. Jenkins suggested that a line of 
credit at the local bank could solve the problem. Hosmer agreed that 
this was one alternative, and said that he was very glad that Jenkins 
had drawn his attention to this potential problem far enough in ad­
vance for it to be solved before it really became a problem.
Before leaving, Jenkins mentioned to Hosmer that it had occurred 
to him that there might be an opportunity for savings in material costs 
if Hosmer could obtain price reductions from his suppliers by virtue of 
his doubling his purchases of materials for the pumps line, as he would 
do, starting June 1, if he obtained the contract. Jenkins said he had 
not taken account of any such potential saving in his calculations.
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Jenkins’ Letter to Hosmer
The following day Hosmer received a letter from Jenkins, which 
read in part as follows:
Dear Mr. Hosmer:
It was a pleasure to work with you on the National Paint pricing 
problem. There follows a summary of the work we performed on 
this engagement, and the results which I discussed with you in 
your office yesterday. Our bill for services is attached. [Section of 
letter summarizing work and results omitted here as repetitious.]
In the course of our work on this engagement we became aware 
of several areas in your company’s operations where we feel we 
could be of further assistance to you, and where we feel that you 
would benefit by having the work done. These are listed below 
for your reference.
1. Revise material and labor standards on hoist, pulley and 
block lines.
2. Institute a system for continuous updating of material and 
labor standards for your staff.
3. Design and install an improved chart of accounts and cost 
accounting system which would provide more accurate informa­
tion on product line costs on a continuing basis than we were able 
to develop for the pump line where in many instances we had to 
rely on historical records. Accurate cost information will enable 
you to measure product line profitability by channel of distribu­
tion, either those presently used or those which you might want to 
consider in the future.
We would be glad to discuss any of the above with you at your 
convenience if you are interested in pursuing this further.
Very truly yours,
s /  Peter Jenkins 
Smith, Adams and Jenkins
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Bartlett Lithographers
Bartlett Lithographers was one of the larger job printers in the 
metropolitan Boston area. In 1961, it employed approximately 100 
persons, and for several years its sales volume had been approximately 
$2,000,000 annually. Bartlett was known as a “city firm” that catered 
primarily to Boston companies; very little of its regular printing vol­
ume was done for customers beyond a 100-mile distance from Boston. 
The printing jobs that it handled ranged all the way from very small 
to very large volume runs. A high premium was placed on providing 
good, dependable service, and roughly half of Bartlett’s volume came 
from regular, long-time customers.
Bartlett Lithographers was a closely held, family corporation. Top 
management were members of the owner group and were actively 
engaged in running the business. The two most important executive 
positions were filled by Joseph Donovan, president, and George Peters, 
Jr., executive vice president. The owner-manager structure preceded 
both Mr. Peters and Mr. Donovan; a generation earlier Amos Hopkins 
and George Peters, Sr. had operated Bartlett as its founding partners.
Hopkins and Peters established a thriving business that was, in time, 
incorporated. At Mr. Hopkins’ death, his wife inherited majority con­
trol of the corporation, and Mr. Peters, Sr. ran the shop. His son, 
George, Jr., joined the organization and progressed in capability to 
the point where he assumed responsibility for the printing shop at his 
father’s death. Later, Joseph Donovan married Mrs. Hopkins’ daugh­
ter, and assumed the presidency of the corporation. Mrs. Mildred 
Hopkins treated both Donovan and Peters as equals, and in the opinion 
of the two executives, she had contributed immensely to the effective­
ness of their joint activities. In 1959, a third generation had joined 
management; Roger Peters had succeeded his father in supervision of
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shop activities. As a result, George Peters, Jr. said that he now had 
more time to devote to upper-level management matters, including 
sales and pricing problems.
James & Pearce, CPAs
For more than twenty years, James & Pearce—a large national firm 
of certified public accountants—had conducted audit and tax work for 
Bartlett Lithographers out of their Boston offices. Thus, in March 1962, 
it was with considerable background that James Turner and John 
Schmidt sat down to review the 1961 annual audit report that had been 
prepared for the principals at Bartlett. In 1961, Turner was partner-in­
charge of the Bartlett account. Schmidt, formerly the senior ac­
countant, was now manager of the account. It was customary at 
James & Pearce for those directly involved to study the audit report 
and all associated information in preparation for a review session 
with the client.
During the course of their discussion, which covered all of the usual 
routine matters, both Turner and Schmidt found their conversation 
turning frequently to the area of costs, pricing, and the adequacy of 
Bartlett’s internal accounting system. They saw several symptoms 
that suggested to them conditions that should be investigated. For 
one thing, Turner was concerned about the large volume of adjusting 
entries that were required annually. He wondered if that condition 
might be indicative of an unnecessarily weak basic accounting struc­
ture. He questioned whether or not the general accounting system in 
use at Bartlett was adequate, and he hypothesized that if the basic 
system was inadequate, it might follow that the cost data used in 
pricing would also be highly suspect.
As the two men reviewed what they knew of Bartlett, and studied 
the information that was available to them, they became more and 
more convinced that management should be alerted to a potentially 
undesirable situation. They knew, for instance, that the quarterly 
reports that were prepared for management’s guidance were outdated 
by more than a month when they were issued. They also knew that 
the standards used in costing production were several years old, and 
had been “adjusted” to current conditions by the application of a 
flat-rate percentage adjustment factor. They suspected that these 
costs might be quite inappropriate in the current competitive market.
Turner and Schmidt were also keenly aware that the cost system in 
use at Bartlett did not effectively contribute to the pricing and bid­
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costing procedures. Frequently, job-cost estimates that were compiled 
on the basis of existing accounting data were discarded in favor of 
“intuitive” quotes. That fact, in itself, caused both men serious con­
cern. They were firm in their belief that an accounting system could 
—and should—provide useful information for pricing, and that a 
properly devised system of cost accumulation should prove itself 
superior to purely intuitive procedures.
When they reviewed industry conditions in late 1961 and early 1962, 
it appeared all the more necessary to these men that Bartlett should 
look more closely at its costing procedures. For one thing, a large por­
tion of customer potential had “dried up”—the result of technological 
advances that had made it economical for large consumers of printed 
material to run their own in-plant printing operation. Bartlett, for 
example, had suffered the loss of a major customer who decided to 
operate what was referred to in the trade as its own “captive print 
shop.” It was possible that as much as one-third of Bartlett’s volume 
was lost when that customer invested in its own printing facility.
At the other end of the line, many short-run, relatively simple jobs 
were being successfully bid away from established printers by low-cost 
“basement shop” operators. Again, technological advances had made 
it possible for these operators to obtain relatively inexpensive equip­
ment which was quite adequate for turning out small jobs that did not 
impose rigid quality specifications. As a result, competition—in the 
form of lower prices—for these jobs had increased sharply.
Thus, established print shops with relatively high capacity potential 
found themselves faced with a demand situation that had been con­
fined, effectively, to the middle of the customer range that had ex­
isted previously. This created severe problems, not the least of which 
was constructing sensible, competitive, profit-generating bids to cap­
ture as much of the available market as was possible, consistent with 
sound business operations.
With demand off, Mr. Turner knew that a large number of critical 
pressures were being felt by the management of Bartlett Lithog­
raphers. In an attempt to maintain a reasonable level of production, 
he knew that it had become necessary for management to submit 
bids on marginal, low-profit business that, under more favorable con­
ditions, would scarcely have been considered at all.
Turner and John Schmidt saw two dangers here. One was, of 
course, that profit margins tended to be thinned as marginal business 
was added. Consequently, sustained dollar volume might quite pos­
sibly provide much smaller profit than had been the case under more
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favorable demand conditions. Reviewing the financial data for sev­
eral earlier years, both men agreed that the influence of slackened 
demand and consequent trimming of profit margins was clearly to 
be observed. The following summary figures for 1959, 1960 and 1961 
demonstrated the point:1
Year
Sales
(In thousands)
Before-tax
profit
1959 $1,992 $87
1960 2,084 97
1961 1,917 11
There was another side to the problem, too. James Turner observed 
that although many of the marginal jobs did not carry with them re­
turns that were, under normal conditions, considered to be satis­
factory, there was real danger of misappraising the value of marginal 
opportunities. In a severe cost-price squeeze, such as faced Bartlett 
in 1961, both Turner and Schmidt feared that inadequate accounting 
data—particularly production cost information—could seriously in­
terfere with maximizing the effectiveness of profiting from marginal 
opportunities. Also, both men knew that Bartlett was dependent on 
a number of highly skilled personnel; it was imperative that adequate 
volume be maintained in order to retain the basic skills that had 
come to be considered characteristic of the Bartlett organization.
Many of Turner and Schmidt’s apprehensions had been presented to 
Bartlett’s management in the past. However, management at that 
time was not responsive to the client review sessions or the manage­
ment letters sent by James & Pearce, CPAs.
Since the new management, under the direction of George Peters, 
Jr., had become more management-minded, Turner and Schmidt de­
cided to present all of their findings to their client at the forthcoming 
review session.
In mid-March of 1962, both Turner and Schmidt met with Joseph 
Donovan and George Peters to review the 1961 audit report and 
present their analysis of the situation. The Bartlett executives were, 
of course, aware of the deterioration of their profit position. They 
understood quite clearly the change that had taken place in the 
competitive situation as well. Thus, Mr. Turner’s discussions made 
some sense to them and raised many questions for their consideration.
1 See Exhibit 1 (page 65) for Bartlett’s 1961 income statement.
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Exhibit 1
BARTLETT LITHOGRAPHERS 
Statement of Income
For the Year Ended December 31, 1961 
( In thousands)
% to Sales
Sales, less discounts and allowances
Less: Commissions and brokers’ fees
$1,916.9
185.4
100.00
9.67
$1,731.5 90.33
Manufacturing costs:
Direct materials $ 770.0 40.16
Direct labor 226.6 11.82
Charged factory overhead 391.1 20.40
$1,387.7 72.38
Manufacturing profit $ 343.8 17.95
Less: Unabsorbed factory
overhead 46.2 2.42
Gross profit $ 297.6 15.53
Operating expenses:
Selling expenses $ 138.8 7.24
General and administrative
expenses 133.2 6.95
$ 272.0 14.19
Profit from operations $ 25.6 1.34
Other income ( expense) (14.0) ( .73)
Profit before federal income taxes $ 11.6 .61
Discussion of the internal accounting system consumed a major 
portion of the meeting, and the appropriateness of the accounting 
data for purposes of costing and quoting also received extensive con­
sideration. At the end of the conference all four of the men agreed 
that further study was clearly desirable, and that they should, with­
out question, meet again to consider specifically what might be done 
to assist Bartlett’s management in its new, uncomfortable, and highly 
competitive environment. As they left the meeting, Turner remarked 
to John Schmidt, “Well, we have been thinking in the right direction; 
I suspect that a good job of variable cost analysis is what will do 
the most good.”
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Exhibit 2
BARTLETT LITHOGRAPHERS 
Engagement Confirmation Letter
March 16, 1962
Mr. Joseph Donovan, President
Mr. George Peters, Jr., Executive Vice President
Bartlett Lithographers
Boston
Gentlemen:
We thank you for the opportunity of meeting with you last 
Thursday to discuss the study you wish made of your present 
cost system and related pricing practices. We are writing this letter 
to summarize the main points covered in our conversation.
As you pointed out during our discussion, the broad purpose of 
the engagement is to establish a working method for pricing anal­
ysis which takes into consideration the relationship between a 
series of possible prices and product costs in competitive bid 
situations. This is particularly important in view of the highly 
competitive situation which exists in the printing industry today.
As we see it, the major purpose of our work will be to make a 
general review of the present cost accounting system to make cer­
tain that your management has a firm basis for evaluating available 
alternate pricing possibilities. While all aspects of the present 
system will be covered, we will concentrate our effort in those 
areas which you have indicated required review. Specifically this 
would include:
1. Reviewing the present system in terms of the accumulation, 
flow, accuracy and reporting of cost information.
2. Evaluating the cost system structure in terms of the number 
of cost centers and the allocation of manufacturing burden 
to those cost centers.
3. Identifying the variable and fixed expense components of 
costs in each cost center and department.
4. Providing variable and fixed machine hour burden rates for 
quotation purposes.
In addition, our efforts will be directed toward providing you 
with a method that will aid in determining the financial effects 
of a series of alternate prices, taking into consideration:
1. The present volume of business in relation to plant capacity.
2. The desirability of accepting or rejecting additional business 
based on breakeven calculations.
This engagement will be directed by a member of our Manage-
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Exhibit 2 continued
ment Services Department. We estimate that this work will re­
quire approximately two days a week over the next 12 to 14 weeks 
for completion.
We will keep you advised of our progress during the course of 
the engagement and will prepare a final report covering findings 
and recommendations at the conclusion of our work.
Very truly yours,
/ s /
James & Pearce
The Management Services Engagement
Once he had presented the problem areas for his client’s consid­
eration, James Turner returned to his office and discussed the situation 
with Joseph Quinn. Quinn was functionally responsible for the man­
agement services phase of James & Pearce’s Boston operation. Turner 
briefed Quinn on the problems at Bartlett and brought him up to date 
on the meeting with the client. Together they surveyed the need- 
potential and agreed that an early meeting with Donovan and Peters 
would be desirable.
In late March, Quinn and Turner met with the two officers from 
Bartlett and discussed quite thoroughly the problems of costing and 
pricing, of meeting competition, of maintaining adequate productive 
volume, of retaining the basic work force, and of earning satisfactory 
profits. All were agreed that the cost data that were provided by 
the existing system were neither current nor useful; further study of 
the situation was agreed upon.
Thus, on the basis of their meeting with Donovan and Peters, 
Turner and Quinn decided to formalize the project, and to proceed. 
Essentially, the late March meeting established the basis on which a 
management services engagement would be conducted. Accordingly, 
Mr. Quinn took care of the arrangements incident to commencing 
the study; he sent a confirmation letter to the company (see Exhibit 
2, page 66) and he assigned John Burns, a member of his management 
services staff, to the project.
In rapid order, John Burns was introduced to the officers at Bart­
lett, James Turner handling the introductions personally, and the 
study commenced. Burns spent one or two days at the Bartlett plant 
each week, and prepared a weekly written report for Mr. Quinn. He
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studied the cost accumulation and reporting system intensively, and 
compiled an extensive file of work papers and analyses, developing 
data on current cost and production relations. (See Exhibit 3 below 
for a typical weekly progress report filed by John Burns.) By late June, 
Burns’ study was completed and the task of drawing conclusions and 
making recommendations began.
Exhibit 3
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Turner, Quinn and Burns focused their attention on four main 
sections of Burns’ work. First, Burns had reviewed Bartlett’s pro­
cedures for preparing price quotations. Next, he had studied current 
manufacturing cost relationships and recalculated departmental man­
ufacturing expense rates. Beyond that, as a third phase of his work, 
Burns endeavored to reclassify the departmental expense rates into 
their fixed and variable components. Finally, Burns had gathered 
production performance and capacity utilization data so that he might, 
if appropriate, relate cost information to the volume of activity ac­
tually planned or attained. A brief review of his findings in each of 
these four areas is presented below.
The quotation system. Price quotations at Bartlett were prepared 
by combining basic data for the several categories of cost that ap­
plied to each order. First, direct materials and purchased outside 
services were calculated. To those costs were added the in-plant 
charges for direct labor and other manufacturing expenses. The la­
bor and manufacturing expense charges were determined by extend­
ing the units of measurement (man-hours, press-hours, or weight of 
material) by the appropriate departmental cost rates to obtain dollars 
of cost. (See Exhibit 4 for the separate departmental rates used in 
1961 for costing and quotations.) No separate charge for selling and 
administrative expenses was made since the departmental rates in­
cluded an allowance for selling and administrative expenses. How­
ever, commissions and brokers’ fees were computed separately and 
all costs were then added to develop total costs for the order under 
consideration.
The addition of a desired profit amount to the total cost figure 
provided a selling price which might or might not be quoted to the 
customer. The calculated price, including profit, was used as a bench­
mark to determine pricing strategy; the final price quoted depended 
upon prevailing conditions. Such factors as size of the order backlog, 
the desirability of obtaining the business, and existing competitive 
conditions had much to do with the degree of departure from the 
calculated company price.
Burns noted two significant points about this system. The first was 
that certain costs were literally “pulled out of the air” without con­
sideration of the cost rates established for individual departments. 
For example, the time required to process art work varied depending 
upon the complexity of the job and the type of art work required. To 
save time, it had become normal practice to estimate an overall
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dollar cost for complex art work without attempting to establish the 
time required for the actual operation. In several instances the final 
cost of the work had exceeded the estimated cost, resulting in a re­
duction in the profit realized on the order. Here, of course, the va­
lidity of the expense rate for the Art Department had little bearing; 
this type of situation, Burns pointed out, could be corrected only by 
electing to quote such operations on a more detailed basis using 
more explicit cost estimates.
Also, Burns cautioned that the merging of selling and administra­
tive rates with the manufacturing rates obscured the cost quotation 
picture by burying selling and administrative expenses in the com­
bined rates. Frequently, when comparisons were needed between 
actual and estimated costs, company analysts had to separate and 
identify the several types of costs incorporated into the overall de­
partmental rates. Such a process had proved to be slow and ex­
cessively time-consuming.
Departmental manufacturing expense rates. Manufacturing ex­
penses (costs of production) were applied through 17 separate pro­
duction departments or cost centers. (See Exhibit 4, page 71.) Burns 
analyzed the manufacturing, selling, and administrative costs for each 
month of 1961 in order to ascertain the nature and behavior of costs 
incurred in each of the operating cost centers. He considered, as 
well, changes in cost structure that were anticipated in 1962; such 
changes as determination of current labor rates, increased charges 
for depreciation, and redistribution of general (service) cost center 
expenses were involved. (See Exhibit 4 for a comparison, by manu­
facturing cost center, of the cost rates in use at Bartlett, and the 
rates developed by the Burns’ study.)
James Turner was not surprised to see the spread between the 
company’s rates and those developed in the study. Tentatively, he 
believed, the study had confirmed his original judgment that the pres­
ent rates used for quoting and cost purposes were severely out of 
date. The study seemed to indicate that the cost center quotation 
rates did not reflect current conditions. Two obvious reasons for the 
differences, of course, were (1) the elimination of unabsorbed factory 
overhead by spreading overhead costs on the basis of 1961 actual 
volume, and (2) the different treatment of selling and administrative 
expenses proposed by Burns. But all the cost center rates had not 
changed by the same proportion, indicating that the “adjustments” 
made in prior years had been inaccurate.
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Exhibit 4
BARTLETT LITHOGRAPHERS
Comparison of Current and
Proposed Manufacturing Rates
Cost Center
Rates Used in 1961 
for Costing and 
Quotations
Proposed
Rates*
Art $ 6.29 $ 7.88
Camera 8.72 9.11
Photo composing 15.55 16.64
Vacuum frame 11.08 19.98
Deep etch 10.47 9.42
Presses #1 and #9 6.73 7.90
Press #4 12.74 14.97
Press #5 11.49 15.21
Press #6 16.33 16.00
Press #7 26.29 25.83
Press #8 19.94 22.41
Cutting 6.13 6.33
Bindery 4.10 3.85
Paper handling .77 .48
Shipping .78 skids 1.03
Packaging
2.21 other 
.09 .40
Delivery .55 .26
Increase
(Decrease)
$1.59
.39
1.09
8.90
(1.05)
1.17
2.23
3.72
( .33)
( .46)
2.47
.20
( .25)
( .29)
Not comparable
.31
( .29)
* Rates include direct labor and total manufacturing expenses only; sell­
ing and administrative expenses are excluded.
Note: See Exhibit 5 (page 73) for unit of measurement on which the 
rates are calculated.
Fixed and variable cost analysis. While the revision in manufac­
turing expense rates would be helpful for cost accounting purposes, 
Burns decided to extend his analysis to cover fixed and variable com­
ponents. He felt that the job of pricing (preparing bids) required 
more detail than was contained in the aggregate departmental ex­
pense rates. He developed new variable and fixed manufacturing 
expense rates for production cost centers based upon units of measure­
ment such as man-hours of direct labor, press-hours utilized, and 
weights of material. As shown in Exhibit 5, Burns calculated separate 
costing rates for:
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Direct labor
Variable expenses
Total variable costs
Fixed expenses
Total costs.
As noted in the exhibit, the rates as calculated were based on 1961 
cost and volume levels. In addition to the manufacturing expense 
rates, Burns also calculated new percentages for the selling and ad­
ministrative expenses, showing the variable and fixed components of 
cost where applicable. Burns expected that use of the new rates, con­
sidering the fixed and variable factors separately, would be far more 
realistic than pricing by the old, single-rate system.
To summarize the results of his fixed-variable cost analysis, Burns 
prepared a new version of the company’s 1961 income statement (see 
Exhibit 6, page 75). This statement indicated that, on the basis of most 
recent experience, variable costs approximated 80.19 per cent of sales 
revenue at the 1961 prices and product mix.
In reviewing his analysis with Turner and Quinn, Burns suggested 
that these average cost rates might be used to facilitate the task of 
preparing quotations on small items or orders which did not require 
the detailed analysis that was necessary for larger or more important 
orders. The average cost rates, he pointed out, could also be used to 
measure the profit content of orders which had already been priced 
and which were ordered repeatedly on the basis of the original price 
quotation.
In order to illustrate his point, Burns used the data in Exhibit 6 
to develop average manufacturing costs expressed in terms of their 
percentage relationship to direct labor dollars:
Variable manufacturing expenses 
Fixed manufacturing expenses
128.03%
65.06%
These average cost rates could then be used, Burns said, to estimate 
total manufacturing costs for a particular job, as shown on page 74:
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Estimated
Costs
Materials 
Direct labor
Variable manufacturing expenses
$1,500 
500
640 ($500 x 128.03%)
Total variable cost $2,640
Fixed manufacturing expenses $ 325 ($500 X 65.06%)
Total manufacturing cost $2,965
The addition of selling and administrative expenses to the manufac­
turing costs would complete the cost analysis and would provide a 
basis for comparing the estimated total cost with the previously es­
tablished sales price; thus, the company could predict the profitability 
for each order going through the shop, and could evaluate the neces­
sity of changing its prices on some of its reorder business.
Burns stressed that the use of this short form of estimating should 
be confined to those instances where the price had been established 
in the past, and repeat business was contingent upon quoting the 
original price. He observed that the use of average cost rates pre­
vented meaningful analysis of costs because the costs of the individual 
operations, by cost center, would not be available for comparative 
purposes. In addition, the use of averages implied that operations 
and costs are similar throughout the plant, and applied equally to 
all printing materials processed. Such implications were incorrect, he 
believed, as evidenced by the differing cost center rates for direct 
labor and expenses as he had determined them.
Plant capacity. The last major area investigated by Burns was the 
availability and utilization of Bartlett’s plant facilities. As Burns said 
to Turner and Quinn when they were reviewing his work, “If the 
plant were running full with work that covered its full cost, a vari­
able cost or contribution analysis would be purely academic.” In 
consultation with company management, Burns had quickly ascer­
tained that production facilities were available to handle a sizeable 
increase in sales volume. Printing capacity (i.e., the capacity of the 
seven printing presses) was the limiting factor in determining plant 
capacity. Management agreed that all other production and service 
centers would be capable of functioning at levels determined by press 
requirements, even if the presses were run around the clock.
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Exhibit 6
BARTLETT LITHOGRAPHERS 
Pro Forma Statement of Income
For the Year Ended December 31, 1961 
(In  Thousands)
% to Sales
Sales, less discounts and allowances $1,916.9 100.00
Variable costs:
Direct materials $ 770.0 40.16
Direct labor 226.6 11.82
Variable manufacturing expenses 290.0 15.13
Variable selling expenses 65.3 3.41
Commissions and brokers’ fees 185.4 9.67
Total variable cost $1,537.3 80.19
Variable gross profit $ 379.6 19.81
Fixed costs:
Fixed manufacturing expenses $ 147.3 7.69
Fixed selling expenses 73.5 3.83
Fixed general and administrative expenses 133.2 6.95
Total fixed costs $ 354.0 18.47
Profit from operations $ 25.6 1.34
Other income or (expense) $ (14.0) ( .73)
Profit before Federal income taxes $ 11.6 .61
Breakeven point $1,787.0
Note: The breakeven point is determined by dividing the fixed costs by 
the 1961 variable gross profit from operations ($354.0 ÷  19.81% =  
$1,787.0).
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Statistics gathered by company personnel for each press, when 
compared with potential press hours available, showed that the presses 
had operated at substantially a two-shift level during 1961. (The de­
tails of the plant capacity study are shown in Exhibit 7, page 76.) 
Bartlett executives considered that sufficient press capacity existed to 
increase sales volume by an additional $1,000,000 at the 1961 price 
level. However, they observed, an increase in volume could be realized 
only through accepting additional business at reduced prices.
Questions
1. Evaluate the analysis done by John Burns on this engagement. 
Do you agree with the decisions he made that are reflected by Ex­
hibit 5? What other areas would you have investigated if you had 
been assigned to this job?
2. What type of pricing formula do you believe Bartlett should use 
in preparing price quotations?
3. Using the data available in the case, compute the effect that a 
price decrease might have on profit. From your examination of this 
company’s cost-price-volume structure, what recommendations would 
you make to Bartlett’s management about their pricing policies?
4. Prepare, in outline form, a final report to the client as promised 
by James and Pearce in their confirmation letter (Exhibit 2, page 66).
Commentary on Bartlett Lithographers
James Turner decided that the best way to utilize the cost data 
developed by his assistant, John Burns, was to attempt to project 
what effect alternative pricing policies might have on Bartlett’s prof­
itability. As he saw it, the company’s major concern was to reverse 
the obvious profit decline. Three alternate courses of action seemed 
to be available. They were:
1. Reducing costs;
2. Increasing prices at current or reduced volume levels; and
3. Increasing volume at current or reduced prices.
As Turner saw it, the company was continuously reviewing costs
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and reducing them whenever cost reduction opportunities presented 
themselves. Increasing prices, in Turner’s opinion, was not consistent 
with the economics of the printing market at the time; strong pres­
sures were being exerted upon prices by Bartlett’s competitors. Tra­
ditional practices of requesting competitive bids probably meant that 
printing customers were fairly “price conscious,” and if this were true, 
raising prices might result in rather substantial reductions in volume. 
Although short-run profits might not suffer as a result of such an ac­
tion, Turner was more pessimistic about the longer-run implications 
of losing customers during the current, hopefully temporary, period 
of over-capacity in the printing industry.
A more positive program, in Turner’s opinion, would be one aimed 
at increasing Bartlett’s market share now by seeking higher volume 
through lower prices. Such a course of action also held out the pros­
pect of increasing short-term profits as well as the longer-run market 
position of the company. The first step in evaluating this course of 
action was a careful examination of the capacity utilization data that 
Burns had collected.
After studying the data contained in Exhibit 7 (page 76), Turner 
surmised that, except for presses #5, 7 and 8, there was room for addi­
tional volume even on a two-shift basis. Further, an entire third shift 
of plant capacity was available if work could be priced at a level that 
would bring it into the plant. Turner believed that the establishment 
of available plant capacity defined the limits within which alternative 
sales targets could be evaluated. Then, each targeted volume of 
sales—and the costs of those sales—could be analyzed to determine 
the profitability of the additional business being considered. The 
profitability of additional volume could be determined fairly easily 
using the variable cost data from John Burns’ analysis.
In order to test the effect of price and volume changes on Bart­
lett’s profits, Turner selected four possible price reduction levels that 
could be handled without exceeding Bartlett’s capacity, even though 
“fixed costs” might increase as more of the available capacity was 
utilized. Analyzing these four price levels illustrated the possible 
effects of lowering prices for additional business, and suggested a 
floor below which prices could not be set without experiencing 
losses. Turner’s four illustrations, as presented below, were subse­
quently included in the report which James and Pearce submitted 
to Bartlett Lithographers.
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Example Number 1:
Assumptions: 1) A three-shift operation producing $1,916,900 
sales on two shifts, and a potential of $1,000,000 
on the third shift.
2) A price reduction of 5 per cent applied to the 
$1,000,000. (This would reduce the additional 
revenue to $950,000.)
3) Variable costs will not exceed 1961 experience. 
(80.19 per cent of sales)
4) No increase in fixed costs.
1st and 3rd
2nd shifts shift Total % to sales
Sales $1,916.9 $950.0 $2,866.9 100.00
Variable cost 1,537.3 801.9 2,339.2 81.59
Variable gross 379.6 148.1 527.7 18.41
Fixed costs 354.0 0 354.0 12.35
Profit $ 25.6 $148.1 $ 173.7 6.06
Comments: 1) The variable cost per cent to sales has increased from 
80.19 per cent to 81.59 per cent. This increase is due 
to the reduction in sales prices of the additional vol­
ume. Company experience has shown that variable 
costs are 80.19 per cent of net sales after discounts 
and allowances. The variable costs of $1,000,000 in 
sales would be $801,900; if the same units are priced 
5 per cent less (at $950,000) the costs would still be 
$801,900.
2) Fixed expenses in this illustration have been charged 
to operations on the first and second shifts only, be­
cause the example assumes no increase in fixed costs 
for the third shift.
3) The results are self-evident; if the assumptions are 
valid, operating profits would increase by $148,100.
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Example Number 2:
A more conservative assumption might recognize that fixed costs 
would increase on the third shift and the Company, after appraising 
the increase, might decide that $35,000 should be added for new fixed 
costs. In this example, prices will be reduced by 10 per cent and 
fixed costs increased by $35,000.
Assumptions: 1) A three-shift operation producing $1,916,900 on 
two shifts and a potential of $1,000,000 on the 
third shift.
2) A price reduction of 10 per cent applied to the 
$1,000,000. (This reduced the additional rev­
enue to $900,000.)
3) Variable costs do not exceed the
4) Fixed costs increase by $35,000.
1961 level.
1st and 3rd
2nd shifts shift Total % to sales
Sales $1,916.9 $900.0 $2,816.9 100.00
Variable cost 1,537.3 801.9 2,339.2 83.04
Variable gross 379.6 98.1 477.7 16.96
Fixed costs 354.0 35.0 389.0 13.81
Profit $ 25.6 $ 63.1 $ 88.7 3.15
Comment: 1) In this illustration, the reduction in prices and the ad­
ditional fixed expenses would return $63,100 in addi­
tional profits if the assumptions concerning prices and 
costs are valid.
Example Number 3:
The company might find that prices would have to be reduced by 
15 per cent in order to obtain the additional volume. These forecast 
conditions are incorporated into this third illustration.
Assumptions: 1) A three-shift operation producing $1,916,900 
sales on two shifts and a potential of $1,000,000 
on the third shift.
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2) A price reduction of 15 per cent applicable to 
the $1,000,000. (This reduces the additional 
revenue to $850,000.)
3) Variable costs do not exceed the 1961 level.
4) Fixed costs are increased by $35,000.
1st and
2nd shifts
3rd
shift Total % to sales
Sales $1,916.9 $850.0 $2,766.9 100.00
Variable cost 1,537.3 801.9 2,339.2 84.54
Variable gross 379.6 48.1 427.7 15.46
Fixed costs 354.0 35.0 389.0 14.06
Profit $ 25.6 $ 13.1 $ 38.7 1.40
Comment: 1) The profit increase under these conditions would be
$13,100 assuming that the price-cost-relationships fol­
lowed the forecast.
Example Number 4:
It is evident from the preceding illustrations that prices on the 
increased volume cannot be reduced by as much as 20% without 
showing losses at the variable gross profit level. The reason for this 
is that variable costs, based upon company history, equal 80.19% 
of the sales dollar. If prices were set at 20% below 1961 prices for 
the $1,000,000 additional volume, the loss at the variable gross profit
level would adversely affect the profit of the two-shift operations. 
Thus:
1st and
2nd shifts
3rd
shift Total
Sales $1,916.9 $800.0 $2,716.9
Variable cost 1,537.3 801.9 2,339.2
Variable gross $ 379.6   ($ 1.9) $ 377.7
After he had reviewed the entire study with John Burns and Joseph 
Quinn, Turner undertook to prepare a brief written report to the 
executives at Bartlett Lithographers. The report was followed by an 
oral presentation.
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Basically, Turner’s proposed quoting procedure recommended that 
the company:
1) use the manufacturing cost rates that had been developed in 
the study;
2) determine separate quotation costs for selling and administrative 
expenses;
3) compare the desired selling price to the total variable costs in 
order to determine the variable gross profit (contribution to 
fixed costs) contained in each price; and
4) compare the desired selling price to total costs (variable plus 
fixed) to check the net profit after the absorption of allocated 
fixed expenses (net profit from operations).
Turner advised that provision should be made for testing quota­
tions against more than one price so that profit potentials of alternate 
prices could be compared before settling on a final price. He designed 
a new form for quotation purposes which incorporated his recom­
mended changes. (See Exhibit 8, page 84). The new quotation form 
revealed two important control figures: (1) the variable gross profit, 
and (2) the final profit from operations. The two profit figures, Turner 
explained, would point out the profit impact of alternate prices for in­
dividual orders, and would also show how much of the fixed costs 
would be absorbed by that order.
In his report, Turner pointed out that he had illustrated the selling 
price, sales volume, and cost relationships for Bartlett Lithographers 
as a whole. The same concepts, he said, were applicable to individual 
quotation and pricing situations. If a potential order could be priced 
lower than competition, and the lower price used as a selling point 
for increasing the order’s size or getting the order if it would otherwise 
have been lost, the effects upon profit could be evaluated before making 
a final price commitment. Conversely, using the new quotation form, 
the effect of higher prices could be analyzed, and the price-cost-profit 
relationships of these prices could be related to other prices being 
considered.
The Client’s Reaction
The James and Pearce report was mailed to Messrs. Donovan and 
Peters on July 13, 1962. The last paragraph in the transmittal letter
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stated, “We will be pleased to meet with you in the near future to 
discuss these recommendations in greater detail.” In a meeting with 
Bartlett management in early October 1962, Mr. Turner found the 
executives to be considerably less receptive to the report proposals 
than he had anticipated. One of the reasons for the client’s negative 
reaction was simply that, during the last few months, Bartlett had en­
joyed an upswing in its business. In Mr. Turner’s opinion, the addi­
tional gross margins provided by this upswing had dampened man­
agement’s interest in going after additional dollars of profit through 
adopting a contribution concept of pricing. Discussing the matter a 
few days later with his colleagues, Messrs. Schmidt, Quinn and Burns, 
Turner observed, “This is another example of the way management’s 
interests change. As we’ve all seen before, it’s difficult sometimes to 
hold its attention on a particular problem long enough to get it re­
solved. In this case, we will have to wait until the next cycle—that 
is, until profits drop off again—to make another major thrust at this 
approach. Fortunately, our continuing relationship with this client 
will permit us to stay on top of the situation, so that we can raise 
the pricing issue again at the appropriate time. In fact, this con­
tinuing relationship is a unique capability which CPA-consultants 
possess, and we must be sure that the client receives the benefit of it.
“There’s perhaps an even more fundamental reason why our pro­
posals to Bartlett have been ineffective,” Turner continued, “and that 
is simply management’s resistance to change. The reasons given by 
Donovan and Peters for not adopting our proposals were: (1) an 
unwillingness to enter into any pricing arrangement that did not re­
cover 'full costs,’ and (2) a fear that committing part of their capacity 
to marginal jobs at less than total cost might mean that they would 
have no room for more profitable work if it should come along. Both 
of these objections can perhaps be best understood if we try to view 
the proposed change through the eyes of Donovan and Peters. Re­
covery of 'full costs’ has been ingrained in this generation of Bartlett’s 
management since the beginning, and the current upswing just pro­
vides a convenient excuse for maintaining the status quo. In order to 
implement our suggestions, greater utilization of capacity, and there­
fore closer scheduling, would be required. At present, all scheduling 
in done by George Peters in the back of his mind, and without a 
compelling reason to revise his practices, the easiest thing to do is 
just to carry on as in the past.
“There’s no easy way to lick this problem,” Turner concluded, 
“but it does make it easier to tackle if we define the problem for what
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it is. Our approach really has to be an educational one, and hope­
fully, by continuing to work with this client during the months and 
years ahead, we can improve their own knowledge and ability to 
manage their business.”
Exhibit 8
BARTLETT LITHOGRAPHERS 
Proposed Quotation Analysis Form
Comparison of Costs and Selling Prices
Desired selling prices
Commissions and broker’s fees
( 1 )
XXX
XXX
Price Levels 
( 2 )
XXX
XXX
( 3 )
XXX
XXX
Total selling price xxxx xxxx xxxx
Variable manufacturing costs XXX XXX XXX
Variable selling costs XXX XXX XXX
Commissions and broker’s fee XXX XXX XXX
Total variable costs xxxx xxxx xxxx
Variable gross profit XXX XXX XXX
Fixed expenses XXX XXX XXX
Profit from operations xxxx xxxx xxxx
% variable gross profit to
total selling price — % — % — %
% profit from operations to
total selling price — % — % — %
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Greenville Seaplane Service, Inc.
Kingsbury, Chase & Co., CPAs, was a large New England firm with 
headquarters in Boston, Massachusetts, and offices in Hartford, 
Connecticut; Providence, Rhode Island; and Augusta, Maine. The 
firm had a total of 10 partners. Its practice comprised mainly audit 
and tax work, and most of its clients were medium-sized business 
establishments in the southern New England area. The firm’s part­
ners were, however, well aware of the fact that they were in a position 
to render valuable advisory services to many of their clients, and had 
therefore established a Management Services Department in 1960. 
In July that year Robert Chase, the senior partner in the Boston office, 
appointed Kenneth Morrison, a young CPA who had just completed his 
M.B.A. degree, as the firm’s first specialist in management services. 
Mr. Morrison had been on a two-year leave of absence from the firm 
to undertake graduate study. The firm’s arrangement with Mr. 
Morrison was that he would be located in the Boston office, and would 
temporarily be assigned to audit work but would primarily be avail­
able for work on management services assignments. Mr. Chase hoped 
that within a year Mr. Morrison would be specializing almost ex­
clusively in management services work, and would eventually become 
the firm’s partner in charge of the Management Services Department.
The new department proved to be very successful. By 1963 Mr. 
Morrison had been formally appointed Manager of the department, 
and had a staff of 4 people, two CPAs and two recent business school 
graduates. Mr. Morrison still reported to Mr. Chase, but had con­
siderable autonomy in the operation of the department.
In March 1963, David Edwards, partner in charge of the Augusta 
office, received a telephone call from one of the firm’s oldest clients, 
Leonard Vogel, President of Greenville Seaplane Service, Inc., of
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Greenville, Maine. Mr. Chase and Mr. Vogel had met while serving 
in the same unit of the Army Air Corps during World War II. After 
the war Mr. Vogel and two other Air Force friends had set up a small 
seaplane harbor and service establishment in Greenville, on Moose­
head Lake. One of Mr. Vogel’s partners had been killed late in 1946 
when his seaplane crashed on a mountainside in northern Maine, and 
the other left to set up his own business in California a year later. 
From late 1947, therefore, Mr. Vogel had operated the business as 
sole owner. He had incorporated as Greenville Seaplane Service, Inc., 
shortly after his second partner had left him. The business had be­
come one of Kingsbury, Chase & Co.’s first clients when the CPA firm 
was established on Mr. Chase’s return to Boston in 1946. For the first 
few years Mr. Chase personally had handled the work on the account, 
but it was transferred to the Augusta office when that was set up in 
1950. However, Mr. Vogel and Mr. Chase had maintained contact 
with each other.
When Mr. Vogel telephoned Mr. Edwards in March, 1963, he ex­
plained that he was preparing plans for the spring, when his busy 
season started, and needed some help for a review of his prices and 
pricing policies. He said that Mr. Chase had told him about Mr. 
Morrison and the new Management Services Department and won­
dered if they could handle the assignment. Mr. Edwards said he 
would be glad to have Mr. Morrison call Mr. Vogel and explore the 
question further.
Morrison’s Meeting With Vogel
Mr. Morrison arranged to meet with Mr. Vogel the following week 
at the firm’s Boston office, as Vogel had been planning to fly down to 
Boston on other business. Prior to the meeting, Mr. Morrison re­
viewed Greenville Seaplane Service, Inc.’s 1962 and 1961 financial 
statements, which Mr. Edwards had mailed to him. (See Exhibits 1 
and 2, pages 87-89.) Mr. Edwards had also included a short memo­
randum in which he described Greenville’s five “activities” in the 
following terms:
1. Charters. The company offers a charter service to fishermen and 
hunters wishing to travel to northern Maine, New Brunswick 
and Quebec. The company’s charter services are also often used 
by wealthy individuals desiring fast transportation to their sum­
mer homes in the same area. In addition, other charters of a 
miscellaneous nature are sometimes requested.
86
GREENVILLE SEAPLANE SERVICE, INC.
Exhibit 1
GREENVILLE SEAPLANE SERVICE, INC.
Comparative Balance Sheet
December 31, 1962 and 1961
Assets
December 31,
1962 1961
Current Assets
Cash $ 1,082 $12,261
Accounts receivable 21,967 6,300
Merchandise inventory 6,906 17,359
Prepaid expenses 4,519 4,994
Total current assets $34,474 $40,914
Fixed assets
Flight equipment, tools, fixtures, 
automobiles and furniture—at cost $50,118 $45,335
Less: accumulated depreciation 15,528 21,816
Building at cost
$34,590
20,230
$23,519
Net fixed assets $54,820 $23,519
Total assets $89,294 $64,433
December 31,
Liabilities 1962 1961
Current Liabilities
Accounts payable $ 5,582 $ 7,062
Notes payable (bank) 9,000 1,000
Greenville Marina 4,799 (1,161)
Income taxes 2,082 169
Accrued taxes (Other) 3,453 2,286
Total current liabilities $24,916 $ 9,356
Leonard Vogel—Note payable $ 7,000 —
Total liabilities $31,916 $ 9,356
Stockholders’ equity
Capital stock $50,000 $50,000
Less: treasury stock 7,500 7,500
Earned surplus
$42,500
14,878
$42,500
12,577
Total equity $57,378 $55,077
Total liabilities & equity $89,294 $64,433
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GREENVILLE SEAPLANE SERVICE, INC.
Comparative Statements of Income
For the Years Ended December 31, 1962 and 1961
December 31,
1962 1961
Sales of merchandise
Parts—shop $22,811 $11,052
Parts—other 16,512 20,123
Gas and oil 9,935 8,261
Airplanes 4,500 18,475
Total sales $53,758 $57,911
Less: cost of sales
Purchases $40,646 $49,341
Less: inventory increase 972 5,583
Cost of sales $39,674 $43,758
Gross profit on merchandise $14,084 $14,153
Service revenue
Flight instruction, dual $12,401 $17,353
Flight instruction, solo 12,779 18,342
Charter 23,495 19,807
Tutoring, aircraft rental, etc. 2,285 1,450
Total flight revenue $50,960 $56,952
Less flight expense 1,781 3,616
Net flight revenue $49,179 $53,336
Labor (shop)1 37,111 34,085
Moorage 6,175 5,964
Total service revenue $92,465 $93,385
Other income
Gain on sale of used aircraft $ 7,179 $ 5,705
Commissions 3,290 3,867
Miscellaneous 2,111 3,816
Total other income $12,580 $13,388
Total gross profit, service & other income $119,129 $120,926
1 Labor hours charged to customers were 9,664 in 1962 and 8,458 in 1961.
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Exhibit 2 (continued)
1962 1961
Operating expenses
Advertising $ 1,378 $ 1,362
Bank charges 48 48
Building repairs and maintenance 433 541
Car expense 865 846
Depreciation2 7,555 11,487
Donations 65 136
Dues and subscriptions 105 43
Gas and oil—Aircraft 5,419 6,685
Equipment repairs 694 559
Rent 6,850 7,400
Insurance 2,967 3,503
Laundry 736 751
Legal and audit 3,028 263
Licenses and permits 540 301
Office supplies and postage 1,223 1,346
Outside labor 2,400 577
Ramp and ground maintenance 1,090 3,576
Salaries—Flight 15,148 12,886
Salaries—Office 9,358 5,485
Salaries—Shop 29,272 25,546
Shop supplies 1,123 1,234
Taxes—payroll 3,077 2,446
Taxes—other 1,974 3,592
Telephone and telegraph 1,233 1,376
Travel and entertainment 671 193
Utilities 800 845
Total Operating Expenses $98,052 $93,027
Other expenses
President’s salary $14,400 $14,400
Interest paid 1,576 1,839
Miscellaneous 971 1,865
Total other expenses $16,947 $18,104
Total operating and other expenses $114,999 $111,131
Income before Federal income taxes $ 4,130 $ 9,795
2 Includes $2,000 depreciation on nonflying equipment each year. The 
balance is for depreciation of various aircraft owned for part or all of 
each year.
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2. Maintenance Service. The company provides maintenance for 
seaplanes regularly moored in its harbor, and also for seaplanes 
specially flown in for that purpose. Seaplane owners from upper 
New England and the Eastern provinces of Canada often fly 
their planes several hundred miles to Greenville for service.
3. Moorage. The company rents storage space in a small hangar 
it has constructed, and also provides outside storage on land 
that it has rented at the shore of the lake. (Mr. Vogel is the 
owner of the land.)
4. Flight Instruction. Mr. Vogel and the other pilots on his payroll 
offer flight instruction in any of the company’s airplanes. These 
include a Cessna 180, a Piper Super Cub, and a Champ.
5. Sales of Merchandise. The company operates a general seaplane 
supply store that stocks gas and oil, seaplane parts, charts, log 
books, and miscellaneous items all the way down to soda pop. 
In addition, the company acts as sales representative for many 
of the manufacturers of light airplanes, and usually handles the 
sale of at least two light planes per year. Airplane sales are not, 
of course, as predictable or as regular as general merchandise 
sales.
When he arrived, Mr. Vogel told Mr. Morrison that he had been 
wondering recently whether the prices that he charged for the com­
pany’s various services were correct. He had started thinking about 
this because, as he put it to Mr. Morrison, “We’re usually pretty busy, 
and at the end of the year it seems as though we’ve done an awful lot 
of hard work and yet we sometimes don’t seem to come out with 
enough profit.” In effect, Mr. Vogel was wondering whether chang­
ing any of his prices would improve his profitability. He told Mr. 
Morrison that the prices that he was charging had been set several 
years ago, and had not been changed at all except in recognition of 
some cost increases over the years. He said that it had now occurred 
to him that it might be advantageous to have someone like Mr. Mor­
rison review his price structure, and perhaps come up with some 
recommendations that would hopefully lead to increased profits.
Mr. Morrison replied that he thought that he and his staff could 
handle this type of assignment. He told Mr. Vogel that it was his 
practice to ask prospective management services clients to spend some 
time with him describing their operations and the nature of their 
problem so that he could form an opinion as to the amount of work
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which would be required. If Mr. Vogel had time to do this on this 
visit he would try to give him an estimate before he left for Green­
ville. Mr. Vogel said that he did have the time. Mr. Morrison sug­
gested he start by giving him a rundown on the important factors 
affecting each part of the business. The discussion which ensued is 
reported below.
1. Flight Charter
The two planes used for charters were the Cessna at $35 per hour 
and the Super Cub at $16 per hour. Direct expenses incurred in 
connection with charter flights were mainly gasoline consumption, at 
the rate of 12 and 7 gallons per hour, respectively. Mr. Vogel said 
that pilot’s salary was also one of the applicable costs, but when Mr. 
Morrison questioned him on this point he admitted that the pilots’ 
terms of employment were fixed by contract, either 12 months or 6 
months per year, and that in addition the pilots also doubled as flight 
instructors when required. Mr. Vogel said that there were four or 
five operators of charter flights in the area that he served, but that he 
did not experience too much competition. He felt that the service 
that he provided was far superior to that offered by his competitors 
in that, for example, his service was more personalized, and his flights 
were better, faster, and used more modern equipment. He said that 
he did more charter business than his typical competitor and there­
fore achieved some of the advantages of specialization.
2. Servicing
Shop labor was charged out at $6.00 per hour. Before charges were 
finally billed, it was Mr. Vogel’s custom to review the total bill and 
adjust it downwards, if necessary, depending on the value of the job to 
the customer and on how well it had been done. Mr. Vogel said that 
repair work on aircraft was mostly a question of labor time, rather 
than expensive parts. The result was that the cost of aircraft repairs 
was very high. He had known cases in which the cost of a repair job 
exceeded the market value of the aircraft after the repair had been 
carried out.
Repair work was one of the areas in which Mr. Vogel thought he 
ought to increase his rates, but he said that repair work was so expen­
sive that he did not feel it was possible for him to charge more for it. 
He had no corporations among his repair clients, and he felt that the 
individuals who came to him would lose their interest in flying if he 
made repair work too expensive. He believed that his customers only
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had a limited amount of money to spend on aircraft maintenance. Mr. 
Vogel said that he had no competition in his repair service because 
his company was the only establishment in the area that had the 
specialized facilities necessary to take care of float aircraft. In addi­
tion, he pointed out that many of his repair mechanics had been with 
him for as long as 15 years, and were well known for the quality of 
their work. These factors, he believed, were the primary reasons why 
people often flew several hundred miles to bring their aircraft to 
Greenville for repair work.
Mr. Vogel told Mr. Morrison that he had heard that very few repair 
shops in the light aircraft service industry were profitable. However, 
he said that he would never think of closing down his own shop, 
because he needed its facilities to take care of the aircraft that he 
operated himself. He estimated that the shop had worked about 1,500 
hours on servicing his planes in 1961 and a somewhat lesser amount, 
perhaps 1,300 hours, in 1962. In addition, having a well set up repair 
shop often meant that additional profits could be obtained from the 
rebuilding of wrecked aircraft which could be bought for a low price 
and sold for a good profit after being rsetored to operating condition. 
He felt that this kind of profit made up for the losses that were in­
curred in the shop on routine jobs. Another variation on this idea 
was to buy and use a new aircraft and then, after a few hundred hours 
of flying time, renovate it and sell it at a price that was below the 
new machine price at retail, but still above the company’s wholesale 
cost.
3. Moorage
The company charged $15 a month for outside storage and $25 a 
month for six of the eight inside stalls. The seventh inside stall was 
rented at $30 a month, and the eighth was used to store the company’s 
Cessna plane. Mr. Vogel was hoping to raise all inside rentals to at 
least $30 per month. Mr. Vogel explained that he used a forklift truck 
to move seaplanes from the lake shore ramp to the storage area be­
tween the hangar and the repair shop. When a customer came to use 
his plane, or a service or repair job was scheduled, the forklift truck 
would then simply drive to the storage area and pick up the plane 
in question.
In response to a question from Mr. Morrison, Mr. Vogel said that 
while repair work did not bring much in the way of other types of 
business with it except moorage, it was often the case that planes
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were brought in for moorage and that the owners would then later 
request that Mr. Vogel have them serviced during the winter at any 
convenient time. Apparently some repair shops that Mr. Vogel knew 
about gave free moorage for airplanes brought in on repair jobs, but 
it was Mr. Vogel’s practice to charge separately for moorage for all 
the time that a moored plane was not in the repair shop. Because of 
the protected position that the company’s premises enjoyed at the foot 
of Moosehead Lake, it was quite safe for aircraft to be stored outside 
during the winter. Theoretically there was danger from both high 
winds and heavy snow, but in all the years that Mr. Vogel had known 
Greenville, the southern portion of the lake had never been subject 
to high winds at any time of the year, and it was a relatively simple 
matter to prevent excessive amounts of snow from piling up on air­
crafts’ wings when snow fell during the winter.
4. Flight Instruction
The company employed two instructors during the six summer 
months, and kept one of them on for the six winter months as well. 
The permanent instructor received $500 per month and the summer 
instructors $450 per month. Mr. Vogel said that they averaged 80 
to 90 hours a month chargeable time in the summer each, and 30 to 40 
hours a month in the winter. The instruction charges and gas con­
sumption rates for the three airplanes used were as stated below:
Solo Dual
Gallons of gasoline 
per hour
Champ $10 $15 5
Super Cub 12 17 7
Cessna 180 30 35 12
Mr. Vogel told Mr. Morrison that he was fairly certain that flying 
lessons were unprofitable. He said that the $5 differential between 
solo and dual rates was “obviously not sufficient to cover the cost of 
employing an instructor.” Mr. Vogel told Mr. Morrison that the 
volume of flying instruction had declined steadily since the end of the 
war, when many ex-servicemen had decided to take flying lessons un­
der the GI Bill. In addition, his company experienced severe competi­
tion for instruction business because they were at a considerable dis­
advantage compared to the many land plane operators in the area. 
Compared with these people, Mr. Vogel’s seaplanes required a larger
93
investment and upkeep cost and involved a much greater risk in 
providing flying instruction.
5. Merchandise Sales
There was about a 25 per cent average gross profit on the sale of 
general merchandise and parts ( the latter were sold mainly in connec­
tion with repair work, but occasionally were delivered directly to the 
customer). Mr. Vogel said that, of course, there was some expense 
connected with the handling of parts sales. For instance, he estimated 
that about 20 per cent of his full-time pilot’s time was spent on parts 
sales activities. The gross profit percentage on gas and oil was about 
30 per cent, and Mr. Vogel remarked that his company was selling 
gas for 2 to 3 cents a gallon less than competitors.
As a final point, Mr. Vogel pointed out that it was not really strictly 
necessary for depreciation to be charged in his annual income state­
ments, although he had been doing so. With the exception of the 
Cessna, which had depreciated somewhat, Mr. Vogel had found that 
it was usually possible to sell used airplanes at approximately the 
wholesale cost of the plane to the company, so that no loss in value 
was ever sustained.
Mr. Vogel summed up by saying that he had flight equipment that 
could be flown more than it was being flown, and facilities that could 
be used more than they were being used. What he wanted to do was 
to use this unused capacity and to do so in the most profitable way. 
If, for example, a price reduction in charter flights would increase 
total charter flight profits by adding more in volume than was lost 
through the price reduction, then he thought that this was a sound 
and constructive way to put his idle capacity to use.
By the time that this point was reached it was almost midday, and 
Mr. Vogel mentioned that he was having lunch with Mr. Chase. He 
said he would return after lunch to see whether Mr. Morrison had 
been able to form any opinion about the project. As he left Mr. Vogel 
made a casual comment that seemed to indicate that he was somewhat 
apprehensive about the potential cost of the project. Mr. Morrison 
replied, “Let’s talk about that when you get back from lunch.”
Questions
1. What type of fee arrangement do you think Mr. Morrison should 
offer to Mr. Vogel? If Mr. Vogel requested some rough estimate of the 
total billing, how would you respond?
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2. Do you think that Mr. Morrison should formalize this project 
by sending Mr. Vogel a letter confirming the nature and the scope of 
this engagement? Draft a letter that you think might be suitable for 
this purpose.
3. Using the data available in the case, prepare an analysis of 
product line profitability for Greenville Seaplane Service, Inc., for 
1962 and and/or 1961. What comments can you make about Mr. 
Vogel’s pricing policies as a result of your analysis?
4. What kinds of additional data could Mr. Morrison try to get from 
a visit to Greenville in order to improve upon your analysis?
5. As Mr. Morrison, prepare a memorandum to Mr. Vogel reporting 
your major findings and recommending the way that he might pro­
ceed to modify his prices in order to improve his profitability.
Commentary on Greenville Seaplane Service, Inc.
When Mr. Vogel returned to Mr. Morrison’s office the latter was 
ready with a suggestion. He told Mr. Vogel that he felt that there 
were two interrelated elements in the problem—not only pricing as 
such but also product profitability. For a multiproduct company an 
analysis of these two elements could be quite a large job. He appre­
ciated, however, that Mr. Vogel did not want a large and expensive 
job done. He proposed, therefore, that the firm undertake a limited 
review of the problem. This review would be exploratory rather than 
decision-oriented, but would serve to open up the problem, and in all 
likelihood indicate whether and where any additional work was 
necessary. Mr. Morrison said that it was quite possible that some 
preliminary conclusions might in fact be drawn from the review 
he had in mind, but he cautioned Mr. Vogel against expecting too 
much in the way of results. Nevertheless, he pointed out, the cost 
would be limited in accordance with Mr. Vogel’s wishes, and yet some 
useful results might be obtained. He said that to minimize the cost he 
would assign Mr. Dexter Cleve, one of his staffmen, to do the bulk 
of the work. Mr. Cleve, one of the two M.B.A. graduates on Mr. 
Morrison’s staff, was billed at the rate of $12.50 per hour. Mr. Mor­
rison said that Mr. Cleve would probably need to devote the better 
part of a week to the project. He, himself, would supervise Mr. Cleve, 
and bill his own time at his regular rate of $20 per hour. He further 
suggested that his report be informally presented by way of an in­
formal memorandum, to avoid unnecessary expenditure of time in
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presentation (although he added that he would certainly be available 
to discuss his findings if Mr. Vogel so desired). In total he estimated 
the cost of the job at between $500 and $600. He pointed out that 
the firm normally did not undertake jobs of such small size.
Mr. Vogel replied that Mr. Morrison’s proposal seemed to be in line 
with his own wishes, particularly in the matter of cost, and authorized 
him to proceed as soon as he was ready. Mr. Morrison promised to 
start Mr. Cleve on the assignment within the next three weeks. Since 
the assignment was defined as a review, Mr. Morrison expected that 
Mr. Cleve would be able to do most of his work in the Boston office, 
relying primarily on the firm’s files and the notes that Mr. Morrison had 
made during his conversation with Mr. Vogel, and supplementing 
these with a one-day trip to Greenville and telephone calls to Mr. 
Vogel.
Mr. Cleve’s Investigation and Analysis
Later that week Mr. Cleve found an opportunity to begin his review 
of the material that Mr. Morrison had given him, which included 
the company’s 1962 and 1961 financial statements (Exhibits 1 and 2, 
pages 87-89) which Mr. Edwards had mailed to Mr. Morrison. After 
reviewing the material, Mr. Cleve’s first conclusion was that the 
dominant characteristic of the company’s operating situation was the 
fact that a very substantial portion of its total expenses was fixed. In 
addition, many of the expense headings in the income statement were 
items that could not be allocated to any of the business’ five areas of 
operations. In other words, Mr. Cleve visualized the company’s total 
annual operating expenses as being made up of the following three 
types:
1. Expenses that varied more or less directly with the volume of 
business in a particular operation.
2. Expenses which could be assigned to one of the company’s 
operating activities, even though the expense itself was unlikely to 
vary with volume.
3. Expenses which were fixed for the business as a whole, and 
could not be assigned to any of the individual operations.
To Mr. Cleve, the importance of this breakdown was that under 
pricing theory, any business operation should make a contribution over
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and above the directly variable costs associated with it, and that the 
total of such contributions over variable costs should at a minimum 
provide for the fixed costs of operating the business entity. If the 
company’s cost framework had been the reverse of what it was (i.e., if 
variable costs had been greater and fixed costs lower), Mr. Cleve 
reasoned that it would have been relatively easy to gauge overall 
profitability from individual product line profitability because the bulk 
of the expenses could properly be allocated to individual operations. 
If fixed overhead costs were small, then it would not be necessary for 
the required contribution to rank large in comparison with the variable 
costs per unit. In the case of Greenville Seaplane Service, Inc., how­
ever, Mr. Cleve recognized that his problem was much more difficult, 
as the two types of overhead “pools” which had to be covered were 
very large in relation to the variable costs of running each operation. 
Because of the large overhead factor, Mr. Cleve thought that here 
indeed was a case where “direct cost” pricing could lead a firm into 
financial difficulties.
Referring to Mr. Morrison’s notes, Mr. Cleve noted that Mr. Vogel 
himself had been aware of this problem, although he had expressed 
it in a different way, when he had pointed out that he had facilities 
and equipment ready for use and that his problem was getting more 
use out of them. The mere fact of having the equipment and facilities 
available accounted for the bulk of the company’s costs, and these 
costs had to be met by the margins over and above the variable costs 
earned from providing services. As a first step in his analysis, there­
fore, Mr. Cleve decided to identify as accurately as possible those 
expenses which were fixed and those which varied with the volume 
of business. Taking the 1962 and 1961 income statements, he pre­
pared the schedule on page 98, which identified costs which could be 
allocated, and which therefore provided a total figure for fixed “gen­
eral overhead” costs.
Several of the items in the schedule on the following page gave Mr. 
Cleve some difficulty which he eventually finally resolved by dis­
cussing them with Mr. Vogel. The first of these was depreciation. Ac­
cording to the notes that Mr. Cleve had received from Mr. Morrison, 
there was no real decline in market value on airplanes, even though 
Mr. Vogel’s books showed an item for depreciation expense, and this 
statement was corroborated by the gain realized from the sales of used 
aircraft in 1962 and 1961. For the purpose of his analysis, therefore, 
Mr. Cleve decided to ignore all depreciation expense except the $2,000 
per year depreciation on non-flight equipment.
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Computation of General Overhead, Years 1962 and 1961
1962
Expenses per income statements:
“Operating expenses”
“Other expenses”
$ 98,052 
16,947
Total expenses $114,999
Less items not to be included in general 
overhead (i.e., to be allocated) 
Depreciation on flight equipment
Gas and oil
Insurance
Laundry
Salaries—flight
Salaries—shop
Shop supplies
Taxes—payroll
Officers’ salary1
$ 5,555 
5,419 
2,740 
736
15,148
29,272
1,123
2,534
2,400
Total to be allocated $ 64,927
General overhead
1961
$ 93,027 
18,105
$111,132
$ 9,487 
6,685 
3,300 
751
12,886
25,546
1,233
2,100
2,400
$ 64,388
$ 50,072 $ 46,744
The next item requiring special consideration was insurance ex­
pense. On inquiring into the nature of the policies held by the com­
pany, Mr. Cleve found that the company’s insurance expense could be 
allocated partly to general overhead and partly to the flight depart­
ment and the repair shop. The amount listed in the schedule above 
was the total that could be allocated to these two departments. Pay­
roll taxes were similarly analyzed and allocated. (See departmental 
analysis on the following pages.)
Finally, Mr. Cleve noted that Mr. Vogel’s salary was charged at 
$14,400 per year. Mr. Cleve felt that it was reasonable to assume that
1 Officers’ salary at $1,000 per month included in overhead ( see text for 
explanation). The $2,400 deduction is not actually allocated to a product 
line; it is deducted only because general overhead is to include only a 
$12,000 salary, as against $14,400 paid.
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a business of this sort would, in the absence of an owner-manager, 
have to employ a manager at a substantial salary and that this salary 
ought to be included in the general overhead pool. After some dis­
cussion with Mr. Vogel, therefore, Mr. Cleve decided that a man­
agerial salary of $1,000 per month would be appropriate to include 
in the general overhead, and he accordingly deducted from the total 
the excess over that amount that had actually been included in the 
expense totals on the schedule on the previous page.
Having established the size of the general overhead pool, Mr, Cleve 
then decided to compare the contribution rates being earned by the 
different departments of the business. He decided to classify the 
company’s operations into three groups for purposes of analysis. The 
first was merchandise sales, the second was the flight department 
i.e., instruction and charter), and the third was the repair shop. This 
grouping omitted moorage as a separate income producing activity. 
In Mr. Cleve’s opinion (substantiated by a discussion with Mr. Vogel), 
there were no expenses at all that were directly allocable to moorage, 
and so he decided to credit moorage income against the general pool. 
Mr. Cleve’s computations of departmental gross profits for the three 
groups are shown in Schedules I, II, and III, which follow.
I—Computation of Gross Profit from Sales of Parts,
Airplanes, and Gas and Oil—Years 1962 and 1961
1962 1961
Sales—
Parts $39,323 $31,175
Airplanes 4,500 18,475
Gas and oil 9,935 8,261
$53,758 $57,911
Less cost of sales (per income statements) 39,674 43,758
Gross profit $14,084 $14,153
% of gross profit 26.2% 24.4%
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II—Computation of Gross Profits from Flight Department
Years 1962 and 1961
1962 1961
Income—
Instruction, including tutoring $26,430 $36,203
Charter 23,495 19,807
Aircraft rental 1,035 942
$50,960 $56,952
Direct expenses—
Salaries—flight $15,148 $12,886
Taxes—payroll 865 700
Gas and oil 5,419 6,685
Insurance 2,626 3,100
Flight expense 1,781 3,616
Shop hours @ $4 per hour 5,284 6,000
$31,123 $32,987
Gross profit $19,837 $23,965
% of gross profit 38.9% 42.8%
III—Computation of Gross Profit from Shop Labor
Years 1962 and 1961
1962 1961
Sales of shop labor $37,111 $34,085
Direct expenses—
Salaries—shop (after deducting
charges on own aircraft) $23,988 $19,546
Taxes—payroll 1,669 1,400
Shop supplies 1,123 1,234
Laundry 736 751
Insurance 114. 200
$27,630 $23,131
Gross profit $ 9,481 $10,954
% of gross profit 25.5% 32.1%
The schedules ( II and I I I ) for the flight department and shop labor 
both included expense headings such as insurance and payroll taxes 
which had been allocated based on Mr. Cleve’s analysis. In addition, 
Mr. Cleve decided to include as a flight department expense the value
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Analysis of Net Earnings, Years 1962 and 1961
1962 1961
Gross profit—
Sales
Flight department
Shop labor
$14,084
19,837
9,481
$14,153
23,965
10,954
Less general overhead, net of moorage*
$43,402
43,897*
$49,072
40,778*
Operating profit
Other income, net of depreciation over $2,000**
$ (495) 
7,025**
$ 8,294 
3,901**
Net earnings before officer’s salary adjustment 
Adjustment to bring officer’s salary to actual
amounts
$ 6,530
(2,400)
$12,195
(2,400)
Net earnings per statements $ 4,130 $ 9,795
Notes:
* Total general overhead
Less moorage
$50,072
6,175
$46,744
5,964
Net general overhead $43,897 $40,780
** Other income, per income statements
Less depreciation as charged
Add depreciation included in
general overhead
$12,580
(7,555)
2,000
$13,388
(11,487)
2,000
Net other income $ 7,025 $ 3,901
of the shop labor performed for the flight department. An analysis of 
Greenville’s records showed that 1,321 hours had been spent by the 
shop in 1962 on planes owned by Greenville. Mr. Cleve valued these 
hours at $4.00, a rough average of the hourly rates actually charged 
to commercial customers in 1961 ($4.03 per hour) and 1962 ($3.84 
per hour). Because Mr. Vogel’s 1962 estimate of “inside” shop hours 
was so accurate, Mr. Morrison accepted the 1,500 hour estimate for 
1961 without verification. The amounts thus determined were treated 
as an expense of the flight department in Schedule II, and the same 
amounts were used to reduce the expense of shop salaries in Schedule 
III.
After preparing the departmental gross profit analyses, Mr. Cleve 
prepared the schedule ( above) to reconcile departmental gross
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profits with net earnings as reported for the corporation in its 1962 
and 1961 income statements. This reconciliation, as will be noted, 
shows departmental gross profits, less general overhead net of moor­
age (i.e., operating profit), plus other income net of additional de­
preciation not included in overhead, less additional officer’s salary not 
included in overhead, resulting in the before-tax earnings total as 
reported in the financial statements.
Mr. Cleve then turned to an examination of the variability of the 
departmental gross margins that he had just computed. He realized 
that while the departmental contribution percentages that he had 
calculated were accurate guides as to the extent to which present 
prices produced margins to cover general corporate overhead, it was 
nevertheless true that many of the expenses that he had included in 
the departmental statements were fixed rather than variable. This 
meant that additional or marginal business could be more profitable 
than the calculated gross profit percentages indicated. He reasoned 
that it was important for Mr. Vogel to know the marginal profitability 
of his different operations, in the event that it was later decided that 
price changes might produce greater total contributions and thus 
increase profits. As far as the gross profit on merchandise sales was 
concerned, it was clear that the margin calculated, roughly 25 per 
cent, was reasonably accurate, because all of the costs deducted from 
sales were variable with sales. As it appeared in the corporation’s 
income statements, “cost of sales” was simply the normal calculation 
of purchases less inventory adjustments.
As far as the flight department was concerned, Mr. Cleve concluded 
that the only expenses which were truly variable were the following: 
gas and oil, flight expense, and shop hour charges. (While the latter 
was an internal charge, Mr. Cleve thought it was probably a fair 
representation of the costs actually incurred in maintaining the com­
pany’s aircraft.) The major “direct expense” for the flight department 
was “flight salaries” which could only vary in large steps, depending 
on Mr. Vogel’s decision to hire or fire his pilots. Once they were on the 
payroll, their salaries were incurred whether or not they flew charters 
or provided student instruction. The other major direct flight depart­
ment expense, insurance, was definitely fixed, as it related to the 
coverage that Mr. Vogel bought each year against the various risks 
that were associated with having a flight department in operation. 
The three truly variable items totalled $16,300 in 1961 and $12,484 in 
1962. These totals were 29 per cent and 24 per cent respectively on 
the flight department revenue in each year. This meant that, on the
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average, flight revenue provided a 75 per cent contribution. Mr. Cleve 
decided to look into this more deeply, and prepared the following 
schedule to show the hourly costs of operating the three different 
aircraft which the company owned.
Computation of Estimated Hourly Cost of Operating
Aircraft
Champ Super-Cub Cessna
Gas consumed (at cost) $1.26 $1.76 $3.02
Maintenance
Manhours (at $4 per hour) 1.30 1.92 2.32
Material .40 .50 1.25
$2.96 $4.18 $6.59
The costs included in the schedule above were the only costs that 
varied with actual operation volume. Mr. Cleve contrasted these 
hourly costs with the standard hourly rates that the company charged
for the use of its aircraft, 
(all figures per hour).
This comparison showed the following:
Champ Super-Cub Cessna
Revenue
Solo instruction $10.00 $12.00 $30.00
Dual instruction 15.00 17.00 35.00
Charters — 16.00 35.00
Costs (previous schedule) $ 2.96 $ 4.18 $ 6.59
Contribution
Solo instruction $ 7.04 $ 7.82 $23.41
Dual instruction 12.04 12.82 28.41
Charters — 11.82 28.41
Contribution %
Solo instruction 70% 65% 78%
Dual instruction 80% 75% 81%
Charters — 74% 81%
As can be seen from the above, none of the different flying opera­
tions offered a substantially different contribution rate to the average 
75 per cent referred to above. Perhaps the most notable conclusion 
to be drawn from this particular portion of the analysis was that the 
Super-Cub appeared to be the least profitable plane on a percentage 
contribution basis. One conclusion which Mr. Cleve drew from the
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Combined Results of Flight Department and Its
Flight department direct expenses 
Less volume—variable items
1962
$31,123
12,484
1961
$32,987
16,301
Calculations
Flight department fixed expenses $18,639 $16,686 (1)
Add: Repair Shop fixed expenses:
Direct expenses $27,630 $23,131
Less: volume—variable items** 1,859 1,985
Gross fixed expenses $25,771 $21,146
Less: net sales revenue
(net of variable costs) 35,252 32,100
Repair shop net fixed
expenses (gain) $(9,481) $(10,954) (2)
Flight department
net fixed expenses $ 9,158 $ 5,732 (3) =  ( l )  + (2)
Flight department contribution % 76% 71% (4)
Flight department
breakeven volume $12,000 $ 8,100 (5) =  (3) ÷  (4)
(Actual volume $50,960 $56,952)
* Supplies and laundry
percentage contribution figures was that if Mr. Vogel believed that 
the demand for instruction or charter flights was very susceptible to 
price reductions, there was plenty of latitude for them.
As far as the repair shop was concerned, Mr. Cleve came to the 
conclusion that practically all of the “direct expenses” were in fact 
fixed, once the repair shop was set up and in operation. Mr. Vogel in­
dicated that he had had many of his mechanics in his employ for a 
considerable period of time, and he had told Mr. Morrison that he 
had no intention whatsoever of laying them off when business was 
slack. As he had told Mr. Morrison, many of his repair customers 
came to him because they knew of the reputation of his mechanics. 
The second thing that struck Mr. Cleve about the repair shop was 
the other statement Mr. Vogel had made to Mr. Morrison; namely, 
that as far as he was concerned, it was necessary for him to have a 
repair shop in existence in order to cater to the needs of his flight 
department. He was thus not particularly concerned if the repair
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shop did not show a profit on the outside repair work that it performed. 
(In actual fact, as the schedule included earlier shows, this depart­
ment did provide a contribution of between 25 and 30 per cent.) The 
important point, however, was Mr. Vogel’s insistence that his having 
a repair shop was in no way related to the volume of repair work that 
came from outside.
Bearing this in mind, Mr. Cleve prepared the schedule on page 104, 
which showed the results for the flight department and the repair shop 
combined, with the revenue earned by the latter being deducted from 
its total expenses, and the net excess being deducted from the direct 
expenses of the flight department. This calculation produced an inter­
esting “breakeven” result.
The schedule on page 104 showed that with this reorganization of 
the figures, the flight department together with its “subsidiary service 
department,” the repair shop, actually had a very low net fixed cost to 
be covered from service revenue in 1962 and 1961. As the schedule 
shows, the breakeven sales volume for the two years was $12,000 and 
$8,100, respectively, compared to over $50,000 realized in each year.
Reverting to the point made earlier that variable expenses in the 
repair shop only amounted to a little under $2,000 in both 1962 and 
1961, against revenue of $37,000 and $34,000, respectively, Mr. Cleve 
noted that the actual contribution percentage in the shop (disregard­
ing the treatment in the immediately preceding paragraph) was there­
fore 94 per cent. Whether or not repair shop contribution was allo­
cated to the fixed expenses of the flight department, Mr. Cleve realized 
that the fixed nature of practically all of the repair shop expenses 
meant that marginal business was extremely profitable.
Mr. Cleve’s Conclusions
When he had completed the preceding analysis, Mr. Cleve wrote a 
memorandum to Mr. Morrison enclosing the various schedules repro­
duced on the preceding pages, and commented as follows:
The main accomplishment of my analysis has been to bring out 
very forcibly the extent to which Greenville Seaplane’s costs of 
doing business are fixed, even at the departmental level. This 
means that additional business in both the flight departm ent and 
the repair shop would be extremely profitable; the only department 
with “conventional” profit margins is the merchandise sales depart­
ment.
I have always felt that one of the most important factors to be 
taken into account in pricing decisions is the competition which
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any particular businessman faces. In the case of this particular 
business, by Mr. Vogel’s own admission, there is not very much 
actual competition. In fact, most of the competition felt by Green­
ville Seaplane Service, Inc., is in the instruction field, where land 
plane operators are at considerable advantage, compared to Mr. 
Vogel. On the other hand, Mr. Vogel experiences little competition 
for most of the other lines of his business, simply because his is 
the only float aircraft company in the area. For the bulk of his 
business, therefore, Mr. Vogel is actually in the position of a local 
monopolist. As evidenced by his actions regarding the adjustment 
of repair bills, Mr. Vogel in fact demonstrates no intention of acting 
like a monopolist. Apparently he believes that repair bills at 
“standard” rates or at posted rates are “just too high” for all or 
many of his customers. Presumably, Mr. Vogel’s business judgment 
tells him that he would suffer more from the alienation or shock 
caused by large repair bills than he would gain by the increased 
revenue to be gained by full-price billing.
This last point is particularly relevant as far as a pricing recom­
mendation is concerned. Despite Mr. Vogel’s local monopoly 
(perhaps because of it), he avoids billing excessive charges for 
repair work. It may be presumed that he knows what he is doing. 
In any event, it was entirely beyond the scope of this particular 
study to determine whether Mr. Vogel would in fact lose more 
by increasing his repair charges and taking the risk of losing other 
business.
As far as merchandise sales were concerned, my conclusion is 
that Mr. Vogel is probably in the usual type of retail selling 
situation there, namely one in which his selling prices are fairly 
well fixed or established, either by custom or by the manufacturers. 
In fact, retail prices might even be determined by competition for 
items such as gasoline, although it is hard for me to imagine how 
anyone dissatisfied with Mr. Vogel’s gasoline price could take his 
plane elsewhere to obtain gasoline. Here again, it was primarily 
a question of public relations. If the customer knows that because 
of Mr. Vogel’s local monopoly, he is being charged excessive or 
“above normal” prices for gasoline, oil, etc., it is quite possible 
that he would feel alienated and that Mr. Vogel would stand to 
lose future business.
The flight department is, in my opinion, the most likely candidate 
for price experimentation and changes. As my analysis has pointed 
out, the variable costs included in the provision of all of the flight 
departments’ services are very small indeed, so that at current 
price levels the contribution earned is extremely high. From the 
analysis, it is clear that Mr. Vogel could experiment by lowering 
his instruction rates, in order to see whether volume would increase 
sufficiently, without risking the possibility of not covering variable 
costs. My conclusion is that the charges for flight instruction 
should probably be reduced, perhaps below that charged by land-
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based flying schools. If the market were price sensitive at all, this 
would be likely to increase the instruction volume, either as a result 
of expansion of demand, or at the expense of Mr. Vogel’s competi­
tion. Suitable experimentation would indicate what the most ad­
vantageous reduction would be.
On the other hand, the demand for charter services is probably 
insensitive to price changes mainly because it is very much a luxury 
type of purchase. I would therefore recommend that Mr. Vogel 
experiment by raising his charter prices in an effort to test this 
assumption. If it is found that net revenue increases, Mr. Vogel’s 
profits would improve. If on the other hand he finds that the 
demand for charter services is sensitive to price, he could experi­
ment in the other direction. Charter rates are, of course, subject 
to the same limitation that Mr. Vogel has already placed upon 
repair shop work; namely, that the charges should not be so high 
as to alienate customers. In my opinion, Mr. Vogel is the best 
judge of the extent to which prices could be raised without in­
curring the intangible costs of customer ill will. However, a 
conscious program of price experimentation, i.e., 10-lesson prices, 
group prices, reduced prices on Mondays, etc., might provide very 
useful data about market sensitivity.
The combined effect of raising charter rates and reducing the 
rates for instruction may have the additional longer-run advantage 
of broadening the market for private seaplane flying. If Mr. Vogel 
makes it less expensive for a repeat charter customer to learn to 
become his own pilot, he may succeed in converting some charter 
customers to pilot-owners, with a resulting increase in Greenville’s 
revenues from plane sales, servicing and moorage.
After Mr. Morrison had reviewed Mr. Cleve’s memorandum, he 
forwarded it and the supporting schedules to Mr. Vogel, with a note 
indicating that he thought that Mr. Cleve’s analysis covered all rele­
vant points in adequate detail. Mr. Morrison said that he would call 
Mr. Vogel the following week to see whether he wished to discuss 
the analysis with him.
When he called Mr. Vogel, Mr. Morrison found that he was well 
satisfied with the analysis that had been done. He asked for some 
technical explanations on some of the schedules compiled by Mr. 
Cleve and told Mr. Morrison that he felt that the study had been very 
helpful to him, and that he would give serious consideration to follow­
ing the various recommendations. He added that he did not wish to 
have any additional work done by Kingsbury, Chase & Co. on the 
pricing question at the present time, because he was not certain 
whether additional expenditure would produce results that were more 
helpful or meaningful to him than the initial report, with which he
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repeated he was extremely pleased. However, he pointed out that he 
would be seeing Mr. Edwards of the Augusta office from time to time 
in connection with the audit and tax work they performed for him, 
and would again make his contact via Mr. Edwards if further reflection 
convinced him that additional analysis of the pricing problem was 
merited.
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Industrial Heating Equipment 
Company, Inc.
Fuller & Co., a local accounting firm in Cleveland, Ohio, numbered 
among its clients of long standing the Industrial Heating Equipment 
Company, Inc., (HeatCo). HeatCo sold and serviced a wide variety 
of industrial heating systems in the Greater Cleveland area. Fuller 
& Co. had performed an annual audit for HeatCo and had served as 
tax advisers to the company and its owner-president, Mr. Joseph 
White, for more than 20 years. A very friendly relationship existed 
between Mr. White and Mr. Norman James, the partner in charge of 
the HeatCo account.
During the first week of January, 1962, when Mr. James was hold­
ing a preliminary tax meeting with Mr. White, the latter mentioned 
that he was concerned because his internal record-keeping and re­
porting system did not give him information on the costs generated by 
the various departments within his company. This concern had ap­
parently developed in December, 1961, when Mr. White had tried 
to review his pricing schedule for the company’s service department 
because he suspected that the department was operating at a loss. 
He asked if anyone at Fuller & Co. could help him with this problem. 
Upon hearing this, Mr. James suggested that Fuller & Co.’s Manage­
ment Services Department might be of assistance and suggested that 
a meeting be arranged later that week with the partner in charge of 
the department to see what Fuller & Co. could do for HeatCo. Later 
that day Mr. James dropped into the office of Mr. Joseph Brooks, the 
Fuller & Co. partner in charge of the Management Services Depart­
ment, to set up the appointment and tell him some of the background.
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Fuller & Co. had six full partners, including Mr. Fuller, the founder, 
Mr. James, Mr. Brooks and three others, and an equal number of junior 
partners. In all, Fuller & Co. employed 35 accountants and 10 addi­
tional office employees. Its audit clients ranged from a small seven- 
man specialty manufacturing concern to a heavy equipment builder 
with annual sales of $30 million. Most of its clients were companies 
with between 50 and 250 employees. Over and above its audit clients, 
many of whom were tax clients as well, Fuller & Co. served a number 
of companies only as tax counselors. These included companies which 
did not wish to be audited or who were audited by small local account­
ing firms which had no tax department and which had referred their 
clients to Fuller & Co.
The Management Services Department of Fuller & Co. had been 
established in late 1956 under the direction of Mr. Joseph Brooks, who 
was now a full partner in the firm. Originally management services 
work took only a fraction of Mr. Brooks’ time, but by 1962 the depart­
ment had grown to the point where not only did he spend most of his 
time with management services work, but he also had a young staff 
accountant assisting him full time and used a portion of the time of 
several other audit staff members. Mr. Brooks expected that by mid- 
1963 the volume of work in the Management Services Department 
would support a full-time, five-man staff which would include three 
CPAs and two men with general business background who were to be 
hired in mid-1962 and put through a 6-12-month training program. 
Mr. Brooks’ department currently accounted for about 10 per cent of 
Fuller & Co.’s total billings.
Mr. Brooks had joined the firm in 1955, after spending several years 
in a U.S. Navy audit office following his graduation from college in 
1952. In 1953, while in the Navy, he passed his CPA exams and subse­
quently had worked closely with several small and medium-sized 
Navy contractors and became quite interested in their operating prob­
lems. Upon joining Fuller & Co., he was assigned to the tax depart­
ment, where he spent almost two years before Mr. Fuller asked him 
to accept responsibility for setting up a Management Services De­
partment.
During the first eight months of Mr. Brooks’ new assignment, he 
spent almost all of his management services time in improving his pro­
fessional competence in his new field. He also continued to spend a 
diminishing proportion of his time on the tax problems of clients he 
had served previously. His “training program” included reading books
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on management techniques and concepts, attending seminars and trade 
shows held by manufacturers of computers, machine tools, and other 
equipment, visiting the plants of many of Fuller & Co.’s clients, and 
reading on a regular basis all the leading management journals. During 
this period, he also talked to each of the firm’s audit and tax partners to 
acquaint them with the types of management service jobs he felt he 
could undertake. He asked them to look for opportunities to suggest 
possible consulting engagements to their clients.
Mr. Brooks’ early management services jobs were concentrated pri­
marily in the area of inventory control, and he performed all the work 
on each engagement himself. Virtually all of these jobs were referred 
to him by the Fuller & Co. audit partners. By 1962, however, the 
Management Services Department was being called in for many 
different types of tasks.
As of early in 1962, Mr. Brooks was spending his time approximately 
as follows:
50%—Analyzing data and developing recommendations for the 
management services jobs handled by himself.
30%—Supervising the Management Services Department and the 
management services jobs handled by juniors.
10%—Unbilled (new business development, self education, etc.)
5% —Working with other Fuller & Co. partners in connection with 
Audit or Tax Department engagements.
5% —Performing tax work for the Fuller & Co. tax department.*
Fuller & Co. billed for management services work in the same 
manner as for regular audit or tax work. The fees were set up at the 
usual rate for the individuals who worked on a job, and the client was 
charged for all actual time spent. There were, however, two excep­
tions to this rule (which also occurred occasionally in both tax and 
audit work). If a specific engagement took much less time than might 
have been expected based on the results, or if the client received far 
more value than the fee would indicate, Fuller & Co. would increase
* Primarily connected with the litigation of a specific tax case on which 
Mr. Brooks had done much of the initial work prior to the establishment 
of the Management Services Department.
111
the fee to reflect these factors. On the other hand, if client goodwill or 
new account cultivation considerations indicated that a fee smaller 
than the amount actually generated should be charged, Fuller & Co. 
would reduce the fee appropriately. About 10 per cent of the firm’s 
management services work fell into this latter category. Separate 
invoices to cover each management services job were sent to the firm’s 
clients (even to those which retained Fuller & Co. on an annual basis 
for audit and/or tax work). This was done to help establish the man­
agement services group in the minds of its clients as a separate de­
partment of Fuller & Co. providing a service separate and distinct 
from that of the regular audit or tax staff.
Industrial Heating Equipment Company, Inc.
After Mr. James had left Mr. Brooks, the latter called John Park 
and asked him to bring in the office file on HeatCo. A summary of 
some of the recent financial statements in the file is contained in 
Exhibits 1 and 2 (Balance Sheets and Income Statements, respec­
tively) which appear on pages 117 and 118. In addition, the file 
contained a descriptive memorandum which Mr. James had prepared 
some years previously, and which is summarized below:
Industrial Heating Equipment Company, Inc., which is known by 
its trademark, HeatCo, is located in [one of the industrial areas 
on the outskirts of Cleveland]. The firm sells and services a wide 
variety of industrial and institutional heating systems in the Greater 
Cleveland area. HeatCo.’s annual sales run between $400,000 and 
$500,000. Mr. Joseph White, president of HeatCo., owns 100 
per cent of the stock of the firm. He is assisted in the management 
of his company by Mr. Buldon Ives, who as sales manager is the 
second “key man” at HeatCo. Mr. Ives is thoroughly familiar with 
all the statistics and figures of the company’s operations and 
participates in all management decisions.
HeatCo performs two distinctly different, although inseparable, 
types of activities. The major type, which produces by far the 
greater portion of its sales income and takes the majority of its 
management’s time, is the sales and installation of industrial 
heating systems. (The phrase “industrial heating systems” as used 
here refers to systems for institutions such as hospitals and schools 
as well as for industrial plants and office buildings.) HeatCo’s 
second type of activity is the servicing of these heating systems.
This service is a necessary and important part of the company’s 
activities, because without it the sale of systems would be virtually 
impossible.
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The sales activities of the company are, of course, a year-round 
activity, but the installation of heating systems is highly seasonal, 
reaching a peak during the summer and dropping to almost a 
standstill during winter. The company varies its work force in 
accordance with these seasonal fluctuations as much as possible, 
although it has to maintain its supervisory personnel and a nucleus 
of skilled workers on the payroll throughout the year in order not 
to lose them.
Service, on the other hand, is a relatively stable activity. The 
decline in “repair” types of service calls during the summer months 
is compensated for by the annual cleaning and inspection of 
customers’ systems. The service force consists of five men who 
work under the direction of Mr. “Mac” Fisher. Reporting directly 
to Mr. White, Mr. Fisher is responsible for scheduling service calls, 
dispatching the men, and maintaining an adequate stock of repair 
parts, as well as training and supervising the servicemen. The 
entire service department, therefore, operates relatively inde­
pendently of the rest of the company.
As he read this description of the service department, Mr. Brooks 
wondered why there was no provision in the company’s accounting 
and bookkeeping system for the separation of the costs incurred by 
the service department. Mr. Brooks knew that it was this fact, and the 
suspicion that the service department was being run at a loss, that 
prompted Mr. White to ask if Fuller & Co. could help him.
Introductory Meeting
The introductory meeting was held at the office of HeatCo on 
January 10, 1962. Messrs. White, Ives, James, Brooks, and Park at­
tended. After the usual initial pleasantries, Mr. Brooks suggested that 
before any discussion of the problem itself, Mr. White might go into 
some detail about the operations of his company in order that the 
Fuller & Co. men could develop a mental framework within which to 
consider the service department problem.
Mr. White began by explaining that most of HeatCo’s dollar volume 
was made up of sales of furnaces, although the company also handled 
boilers, controls, and the ductwork or piping necessary in a system. 
HeatCo usually would bid on a job and then buy the necessary equip­
ment, although it worked on a commission basis for some items. Mr. 
White referred to his copy of the 1961 income statement (see Exhibit 
2, page 118) to show the breakdown between various types of sales. 
He explained that the “parts” figures referred both to parts used in
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connection with servicing and repairing customers’ heating systems 
and to parts used for occasional small jobs to change or improve 
present systems. (These smaller jobs usually were done on a “time 
and material” basis.)
Mr. White stated that HeatCo carried no inventory other than the 
most frequently needed repair parts. He said that the equipment 
manufacturers gave excellent delivery service on most parts from 
regional warehouses, and that manufacturers would give a firm price 
commitment to HeatCo for all equipment which it would need for 
the contract jobs on which it was bidding.
Mr. White explained that the business of selling and installing in­
dustrial heating systems was highly competitive. Entry into the 
business was relatively easy because dealers did not have to carry 
inventory and did not need a large plant. The equipment manufac­
turers would give the same price and delivery commitments to any 
reputable firm. Although local competition was not “cutthroat,” it 
was certainly severe. Mr. White stated that to win a satisfactory vol­
ume of contracts, HeatCo not only had to price its bids quite carefully, 
but had to offer warranties and the guarantee of continuing availabil­
ity of service for its installations. The pricing of each quote was done 
with an eye both to equipment and installation costs, all of which were 
quite predictable, and to the market and competition for the job. 
Often HeatCo was forced to “throw in” certain “extras” to win a bid. 
This kind of competition, Mr. White said, was common whereas actual 
price cutting was not considered by those in the trade in Cleveland to 
be an acceptable form of competition and was extremely rare. The 
“extras” most often used in the bidding were the warranty terms. 
Therefore, in “building up” the cost estimate that was prepared prior 
to submitting a bid on a job, the cost allowance for the free servicing 
that might be required under the warranty clause rarely bore any 
close relationship to the expected cost of fulfilling the terms of the 
warranty. Mr. White said that the amount allowed for warranty work 
was his competitive “fudge factor,” reflecting what he thought could 
be charged without jeapordizing the firm’s chances of winning the 
contract.
Mr. Ives stated, in response to a question asked by Mr. Brooks, that 
the warranty allowances on the past year’s contracts had ranged from 
about $100 to $1,500 per contract, with the majority being in the $200 
to $450 range. He said that only about 20 per cent of recent contracts 
had warranty allowances of over $500 and that he felt on the basis of
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current experience that performing warranty service on most of the 
others would cost HeatCo more than had been allowed in their bids 
on the contracts. He had no way of confirming this, however.
“The important thing that we want to know,” said Mr. Ives, “is how 
much this service operation is costing us. The servicemen spend their 
time doing warranty work, other service work for which we can 
charge time and materials, a small amount of “free service” when one 
of us feels that customer relations considerations call for this, and in 
addition they work on making panels for contract installations. At 
the present time we have no idea whether or not we are losing a lot 
of money on these operations or only a little and, in either event, how 
much on each. Although competition for new business means that we 
are pretty well stuck with the losses on the warranty work, we can 
adjust our pricing for billable service somewhat, and we should be 
costing the panel work realistically. What we want you to do is to tell 
us what our costs are, how much we are losing in each of these areas, 
and then set things up so that in the future our bookkeeper can tell 
us how we are doing on a monthly basis.”
After some additional discussion, Mr. Brooks was able to determine 
that the two top executives of HeatCo were unable to provide any 
further significant information. It was also apparent to Mr. Brooks 
that Messrs. White and Ives had already made the decision to retain 
Fuller & Co. to examine their problem and were not waiting for a 
formal proposal from his department. Mr. Ives’ remark, quoted above, 
had convinced Mr. Brooks of this, and he attributed it to the fact that 
over the years Mr. James had succeeded in developing an extremely 
good relationship with the two men. Apparently, once Mr. James had 
suggested that Mr. Brooks’ Management Services Department examine 
the problem, there was no question in the minds of Messrs. White 
and Ives that this should be done. Now they appeared anxious for 
Mr. Brooks to get on with the job. He sensed that he should rapidly 
conclude the current conference in order not to risk annoying the two 
men with what to them could be boring repetition of “obvious” facts. 
Mr. Brooks also sensed that not only was no formal presentation ex­
pected, but that at this meeting the two HeatCo executives expected 
him to indicate what he expected to do and when he would do it.
When they returned to the office Mr. Brooks informed Mr. Park 
that he would have the responsibility of gathering the data and doing 
the bulk of the analysis of the HeatCo problem. He suggested that 
Mr. Park return to HeatCo the following day to look briefly at the
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bookkeeping system before the two men worked out a plan for the 
job. Mr. Park did so, and on the basis of a discussion with HeatCo’s 
bookkeeper, Mrs. Sampson, prepared the description of the existing 
methods included as Exhibit 3 which appears on page 119. Mr. 
Brooks also dictated a short letter to Mr. White in which he recalled 
that Mr. White had told him to omit the formalities, but that he never­
theless preferred to confirm the terms of the engagement. He added 
that he expected that no more than 15 man days of work would be 
required, and that HeatCo would be billed at Fuller & Co.’s usual 
management services rates for the time actually spent on the job.
Questions
Up to this point, this case contains insufficient data to permit you to 
analyze HeatCo’s costs or prices in order to arrive at specific recom­
mendations for management. The major problem faced by Fuller & 
Co., in fact, is the collection of the necessary data. Before you read 
the commentary, therefore, it is suggested that you:
1. Prepare a list of the kinds of information that will need to be 
gathered on this engagement.
2. Decide how you would go about getting these data.
3. Consider the form that Fuller & Co.’s recommendations should 
take. Specifically, should Fuller & Co. concentrate on analyzing costs 
and prices in order to be able to suggest particular changes, or should 
they devote their main attention to the creation of an improved re­
porting system?
In addition to the above, you should consider the following ques­
tions on Fuller & Co.’s relationship with HeatCo.
4. Did Brooks act too hastily in making his brief verbal proposal?
5. Should Brooks’ letter have been sent? If so, should it have con­
tained a detailed proposal rather than a repetition of Brooks’ verbal 
summary?
6. Did Brooks handle the question of the fee correctly? Spe­
cifically, should he have made a point of discussing it with his client?
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Exhibit 1
INDUSTRIAL HEATING EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC. 
Comparative Balance Sheet
October 31, 1960 and 1961
ASSETS
October 31,
1960 1961
Current assets
Cash
Accounts receivable $ 68,820
Allowance for
$ 63,647
66,320
$ 96,957
3,500
$ 41,626
93,457uncollectible accounts 2,500
Inventories 13,455 13,049
Fixed assets
Plant and equipment $ 23,402 $ 25,670
Accumulated depreciation 13,039 10,363 14,306 11,364
Other assets* 5,750 5,157
Total $159,535 $164,653
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
Equities
Accounts payable $ 14,752 $ 10,237
Accrued payroll & bonuses $ 16,300 $ 14,206
Accrued, withholding, & payroll tax 10,702 10,801
Accrued profit sharing contribution 16,127 43,129 15,144 40,151
Reserve for warranty service 10,000 10,000
Equities $ 67,881 $ 60,388
Common stock 31,500 31,500
Retained earnings 60,154 72,765
Total Liabilities and Equities $159,535 $164,653
* Other assets
Prepaid expenses $ 3,692 $ 1,800
W ork in process 256
Panel inventory 935
Cash surrender value & accum.
Dividend—life insurance 1,802 2,422
Total $ 5,750 $ 5,157
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Comparative Statements of Income
For the Years Ending Oct. 31
Sales
Contracts 
Service and repair 
Parts
Commissions earned 
Discounts earned 
Miscellaneous
Total sales
Cost of goods sold 
Inventory decrease 
Freight
Materials & parts 
Labor
Total
Gross profit
Expenses
Office supplies & postage 
Telephone & telegraph 
Union insurance & pension fund 
Fed’l. & state income tax 
Uniforms
Blueprints & diagrams 
Contract labor 
Employee travel 
President’s travel 
Vehicle expenses 
Entertainment 
Repair & maintenance 
Depreciation 
Rent
Salaries (excluding president)
Insurance 
Life insurance 
Utilities 
Payroll taxes 
Other taxes 
Professional fees 
Dues subscriptions 
Donations 
Interest expense 
Miscellaneous 
Bad debts 
Bonuses
Discounts allowed 
Commissions paid 
Organization expenses 
President’s salary
Profit sharing trust contribution & expenses 
Total expenses
Net profit
1959 1960 1961
$438,577 $419,303 $347,972
13,428 12,397 13,102
38,322 37,828 34,183
9,326 24,759 39,796
10 984 648
76 30
$499,663 $495,347 $435,731
$ (1,966) $ 1,701 $ 406
6,419 4,383 3,844
256,567 258,406 211,963
45,511 54,381 55,166
$306,531 $318,871 $271,379
$193,132 $176,476 $164,352
$ 1,596 $ 1,793 $ 2,043
4,016 4,686 4,979
697 769 1,035
17,515 7,991 6,564
380 384 376
177 139 255
1,637 518 294
5,574 5,801 5,129
796 1,329 1,739
5,155 5,058 6,868
2,599 3,917 2,272
163 1,725 532
3,722 4,298 5,269
6,300 6,300 6,300
26,092 30,313 28,886
3,340 1,417 1,893
253 253 253
734 683 677
3,010 3,421 3,572
645 917 936
2,275 1,650 1,300
562 695 743
534 1,200 1,209
5 23 —
997 1,119 681
1,643 748 1,038
19,800 22,400 17,200
224 205 188
1,161 1,084 150
249 249 249
41,957 33,994 32,175
14,969 16,127 16,346
$168,777 $161,206 $151,151
$ 24,355 $ 15,270 $ 13,201
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Exhibit 3
INDUSTRIAL HEATING EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC.
Notes on Accounting Procedures in Use, 1/11/62
1. Payroll Book
All wages and salaries broken into three accounts:
a. Labor (shown as Cost of Goods Sold)
b. Salaries (shown as an Overhead Expense)
c. President’s Salary (shown as an Overhead Expense)
2. Sales Book
Kept by category; sales made entered under one of the following 
columns:
a. Contracts: including all contract installation work
b. Service and Repair: including actual charges billed to customers 
for service labor and travel
c. Parts: including actual charges billed to customers for parts 
needed for service and repair or other noncontract work
d. Commissions earned: including total commissions received on 
equipment sold under this arrangement
e. Miscellaneous
3. Voucher Register
Kept as a chronological record of invoices received by the company. 
Distributions made into columnar accounts for end-of-month posting 
to ledger accounts.
Distributions include:
. a. All material purchases entered under “Material and Parts” (a Cost 
of Goods Sold)
b. All traveling expenses (except President’s Travel) entered under 
“Employees Traveling Expenses” (an Overhead Expense)
Commentary on Industrial Heating Equipment
Company, Inc.
The next day, Mr. Brooks called Mr. Park into his office to discuss 
a specific approach to the problem which the officers of HeatCo had 
posed. It was obvious that the investigation would have to go beyond 
the costs of each segment of the service operation, because costs were 
only half the picture. While the company’s income statement did 
break out service revenue by department, Mr. Brooks wondered 
whether this revenue was correctly determined. It was obvious that 
there was a connection between prices on installation jobs and the 
financial results of the service department (i.e., the losses that Messrs. 
White and Ives suspected). Mr. Brooks agreed with their premise
119
that if there were losses a review of pricing was appropriate, but he 
suspected that further analysis was needed. Mr. Brooks also recog­
nized that under the present cost accounting system and contract 
pricing methods, while it seemed that the profits from at least some of 
the contract installation jobs were being completely wiped out by 
losses incurred by performing the warranty service, it was probably 
necessary to be more specific in the determination and reporting of 
these “losses.” For example, a loss incurred because a warranty allow­
ance was too small to pay for average warranty service requirements 
was not the same as a loss incurred because an installation required 
abnormal and excessive warranty service; and neither of these was the 
same as a loss arising out of inefficiency or waste in the service depart­
ment. Mr. Brooks wondered what criteria were used in establishing 
the so-called profit on a contract installation. He suspected that clari­
fication of this point and the provision of better cost figures would 
assist Messrs. White and Ives in pricing their bids on installation con­
tracts, or would at least give them a better understanding of the effects 
of the many variables built into each bid.
Mr. Brooks and Mr. Park agreed immediately that their approach 
to the HeatCo problem should have these basic goals:
1. Determine both the direct and the total costs* of operating the 
panel work, billable service and warranty service portions of the serv­
ice department, or of the department as a whole.
2. Determine the income provided by billable service and the por­
tion of the warranty cost allowance included in previous contract 
installations which should be considered to offset the warranty service 
costs for the period under consideration.
3. Develop a system which would allow HeatCo to monitor both 
income and costs in the future.
With these goals in mind the two men proceeded to discuss first 
the data which were needed in order to determine the costs of oper­
ating the service department. They realized that some of the needed 
information was necessarily already being collected by HeatCo’s book­
keeper and merely had to be segregated from installation contract 
costs. Other needed data might not be flowing into the accounting
* Total costs would include both direct costs and appropriate allocations 
of HeatCo’s administrative expenses.
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system at present, and systems would have to be developed to provide 
these. They proceeded to list the information which would be needed, 
and the probable means of obtaining it.
1. Service Department Payroll—can be easily broken out from total 
labor costs by establishing a separate account for servicemen’s salaries.
2. Separation of warranty labor from billable service labor and 
panel work in order to allocate properly the labor cost between these 
areas. This information would have to be provided by the service 
department, through time cards to be kept by the servicemen or 
through Assignment Records to be kept by the service supervisor, 
Mr. Fisher. (The two men speculated that some records of this type 
must now be kept by someone in order that the amount which was to 
be invoiced for billable service work could be determined. Mr. Park 
made a note to check into this on his next visit to HeatCo.)
3. Value of parts used for warranty service work and those used for 
billable service and panel work. Again, records must have been kept 
previously for billable parts in order to invoice customers. This in­
formation should be easy to have recorded and kept if this is not 
already done.
4. Travel expenses for servicemen. This information should be 
readily available from servicemen’s travel and expense reports.
5. Administrative, occupancy, and other indirect expenses properly 
allocable to the service operation. The information needed for this 
allocation would have to be developed by Mr. Park in future visits to 
HeatCo. The amount of the various overhead items to be allocated 
to Service would have to be decided on the most logical basis after 
each overhead expense was examined for its contribution to the Service 
operation.
6. Breakdown of billable service income into parts charges, travel 
charges, and labor charges. This should be available from invoice 
worksheets if not broken down on the invoices themselves.
7. Amounts included in contract bids to cover future warranty 
work. Should be available from bid worksheets.
At the conclusion of this discussion, Mr. Brooks asked Mr. Park to 
visit HeatCo again, investigate the availability of the data outlined 
above, and based on what he found, recommend how the HeatCo
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accounting system might be modified to generate service-cost data on 
a continuing basis.
Park’s Investigation
Mr. Park spent most of the next week at the HeatCo plant, and 
spent the greater part of his time working with Mrs. Sampson. From 
her he learned that much of the needed information listed on the 
outline he had drawn up with Mr. Brooks was available in raw form 
from the company’s basic records; when it came to be recorded in 
the books, it was not kept separate, however, which was why Mr. 
White had claimed that he could not get departmental costs. All that 
would be required, therefore, to make it available was to refine the 
chart of accounts. The formal monthly reports, if redesigned, would 
then automatically provide the breakdown the HeatCo executives 
needed. The only facts on Mr. Park’s list which Mrs. Sampson could 
not provide were the breakdown of service hours between billable, 
panel, and warranty work, although total Service Department payroll 
was easily taken from the payroll book.
Parts used and travel expenses incurred were reported to Mrs. 
Sampson for each customer call by the servicemen. Mrs. Sampson 
maintained a perpetual parts inventory record, based on material 
usage cards which were made out by all men drawing parts and which 
indicated the job for which the material or parts were being drawn. 
Travel and expense reports indicated which customers were visited as 
part of the information required. Similarly, special parts purchase 
order requests gave the name of the intended customer. As a matter 
of routine, Mrs. Sampson had been keeping a record of parts used and 
expenses incurred for each service customer, both billable and war­
ranty. She told Mr. Park that she had thought these records might 
be useful at some later time but that no one had ever asked to see 
them as yet.
Mrs. Sampson kept a list of all warranty customers, including the 
warranty dates. She stated that she billed for all service to customers 
not on the warranty list except when Mr. Ives told her not to do so. 
She reported that from time to time he would tell her not to charge a 
customer for certain service work—this was usually either for rela­
tively minor work on a large installation, or for a major installation 
customer, or on an installation where the warranty had barely run out. 
Mrs. Sampson stated that Mr. Ives kept track of all service requests.
Mrs. Sampson showed Mr. Park the price list which she used to 
invoice service customers. It listed a rate per hour for labor, a standard 
mark-up to be used on all parts, and a rate per mile for all travel in­
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curred by servicemen. The information concerning labor came from 
Mr. Fisher who told her how many hours were spent on each “billable 
service” job when it was completed. She said that when she invoiced 
a service customer, she listed each of these items separately. Mr. Ives 
had given her these prices several years previously.
Mr. Park also talked with Mr. Fisher, the service supervisor. Mr. 
Park learned that he was compiling, on a regular basis, the last piece 
of information needed for a determination of service costs. In a pocket 
notebook, Mr. Fisher maintained a record of the time spent by each 
of his servicemen. He explained that this diary was used to plan the 
work of his men, to keep track of their work for pay purposes, and to 
maintain the records necessary to provide Mrs. Sampson with the labor 
hours spent on service to billable customers. Mr. Fisher stated that 
he met regularly with Mrs. Sampson to tell her of the hours spent by 
his men performing service work for each customer and that she kept 
him informed as to whether they were warranty, free service, or bill- 
able customers. Mr. Fisher showed this diary to Mr. Park, and the 
latter noted that it was detailed enough to provide the information 
required for his present assignment. With Mr. Fisher’s assistance, he 
made a summary of these data for the 1960-61 fiscal year. (See 
Exhibit 4, page 124.)
At this stage Mr. Park felt that it would be a relatively simple matter 
to set up procedures to segregate direct costs for the service depart­
ment. He drafted the following notes for eventual inclusion in 
HeatCo’s accounting procedures.
Accounting Procedures for Direct Costs
1. Present account numbers will be maintained. However, suffixes 
will be used to indicate departmental allocation, as follows:
.1 —Contract Installation 
.2 —Service Department 
.21—Warranty 
.22—Free Service 
.23—Billable
.24—Panel Work
2. Direct expenses will be accumulated by customer from source 
data. All source data presently include customer identification. “Cus­
tomers” will include work done on contract installation and panel work 
(each being regarded as a customer with that name). These “cus­
tomer” records are quite separate from accounts receivable records.
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3. Periodically when customers are billed, “customer-direct-ex­
pense” records will be summarized and the expense totals debited to 
the departmental classification of each functional account, according 
to the status of each “customer” from time to time, i.e., warranty serv­
ice, free service, or billable service. Intracompany cost transfers for 
panel work and installation work will be recognized at the same time. 
These customer direct expense records will of course contain all the 
information needed to complete actual billings.
4. Specific procedures for each expense type follow.
(a) Payroll: Mr. Fisher, the service supervisor, should formalize 
and combine his current practice of keeping time records and notify­
ing Mrs. Sampson of hours spent on each customer. This will be 
accomplished by his preparing a weekly report listing customers 
vertically and employees horizontally, and accounting for all hours 
spent. “Customers” will include installation and panel work. There 
will be a subtotal in the vertical listing, beneath which will appear 
headings for “office work,” “vacation,” “other (specified),” and “not 
accounted for.” This report will be used as the basis for allocating 
payroll cost by employee, including as expense accounts the four 
non-customer accounts previously noted.
(b) Parts: Material usage cards and special purchase orders all 
contain customer identifications, and can be used to post to the 
customer records. A periodic summary of material usage cards will 
be used to obtain a total credit to material and parts inventory.
(c) Travel and expense reports all contain customer identifica­
tion, and can be used to post to the customer records. Postings 
should include actual expenses incurred (reimbursed) and the total 
mileage per customer, on which the charge to the customer is based. 
The expense posting is for memorandum purposes only, since ex­
penses are not billed to customers for actual reimbursement. How­
ever, an allocation of reimbursed expenses is needed by department, 
hence this item’s inclusion within this procedure.
Mr. Park noted that most of the procedures he had written out were 
simply formalization of work already being done by either Mr. Fisher 
or Mrs. Sampson, and were only “new” in that they involved proper 
coordination and systematic recording.
Mr. Park next turned to a consideration of overhead expenses (ex­
penses other than direct expenses). Reviewing the chart of accounts 
with Mrs. Sampson, he compiled a guide to be used for allocation 
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purposes, based on what Mrs. Sampson told him about each type of 
expense. Before submitting it to Mr. Brooks he discussed it with Mr. 
Ives and made one or two minor changes at his suggestion. The 
schedule showing allocations is shown in Exhibit 5 on pages 126-127. 
In making this schedule Mr. Park did not attempt to subdivide Service 
Department overhead into the four sub-classifications used for direct 
expenses. He felt that no empirical basis existed for making such an 
allocation since the expenses were incurred for the benefit of the 
department as a whole. While some basis for allocation could certainly 
be found, he did not feel that this would serve any useful purpose.
Mr. Park’s final inquiries concerned the recognition of revenue. He 
found that the notes he had previously made on Accounting Pro­
cedures in Use (Exhibit 3, page 119) amounted to a complete de­
scription. The total price of completed contracts was taken into in­
come as contract sales. Service and Repair and Parts revenue were the 
totals billed to customers (service and repair also including mileage 
charges for travel). Commissions and Miscellaneous were self-explana­
tory. Mr. Park also found that, only minimal additional work would be 
required to set up additional allocation columns in the Sales Book to 
record the makeup of each invoice. He noted the following as the 
breakdown that should be recorded:
Contract Sales: Installation revenue
Warranty allowance
Service and Repair: Labor charges 
Travel charges
Parts
Commissions
Miscellaneous
no breakdown necessary.
Review with Mr. Brooks
The day after he had completed the investigation described above, 
Mr. Park met with Mr. Brooks to report on what he had found out 
and to present his notes on suggested procedures and allocations.
Mr. Brooks was quite satisfied with what Mr. Park had done. He 
pointed out, however, that the work completed to date was strictly 
of a theoretical nature. This was appropriate, because it was obvious 
that before costs and revenues could be separated, procedures had to 
be determined for that purpose. The next step, he said, was to test 
the procedures and at the same time complete the next portion of the
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assignment. He asked Mr. Park if he felt that it would be feasible for 
him to prepare a post facto analysis on the company’s transactions 
since November 1, 1961 (the start of its current fiscal year). The idea 
would be to produce figures for the months of November and Decem­
ber, for which records would be complete, and for January, where he 
would work with partly complete data and partly current data. Mr. 
Park pointed out that by the time he could get started back at HeatCo, 
January would be about two-thirds over, and suggested that his as­
signment include February on a current basis as well. Mr. Brooks 
accepted the suggestion but said that since Mr. Park’s results would 
only be completed in six weeks time, he felt he should make an interim 
report to Messrs. White and Ives. Within a week Mr. Brooks had con­
tacted Mr. White and had visited at HeatCo’s offices with him and 
Mr. Ives. The visit was short, with Brooks reporting that his assistant 
had developed procedures for separating costs and revenues, and pro­
posed to test his procedures by preparing four-month income state­
ments through February 28. Ives remarked that this period would 
show less than proportionate revenue, particularly for installations, 
but agreed that the experiment would be worthwhile because it would 
give HeatCo the historical data needed to place the whole of the 1962 
fiscal year’s results on a consistent basis, assuming that Fuller & Co.’s 
recommendations were accepted for future reporting.
Park’s Analysis of November 1961-February 1962
As Park began his analysis of the period commencing November 
1, he realized that the question of warranty service income would be 
troublesome. Since very few installations had been made after 
November 1, there was very little revenue entered under the “war­
ranty allowance” column he had set up in the Sales Book. On the other 
hand, his first attempt to analyze payroll costs indicated that warranty 
service work was continuing at the normal level. As he thought about 
it, it became obvious to him that recognizing warranty service income 
on a completed contract basis was illogical. The warranty allowance 
on a contract was intended to cover warranty service over the period 
of the warranty, usually six months from date of installation. Taking 
full allowance into income could only be defended if the dollar value 
of warranty allowances each month was approximately constant, and 
then only if proper deferrals were calculated at appropriate intervals. 
Park discussed this with Mr. Brooks and Mr. James, and the latter 
informed him that, in the past, warranty allowances had been ap­
129
proximately constant on an annual basis, and had been taken into in­
come each year as accrued on completed contracts; however, at Fuller 
& Co.’s insistence, HeatCo had set up a $10,000 reserve for Warranty 
Service some years previously in order to defer the “unearned” portion 
of the allowances on current warranties. This reserve had never been 
changed, because each year since its creation (as well as in the first 
year) Mr. White had insisted that $10,000 was more than adequate 
as a deferral. There had never been any attempt to verify the ade­
quacy of the reserve because of Mr. White’s insistence that it was 
adequate and his disinclination to make annual changes in it.
Messrs. Brooks and Park agreed that warranty allowances (that is, 
the expected cost of warranty service) ought to be prorated over the 
period of each warranty, and so Mr. Park made a schedule showing all 
warranties current at 10/31/61 and all allowances on completed con­
tracts since that date. The amount of the allowance was spread out 
over the appropriate number of months. This required close to 30 
allocation columns, and obviously would require an additional column 
each month. Mr. Park therefore devised a series of worksheets that 
provided 12 monthly columns to a page, and used a column reference 
list on which was stated the contract number, date of completion, and 
total warranty allowance. The monthly allowance was first entered 
in the month the warranty commenced, and was continued hori­
zontally to the right and over onto the same line on succeeding pages 
until the last month was reached. Although it took Mr. Park a few 
hours to set up the worksheets, he found that keeping them up to 
date and totalling the warranty for each month were both speedy 
operations. When Mr. Park totalled the extensions for warranties in 
force as of 10/31/61, he found that the unexpired dollar value was 
$9,842. This meant that the reserve was $158 in excess on that date; 
this amount properly belonged in equity, after adjusting for income 
tax. Mr. Park summarized his calculations on warranty income for 
the 4-month period as follows:
11/61 12/61 1/62 2/62
Unearned income,
beginning of month $9,842 $9,667 $9,578 $9,416
Add-warranty allowances on
completed contracts 840 920 798 748
Less-earned income for month (1,015) (1,009) (960) (941)
Unearned income, end of month $9,667 $9,578 $9,416 $9,223
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The total warranty allowance income for the 4 months as shown 
above was $3,925. This was almost 20 per cent more than the $3,306 
total of allowances on contracts completed during that period.
By the end of January Mr. Park had completed his analysis of 
November and December, and was finding it no problem to keep 
current with January, which he finished during the first week of 
February. During February he called regularly at HeatCo for about 
half a day twice a week, which was sufficient time for him to keep 
his work current. By March 3, therefore, he had completed the in­
come statement for the 4 months to February 28. The latter is shown 
in Exhibit 6 (page 137), with supporting detail in Exhibit 7 (page 138).
Reviewing the four-month statement it seemed to Mr. Park that a 
closer look at two apparent loss areas in the Service Department 
would be worth while. These were “time unaccounted for” and “travel 
expenses.” He spent approximately a day in investigating these items. 
His conclusions are contained in his draft report, which follows below.
Report to HeatCo
After completing the four-month income statement and subsequent 
additional investigation, Mr. Park drafted the following report to 
HeatCo for Mr. Brooks’ approval.
(Fuller & Co. letterhead)
March 00, 1962
Mr. Joseph White, President
Industrial Heating Equipment Co., Inc.
Cleveland, Ohio
Dear Mr. White:
We have completed the study of revenues and costs in your 
Service Department which we were engaged to carry out in 
January. This report will summarize the work we performed, and 
our findings. We would be happy to discuss these with you at 
your convenience. Furthermore, our Mr. Park is ready to install 
the proposed new system at once, if it meets with your approval. 
He will instruct Mrs. Sampson in its operation and be ready to 
assist her, if required, in preparing monthly financial statements.
At the start of the engagement we determined that HeatCo’s 
existing procedures contain all the information required to separate 
the revenue and costs of the different elements of the Service
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Department. As you know, however, the books of account did not 
provide the means of keeping this information separate. We 
therefore have prepared procedures to make this possible. These 
procedures encompass two main steps: (i) provide a sufficiently 
detailed framework of ledger accounts, and (ii) provide a formal­
ized means of collecting the data required in the form required on 
a regular basis. Under (i) within the Service Department we pro­
pose to set up separate ledger sections for warranty service, free 
service, billable service and panel work, each section containing 
accounts that record revenue and expenses for the direct items 
“parts, labor and travel.” We have also investigated HeatCo’s 
overhead expenses. Some of these expenses can fairly be allocated 
between the sales and service department; in some cases, portions 
of the expenses, or complete items, are clearly unallocable in that 
they represent the cost of administering the company as a whole. 
It is not possible to allocate overhead expenses to subdivisions 
of the Service Department. Under (ii) we have set up procedures 
whereby records that are presently maintained on labor hours, 
materials and parts used, and travel expenses, are used to channel 
expense data in the required detail to the new ledger accounts. 
In addition, we propose that the detail on customer invoices be 
shown in the Sales Book in columns provided for that purpose, so 
as to provide the required breakdown for revenue items.
The structure and methods briefly described above were next 
used to carry out the other portion of our assignment, namely to 
determine actual revenue and expenses for the Service Depart­
ment. As you know, this exercise was performed for the four 
month period through February 28, of which February was carried 
out on a current basis to test the system as it would be used by 
you. No obstacles were found in the system’s operation, and the 
February figures were complete by March 3. The figures for the 
four months are contained in the appendix to this report (see 
Exhibits 6 and 7). You will observe that the structure of the 
main report, The Income Statement, is such that it clearly indicates 
variable revenue, expense and profit or loss, item by item, within 
each subdivision of the Service Department. (For completeness 
we also included figures for the Sales Department and for Ad­
ministrative Overhead, many of which were actually computed at 
the same time and in the same operation as figures for the Service 
Department.) We have a number of comments on the Income 
Statement.
(1) Sales Department. The item “sales” represents the dollar 
value of completed installations, less the warranty allowance con­
tained in each, which has been dealt with in the Service Depart­
ment (discussed below). No “income” is shown against labor and 
travel expense; the latter are deducted from the so-called gross 
profit, which is sales less cost of goods sold (i.e., less material cost 
of installation).
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(2) Warranty Service. The only revenue item here is shown 
under “labor,” and represents the pro rata warranty allowance 
on all warranties presently in existence. This treatment differs 
from your previous policy of taking warranty allowances into 
contract sales income when contracts were completed, and main­
taining a deferral of $10,000 representing unexpired warranties. 
We computed the actual unexpired warranty value at 10/31/1961 
and found it to be $9,842. This figure was obtained from work­
sheets we set up for proposed future use in allocating warranty 
allowances pro rata over the time periods involved. It is your 
practice in many cases to offer more actual warranty service than 
the cost allowance would indicate. Given that this is a competitive 
necessity, we recommend including the true full prospective war­
ranty cost in warranty service income and showing the difference 
between this full cost and the actual dollar allowance in the bid, 
as an expense (“warranty price concession,” perhaps) in the sales 
department income statement. This would unquestionably provide 
more meaningful financial results than are available at present. 
The warranty service is showing a direct loss at least in part 
because the sales department is underestimating the cost of fulfill­
ing the warranty in preparing its original bid on the contract. 
The service department is not responsible for this loss, although 
in effect it is being charged to them.
(3) Billable Service. It was the suspicion that prices on billable 
service were too low which prompted you to engage us to perform 
this study. However, the Billable Service Income Statement shows 
a substantial contribution to overhead and markups over cost of 
approximately 58% on parts and 19% on labor. This does not 
imply that prices are too low or too high; billable service is the 
major portion of the Service Department, and the department as 
a whole shows a net loss after overhead. Although Billable Service 
shows a profit on travel, there may be hidden losses here; see 
further comments in paragraph 6 below.
(4) Total Service Department. The total service department 
shows a net loss after overhead of $4,828 for the 4 months. Of 
this, perhaps $2,300 (approximately) is accounted for by inade­
quate revenue on warranty service (i.e., this amount was credited 
to the sales department instead of warranty service). This leaves 
a deficit of some $2,500. Reference to the schedule of Overhead 
Expenses [Exhibit 7] will show that the service department is 
charged almost $1,900 for “time unaccounted for” (see paragraph 
5 below). This therefore could be said to be the bulk of the 
$2,500, leaving only $600 unexplained; at least part of this could 
be travel expenses (see paragraph 6 below) or perhaps general 
inefficiency that is impossible to measure without cost standards. 
However, your expectation is undoubtedly that the service depart­
ment should make a profit, so that the shortfall is $600, plus 
whatever minimum profit expectations you have, plus $1,900
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which, while explained, is still a cost. It is conceivable that price 
increases on billable service could make good part or all of this 
loss. This analysis does not and cannot indicate the extent to 
which prices should be raised, but it does indicate the magnitude 
of correction desired.
(5) Time Unaccounted For, and Office Use of Service Labor. 
These items, $1,900 and $2,400, have been charged respectively 
to service overhead and administration overhead. Both represent 
part of the payroll cost of the service department labor force. 
Approximately 20% of the hours worked by the service department 
labor force are devoted to miscellaneous tasks in the office. This 
is the equivalent, more or less, of one full-time employee; in effect, 
the service department is overstaffed by one man and the office 
understaffed by one. We recommend that you consider hiring an 
additional clerk for the office, and discharging one of the five serv­
ice department employees, unless his continued availablity is 
desired as a policy matter.
In addition to this office work, however, approximately 15% 
of the service department’s total hours were not accounted for 
by the department’s time records (Mr. Fisher’s diary). We dis­
cussed this in some depth with Mr. Fisher and the men in the 
service department. Mr. Fisher’s estimates that 80% of the time 
not accounted for (i.e., about $1,500 worth) is travel time. About 
⅔ of this is on billable service work (because the average service 
job is of less magnitude in billable work than in warranty work, 
so that travel time is proportionately higher). Thus billable 
service labor cost should be increased by $1,000 to approximately 
$3,700, by adopting a “portal to portal” billing policy. We recom­
mend that such a policy be adopted.
(6) Travel Charges. Travel expenses are recovered through 
“per mile” charges on billable service (and possibly through allo­
cation of part of the warranty allowance, as suggested in paragraph 
(2) above). In the case of billable service, there appears to be a 
small profit ($1,334 charged, and $998 paid out). This is illusory, 
however. Reference to the schedule of overhead expenses will 
show that a total of $2,400 is allocated to the service department 
for truck operating expenses and depreciation. No means presently 
exists of allocating this among the subdivisions of the service 
department, although records of total service mileage travelled 
are available. (However, some mileage travelled is undertaken 
in employees own automobiles, for which they are reimbursed, and 
some of the truck mileage is for travel not connected with any 
specific job.) Despite these uncertainties, however, the magnitude 
of the figures suggests that HeatCo. is incurring a loss on travel 
mileage. Further study of travel expenses seems to be indicated; 
this subject is referred to again, below.
(7) Panel Work and Free Service. Both of these portions of 
the service department have only actual costs assigned to them.
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These actual costs are then shown (in the Sales Department and 
the Service Department, respectively) as the cost of performing 
these particular functions. Service department reporting might 
be simpler, and more meaningful, if work done under these head­
ings were actually billed at regular or agreed rates. The Sales 
department would then show, as a cost, the full price of panel 
work as if it had been done by an outside contractor (and this 
will help the sales department in deciding whether or not to sub­
contract panel work). In addition, the Service Department will 
show (as an overhead expense) the full cost of free work, while 
showing all work other than warranty work as regular billed work 
on the upper portion of its income statement. It is true that some 
of the cost and income figures will be “inflated” by the nominal 
profit that the (billable) service department charges on internal 
work, but the “inflated” figures do have meaning as a true economic 
representation of costs and revenues. (The same proposition could 
also be applied to warranty service work, but here the concept 
becomes less clear, because the availability of services of the service 
department is an inseparable part of the “product” of the sales 
department. The alternative of subcontracting warranty service, 
while it does exist in theory, is not available in practice, as a matter 
of basic policy. This does not mean that warranty service should 
not be billed internally at full rates, but makes it less meaningful, 
since one of the premises when a bid is made is that $X amount 
[cost] of service will be provided.)
Possibilities for Further Work
As has been pointed out in various places above, the completion 
of this project has indicated a number of instances where further 
study would be of value to you. We would be pleased to make 
a proposal to carry out this work for you. The work we have in 
mind is summarized below, for your convenience.
(a) Determine proportions of warranty allowance applicable 
to parts, labor and travel.
(b ) Set up procedures to recognize full prospective warranty 
cost and treat as an expense the “warranty price concession.”
(c) Determine standard costs for service work; set up pro­
cedures to report against standards and to keep standards 
up to date. (Note: Some standards in any event will have 
to be computed for item (b ), although they can be esti­
mated and be less detailed than full work cost standards.)
(d ) Improve service department timekeeping procedures and 
accounting for time spent.
(e) Investigate incidence of travel expense and determine what 
rates should be charged to recover costs.
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We would like to acknowledge the helpful assistance we received 
at all times from HeatCo’s employees, particularly Mrs. Sampson 
and Mr. Fisher whom we called on repeatedly for information. 
We, of course, take full responsibility for the analysis and con­
clusions herein presented.
Very truly yours,
FULLER & CO. 
by Joseph Brooks
Management Services Department
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Exhibit 7
INDUSTRIAL HEATING EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC. 
Schedule of Departmental Overhead Expenses
For Period Nov. 1, 1961 to Feb. 28, 1962
Sales
Dept.
Service
Dept. Admin.
Salaries and wages—engineers $10,615
Salaries and wages—office $3,843
Salaries and wages—executive 8,000
Salaries and wages—office use of service labor 2,407
Bonuses 2,340 $ 1,116 144
Profit-sharing expense 3,024 2,016 560
Payroll taxes 781 645 271
Employees’ benefits 111 256
Commissions paid
Union insurance and pension fund 125 288
Blue prints and diagrams 68
Contract labor 187
Contract bonds (68)
Customer entertainment and promotion 1,082
Repairs and maintenance—building 38 155 42
Rent 336 1,386 378
Insurance 96 218 6
Life insurance 240
Utilities 55 55 55
Other taxes 54 96 42
Group insurance 94 63
Expendable tools 246
Uniforms 113
Depreciation shop equipment & office furniture 72 336
Advertising 363
Postage and parcel post 239
Stationery and printing 357
Office supplies 233
Telephone and answering service 1,783
Professional fees 771
Dues and subscriptions 28
Donations 300
Truck operating expenses 176 1,579
Depreciation (trucks) 547 821
Depreciation (auto) 624
Miscellaneous expenses 313
Time unaccounted for 1,897
Totals $28,888 $11,022 $12,108
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